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ABSTRACT

NEWS AS A POLITICAL RESOURCE?
A CASE STUDY OF THE MEDIA STRATEGIES AND MEDIA
REPRESENTATION OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN,
1966-1980.

Bernadette Barker-Plummer

Professor Oscar Gandy, Jr.

This dissertation is a case study of the historical
interaction between the New York Times and The National
Organization for Women, 1966-1980. It investigates
whether commercial news media can be used as a political
resource by social movement groups. Using archival and
content analysis methods, the study investigates the
development of media strategies by NOW and then assesses
whether these strategies "succeeded," through an
analysis of NOW's representation in the Times, over a 15
year period. The study found that news was a resource In
some ways. Through resource investments in media work, a
general strategy of reflexive appropriation of news
conventions (media pragmatism), and the creation and
maintenance of relationships with some key women
reporters, NOW was able to produce some routine access
to news over time. Despite some marginalizing coverage
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In the early years, NOW's legitimacy as a source in the
Times increased generally over 1966-1980. However this
"success" had important limitations. NOW's news access
and the legitimacy of its representation shifted
depending on the kind of issue NOW was addressing and on
the context in which the group was being judged. If NOW
talked about more traditionally "public" issues (such as
sex discrimination in employment), it was represented as
a more legitimate source and its stories were more
likely to be placed in the news sections. When the
organization talked about "newer" issues or invoked more
structural frames -- such as child care issues

or

structural "sexism" or patriarchy frames -- these
stories would be placed in lifestyle or "women's page"
sections and in the context of these stories, NOW's
organizational legitimacy was likely to be questioned. I
argue that these and other patterns in the NOW-Times
relationship indicate a general "processing" of NOW's
discourse by the Times through a pUblic-private filter
which worked to contain NOW's public communication and
which makes news a contradictory resource for feminists.
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1
Introduction and Overview

Social movements, especially the "new" social
movements such as the women's, environmental, and peace
movements, have come to be seen as important
transformative agents in modern societies. As one of the
few sources of both critical ideas and effective
mobilization in contemporary societies, the new social
movements (NSMs) have come to center stage as agents of
social change (Habermas, 1981; Touraine, 1985; Giddens,
1987; Boggs, 1986; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991).
In particular, the women's or feminist movement has
been credited with the potential to radically transform
society. Feminism, it is said, has produced fundamental
challenges to traditional or "old" political
distinctions,

(such as that between public and private

concerns), and it has subtly, but radically, extended
what can even legitimately be considered a "political"
issue (Habermas, 1981; Offe, 1985; Van Zoonen, 1994).
However, we have very little information about how
the new movements have (or will) achieve these
transformative goals. How have the new movements
produced new knowledge to challenge existing paradigms?
How have they communicated these challenges? What are
the concrete communication strategies involved in
building and diffusing new political agendas or

identities? In particular, what role(s) do media play In
the mass communication of new social movement
discourses?
As the maJor source of political information for
citizens in modern societies, news media are still one
of the most critical bottlenecks in the distribution of
new knowledge by and about emergent social movements.
Whether (and how) the new movements can strategically
produce access to news media, and what kinds of control
(if any)

they can exercise over the representation of

their issues and identity must be key questions in any
assessment of the transformative potential of the new
movements. 1
This dissertation lS a case study of the
relationship between one new social movement
organization, The National Organization for Women (NOW),
and news media. Through a close historical analysis of
the experlences of NOW in interaction with media,
followed by an analysis of the outcome of NOW's
strategies in news content, the study asks whether
commercial news media can be a resource in the
mobilization and strategic effectivity of new social
movements.
Some critical media observers (cf. Gitlin, 1980)
have dismissed news as a political resource for social
movements, saying that news, because of its commercial
basis and its links to powerful groups in society, will
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always tend to -marginalize- challenging VOlces. This
approach to media-movement relationships

what we

might call a -strong hegemonyll model -- has gained quite
wide acceptance in critical media studies. It is also a
model, despite its tendency to be disempowering, that is
held by many movement activists as well.
But the strong hegemony model of media and social
movements is long overdue for a theoretical overhaul.
The position that news media will inevitably marginalize
-real

ll

criticism and incorporate all other kinds, is at

once too deterministic to accommodate the day-to-day
complexity of media-movement relationships (only two
outcome categories for what is a complex historical
engagement), and also too vague to be particularly
helpful. 2 Perhaps most importantly the strong hegemony
model obscures the reflexivity of movement strategists
and the contradictory nature of news itself -- both of
which, recent studies suggest, may be key to the use of
news as a political resource by strategic movement
sources (Ryan, 1991; Hackett, 1991; Barker-Plummer,
1995, 1996).
In this study I propose a new model for analyzing
media-movement relations -- a dialogic

model. A

dialogic approach to media-movement interactions moves
beyond a deterministic approach and allows us to see the
media-movement relationship as two-way, shifting and
reflexive. It treats news as a discursive resource --
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that is a system of knowledge -- that can be
strategically appropriated by movements, even though
this appropriation may corne with some unintended costs.
A dialogic model sees movement strategists as reflexive
agents, and both movement and media discourses as
socially constructed and essentially overdetermined. A
dialogical interaction may well end in marginalization
for a movement, but in this framework that is an
empirical not a theoretical question. In a dialogical
framework media-movement relations are essentially
indeterminate because the actors involved can learn
about and use the structures that may have previously
constrained their interactions (Giddens, 1984).
Not only does a

dialogical approach to media-

movement relations have more purchase on the empirical
(messy and contradictory) reality of these interactions
than a marginalization model, but it allows us to
construct an ethical model of such relations in which we
allow our subjects to be reflexive agents (not hopeless
objects of media coverage) and in which we can account
for any effects of our own communications about the
process within the theory itself (Krippendorff, 1995,
1996) .
The study is structured In two parts. First it
investigates the development of NOW's media strategies,
asking how NOW leaders understood news as a political
resource, how they managed the organization's
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relationship with news media, and what
work

such symbolic

"cost" the movement -- both materially and

ideologically -- over time.

Second, the study then

analyzes the outcome of the NOW-news interaction In news
content. Through a content analysis of NOW's
representation over time in The New York Times, the
study assesses how well NOW was able to communicate its
discourse "through" news media. The study tracks how
news re-presented NOW's political agenda and its
organizational legitimacy as a speaker for women's
concerns. Overall the study ask what kinds of "success"
NOW experienced in using news as a political resource,
and what such

suc~ess

"cost" the organization.

The study draws on NOW's archived historical
papers,

on an original content analysis of the

representation of NOW in the New York Times, 1966-1980,
and on accounts of early feminist movement mobilizing by
journalists and activists.

Movements and Media:
Mass Communicating New Knowledges

Observers of the new social movements have tended
to assume that the innovative content of new movement
discourses will itself be transformative (cf. Habermas,
1981; Giddens, 1987), but the transformative potential
of social movements is as likely to rest in their
ability to strategically articulate, mass communicate,
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and mobilize people around their ideas, as it lS In
ideas themselves. As Snow (1988) has pointed out,
movements can have no effects at all until they reach
and resonate with audiences, whether these are elite
policy makers, grassroots activists or potential
sympathizers. 3
The importance of mass communication to the new
social movements is especially clear. The goals of the
new movements (such as the environmental, women's and
peace movements) are themselves essentially
communicative. Their alm lS not to overthrow governments
but to produce a revolution in meaning. They seek to
persuade people to change behaviors, values, and
identities through publicizing irrationalities or
inequalities in society and by making available
alternative sources of information for identity
formation (Larana and Johnson, 1994; Touraine, 1985;
Eyerman and Jamison, 1991).
As producers of new knowledge and "framers" of
social reality in new and challenging ways, the NSMs may
be especially important strategic communicators early in
the public opinion and public policy formation process
-- that is In the making of "new" public issues. Fraser
(1990, 1992), for example, has suggested that it is
largely due to the communicative efforts of feminist
groups that such issues as sexual harassment, domestic
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violence, reproductive choice and child care have become
"public"

(and problematic) areas of social life at all.

However, we have no clear idea how these issues
were "created" or communicated by movement groups. How
did feminist groups identify, publicize and "make"
sexual harassment a public issue? What communication and
mass communication strategies did they use and how
successful were these strategies? What role(s) did media
play in this process of publicity?
A critical first step in understanding the
communicative practices and potential of the new
movements may be taken by focusing on their relationship
with news media organizations. Just as other political
actors in modern societies have discovered, movement
strategists realize that news access, and especially
legitimate access or "voice" in the news, is critical to
being heard and taken seriously in the public sphere
(Bonk, 1988; Bobo, Kendall and Max, 1991; Ryan, 1991)
Before they can change society, and public or policy
makers attitudes more generally, movement communicators
have to successfully access and use news media.
News has both distributive and authoritative value
for movements. It can help movements reach mass
audiences they could not otherwise afford to reach
and in doing so movements may be able to influence
decision making on their issues. But access to news
brings more than just visibility for sources. News
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access --

especially routine and legitimate VOlce in

the news -- is also associated with credibility and
authority in American politics. Ericson et al.

(1989)

have suggested in fact that routine access to news in
modern complex societies, where struggles over public
policy and cultural practices often take place through
news media, is a form of symbolic or cultural capital
that lS critically tied to other forms of social power.
As for-profit,

capitalist organizations, interested

in audience maximization and in serving advertising
clients, news media are unlikely to be straightforward
or easy targets for movement communications. In fact
most of the routine tendencies of capitalist news media
are indeed likely to work against the serlOUS
representation of movements. From the political
positions of their owners, to the day-to-day collection
of the "information subsidies" produced by state and
corporate organizations, media routines, ideologies and
practices are not predisposed towards the sympathetic
diffusion of movement discourses. And as low resourced
sources, usual outside the already-constituted "beats"
that reflect institutional power, movement organizations
are also likely to find it difficult to make themselves
newsworthy.
However, news lS more than simply a rationalized
information product. It is also a complex, historically
developed and professionally produced discourse or form
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of knowledge (Van Dijk, 1988; Hartley, 1982; Altheide
and Snow, 1979). As such, news may attain some relative
autonomy from its economic base for a variety of reasons
-- not least of which is the fact that its legitimacy as
a form of knowledge for its practitioners and consumers
depends at least on the appearance of such autonomy.
In fact, as Hallin (1992) has recently suggested,
news media in the United States need to be understood as
overdetermined institutions that produce contradictory
and overdetermined texts. News organizations are at one
and the same time driven by commercial, cultural and
political forces. Such overdetermination does not
preclude structure in news practices and discourses,
rafher it brings our attention to mUltiple structures.
It challenges our ability to produce simple cause-effect
relationships between forces and their outcomes, but
does not deny that these forces may indeed have some
structuring effects. In the case of news and movement
interaction, the problem becomes one of identifying the
structuring forces for both news and movements that
reproduce and/or challenge hegemonic realities.

A Dialogical/Structurationist Framework

Media-movement interactions are best understood as
historically dialogical relationships. That is, they are
interactive, reflexive and strategic relations which
take place not only between individuals and

9

organizations day-to-day, but also, ultimately, between
discourses (or systems of meaning) which influence each
other historically.
Like other social agents, movement strategists and
media workers are at the same time complex,
knowledgeable and strategic agents, who have some
autonomy to create the relationship In a unlque way, and
also, determined subjects acting out (or at least
constrained by) the underlying "rules" and resources of
their respective organizations' practices and discourses
(Giddens, 1984). That is, movement strategists and media
workers actively draw on their respective discourses but
they are also produced by them. For example,

journalists

inceracting with the feminist movement may, even as they
seek to understand feminism on its own terms, bring to
the interaction categories of analysis (such as the
public/private divide of liberal politics) that
constrains their ability to "see" the movement. This
kind of constraint affects what they consider to be
"real" news as much as any consciously learned criteria
of "newsworthiness." But while they may draw reflexively
on one set of constraints (i.e. be aware of and try to
stretch the definitions of "newsworthiness" that they
know), they are reproducing another at the same time.
To add to this complexity, both sets of agents are
reflexive

about their own and each others' discourses.

That is, both media workers and feminists are able to
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infer patterns and conventions (the rules) about their
own and each others discourse, and to encode their
communications within that framework in order to better
work with or manipulate the other. 4 Giddens

(1984) has

called this kind of human activity llreflexive
appropriation ll of the rules of human actions and
interactions, and he has suggested that it is exactly
this kind of recognition and reflexive appropriation
that complicates, and challenges, any deterministic
model of social change.
In the case of feminism and news, then, not only
are two discrete systems of meaning interacting
historically (one processing the other in systematic
ways), but the agents of each discourse may
strategically learn and employ the llrules ll of their own
or each others' practice in the interaction. This kind
of llreflexive appropriation of the rules ll is most
apparent,

for example, in the centrality that some

movement strategists attribute to learning about and
using the llrules ll of news

(e.g. event-oriented,

personality centered, individualistic, narratives)

for

their own purposes. But it is also the case that news
itself has been changed as feminist journalists bring to
it new categories of experience (such as sexual
harassment or the category called llwomen's issues ll ) and
change that discourse too.

11

Seeing the media-movement relationship as
dialogical does not preclude that it is an imbalanced
interaction. It is likely that movements continue to
"need" media more than media "need" movements. Neither
does a dialogical relationship preclude that the outcome
of media movement dialogs over time may indeed be
something we might call "marginalization" or
"incorporation." But such a framework does draw our
attention to the likely complexity of such a process.
For example, in a dialogical model,

"incorporation" may

be seen as the processing of one discourse
systematically through the lens of another In ways that
strip the original of key elements. But this processing
may not always be the result of news categories being
imposed, but (as is the case In this study)it can be the
outcome of movement groups themselves using media
conventions to package their ideas.
These multiple, reflexive interactions
individual, organizational and historical-discursive
make the

media-movement relationship extremely complex

and overdetermined. But such a model is likely to have
more purchase on reality than more reductionist
either/or frameworks. When we see movements and media
engaged in dialogical struggle, instead of inquiring how
a movement is "covered" by news, we ask:

How do

movement strategists and journalists interact? How have
movement organizations understood news as a resource and
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how have they experienced its constraints, both in terms
of the Ycost" of accessing news and in constraining
their identity formation? What strategies have they
developed to control their interactions with news media
and how have those strategies fared in interaction with
news media routines and processes? In short, what has
worked and what hasn't?
As such a dialogical understanding may produce
critical or strategic knowledge -- knowledge that may be
used to produce change.

What Structures Dialogic Relations?
Resources, Strategies and Ideology

In a dialogic framework,

then, we expect the media-

movement relationship to be two-way, reflexive and
strategic, and the outcome of news-source interactions
to be overdetermined. But it is still a critical
question as to what factors delimit or enhance these
interactions from the point of view of a movement
organization. Giddens (1984) has noted that social power
is implicated, and reproduced,

ln all interactions, but

we still need to ask what aspects of interactions make
them less or more likely to reproduce structures in
hegemonic (i.e. as they were before) or challenging
ways?
In the context of media-movement relations, this
means that we are still left with questions about what
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is likely to structure that relationship in ways that
are useful for movement groups. For example, what
resources or practices of movement groups are associated
with successful interactions? And, what is "success" in
this framework anyway?
In this study I identify and investigate three
general factors that have a significant impact on the
outcomes of media-movement relations: the role of
resources (such as money, skills, competencies,
organization and so on) in structuring the interaction
for a movement organization, the role of reflexive
strategies (for example, developing and using news
conventions), and the role of ideology and identity
factors,

in NOW's ability to access and control its

interactions with news.
I draw these three general structuring forces from
a synthesis of three different but overlapping
approaches to understanding news -- the political
economlC, sociological and ideological/hegemonic studies
of news and its sources. First,

from the political

economic literature (cf. Gandy, 1982, 1989) I draw
questions about the resources needed to access media. I
argue that resources are fundamental to any successful
interaction and in this study I investigate NOW's
mobilization of resources generally, and try to
determine what kinds of resources were most useful In
producing successful dialogic relations with media. I
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trace NOW's mobilization of members, staff and
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communicative competence over time and analyze how such
resources were associated with media access.
From the sociological news literatures I draw
questions about media access strategies. These studies
(cf. Tuchman, 1980; Gans, 1980; Fishman, 1980) have
emphasized the centrality of media routines and
practices to understanding news. In source studies, such
as this one, then, strategies that try to use and/or
subvert these routines

are likely to be important. In

this study, I investigate NOW's development of media
strategies across time, describing the group's shifting
understanding of media and the concrete practices and
strategies the organization developed to use access news
and to control its representation within news content.
In particular, I am concerned with investigating the
practices and outcomes of what Giddens (1984) has called
ureflexive strategizing U in which agents learn about and
try to use the urulesu of systems and discourses which
would previously have constrained them (in this case the
urules u of news,

such as news conventions, routines and

practices. )
Finally, from the critical ideological approach to
news media (cf. Gitlin, 1980; Goldman and Rajagopal,
1991), I draw questions about the structuring properties
of a group's ideology or identity. In this framework,
lS

it

the content of movements -- i.e. their ideas -- that

is seen to structure the media-movement relationship
rather than the groups' resources or media strategies.
Movements llsuccess ll

(or usually failure)

in this

framework is seen to be more a result of what they are
than what they do.
This Vlew of a movement group's ideology/identity
is very problematic however, because it tends to see
identity as something pre-structured and independent of
media relations. But a movement's identity is not a
stable object. It is a construction that is constantly
being reconstructed over time. In fact a movement's
public identity (how it is perceived by most people
including people who are part of the group or who may
then join the group)

is the result of interaction with

media, not a precursor to it (van Zoonen, 1992).5
Still, it is important that we try to discover how
a movement's identity at different times, and its
interpretation by journalists, may influence its
relationship to media. So in this study I compare some
elements of NOW's llinternal" identity with its media representation (which I am calling its public identity).
For example, I ask what was NOW's llagenda" at different
points and how was this re-presented by news. And, how
was NOW's self-image as a spokesperson for all women represented by the Times.
I draw my construction of NOW's llinternal" identity
from its own records and documents and then compare this
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construction to the Times construction of NOW. This is
not a perfect solution --

neither of these identities

are "authentic." Both are likely to be the result of
strategic communication which will shift over time. But
by comparing the representation of NOW in the records
(internal newsletters, policy statements, minutes, etc.)
over which its leaders at least had some control, with
re-presentations of NOW's identity in news media, we may
be able to map some patterns in the "processing" of NOW
that may give us some leverage on the question of what
role(s) NOW's varylng (and strategically produced)
identity played in its media relations.
These three traditions in news studies -- the
political economic, sociological and ideological -- have
often been set up in opposition to one another, each
being presented at different times as "the " answer to
the question of what determines news content. However, I
argue here that news as a professional, commercial and
cultural institution reflects the influences of all of
these factors

(Hallin, 1994). In a

dialogic/structuration approach, the question becomes,
not which one factor determines the outcome of any news
interaction, but how and in what contexts do all of
these factors interact and/or overlap to produce a
complex outcome. Only empirical investigations that
include all these factors for analysis can in fact sort
out the overlapping roles of these determinants. 6
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What Constitutes Success?
Assessing Outcomes in a Dialogical Framework

It is difficult to assess the roles of these three
factors, however, until we also have a working
definition of success. In a general sense we can define
success In this study as the relative ability of
movements to use the rules of news as resources rather
than constraints, but still, what outcomes would
constitute successful strategic appropriation of news?
How would we know if a movement has succeeded in
reflexively appropriating news conventions? What are
some measurements of communicative success? What
constitutes a successful reflexive media strategy?
For example, what would constitute a successful
interaction of NOW with the Times? Is it simply the case
that being talked about is enough? As Ericson et al.
(1989) have suggested there is a vast difference for
sources In being covered

by news (i.e. being talked

about) and having routine news voice

which they

associate with a form of cultural capital in modern
media saturated societies. What kind of treatment by
news constitutes reasonable representations? Should NOW
be represented in the same way that it would represent
itself? And what should that representation cost the
movement organization? Is access successful if it takes
all of an organization's time and resources?

For the most part, source studies have avoided this
question. Gitlin (1980),

for example, in his important

study of media and movements does not explicitly state
what kind of representation of SDS would have been a
llgood ll

outcome for the group.

Other news studies have

(implicitly at least) equated success for sources with
simply being mentioned or being quoted in news accounts
(cf. Sigal, 1973; Gans, 1980; Barker-Plummer, 1989,
etc.), though the relationship between being cited and
controlling the representation of an issue is surely
quite problematic.
More nuanced accounts of media content have
suggested that source success can be seen in processes
of- -definitional authority-

(cf. Hall, 1978) in which

powerful sources define issues first and then others
have to respond. But even these concepts have their
problems. As Schlesinger (1990) notes, for example, the
text-based (or -media-centric") idea of definitional
authority suggested by Hall et al.

(1978) may not be

particularly helpful in assessing source success because
it does not trace the process through which such
authority is produced, but rather infers it from the
already powerful social locations that these sources
hold outside of media discourse. 7
Indeed the difficulty of defining success within a
dialogical or constructivist framework has led some
researchers to abandon it as an overly -instrumental"
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concept that has no place in a constructivist/dialogical
framework of media in society (cf.

Van Zoonen, 1992).

But even in a dialogical framework we still need some
indicators or assessments of whether what movements are
doing is having useful outcomes, both for their own
sake, and for the sake of developing useful models of
media-movement interactions.
In this study I use a four tiered system of
assessment of NOW's success: access, voice, placement
and control. Access lS simply a question of visibility.
Voice

refers to NOW's ability to be quoted

l.e.

being allowed to speak. Placement refers to the context
of NOW's stories and the associated value of different
news sections. Control refers to NOW's ability to
maintain control of its organizational agenda and
identity In its media representation. The measurement of
control here is essentially comparative -- it attempts
to gauge how much of NOW's own issue choice and framing
came through into news content. It is assessed by
comparing NOW's agendas and identity strategies with
their media representation at key points.
These dimensions of success are analytically
separable, and can, to some extent be understood,
hierarchically. We can say for example that access is
basic to all other levels, that voice is an additional
level of successful interaction, and that legitimate
representation or control of one's identity makes a
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voice more credible and more likely to be listened to.
Control, over one's identity and one's agenda, is In
this framework the ultimate Hsuccess H of strategic
interaction. In reality of course, anyone story might
have overlapping and contradictory elements of all of
these, and my alm lS not to put these forward as
definitive a-priori categories of success, but simply to
use them to organize a discussion in which it will
become clear that they are exploratory and inter-related
concepts.

Design of the Study

Understanding and assesslng a dialogical
relationship over time requires a willingness to move
back and forth between perspectives and methods. In this
study I draw on various sources of information (archival
papers, historical accounts, news content) and use
different types of analyses (historical, case study and
content analysis)

to deal with different aspects of

these questions. Archival sources (such as NOW's
historical archive at Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe and
the Women and Media Archive at the University of
Missouri) were invaluable resources in reconstructing
NOW's media resource investments and media strategies.
Secondary sources such as accounts and histories of the
early movement (and its relationship to the press) by
activists made it possible to expand the analysis of
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movement media strategies beyond NOW and indeed to
compare NOW's strategies with other movement groups.
Memoirs and articles by journalists about covering the
early movement were critical to understanding how the
interaction was experienced from the news workers
perspective. Finally, the study draws on an original
content analysis of 377 stories about NOW in the New
York Times in order to track the outcome of the
interaction over time in at least one outlet.

NOW as a Case Study Organization:
A Note on Generalizability

Both NOW and the New York Times are key
organizations in their respective sectors. NOW

lS

arguably the most important organization in the second
wave US women's movement. Though it has been seen as too
IIliberal

ll

by some groups and too II ra dical" by others,

there is widespread agreement in the US women's movement
that NOW played a central role as the public voice of
feminism for many years, and that even now, with the
number of women's issue groups mushrooming, it is
perceived as a central movement organization. As a
recent history of the movement notes,

"The fact is that

if the National Organization for Women were to collapse
and disappear, it would be taken as a signal of the end
of this era of feminism,

" (Carabillo, 1993, p. viii).
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The New York Times also plays a central role in
American political life where it is often presented (and
accepted by professional journalists throughout the
country) as the pre-eminent journal of record in the
American media sector. The Times coverage of new
movements and ideas is often the harbinger and active
trend-setter for other mainstream media.
These two organizations are important In and of
themselves, then, and their interaction may have some
historical significance beyond any issues of
generalizability. But of course, the investment of time
and energy in a case study is usually made in the hope
that inferences can be made from the experience of one
organization to others, or that we can at least derive
questions from this interaction that will be useful in
addressing the experiences of other organizations.
From the perspective of generalizability, NOW

lS

both a typical and an atypical movement organization.
Like all movement organizations,

NOW is staffed mostly

by volunteers and by (badly) paid staff activists who
work there for political rather than career reasons. It
has multiple political goals at anyone time and works
on mUltiple fronts

(such as legislative, educational and

media). It is funded mostly by membership fees and often
stretches its resources and staff to their limits -working continuously in what one observer calls ·crisis
mode.· Like other advocacy or movement organizations NOW
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1S

often in the position of responding to, rather than

initiating public issues and events, and compared to its
perceived opponents in the political arena (such as the
Pentagon or right wing research institutes) the
organization is chronically under-financed. As such,
then, NOW can be compared to many other under-financed
and overburdened movement or advocacy organizations.
However, NOW is also untypical of other movement
organizations in that it was, at least in the early
years, perhaps better organized, more ·professionally·
managed and more focused on developing media as a
resource than many other women's movement organizations.
Many of its original members (as

I

describe more fully

in'chapter five) were already in communication related
positions or had some contacts with the press in
previous professional positions, so that the
organization's early access to news media may not be
typical of some other groups, Also, NOW was, and is, a
predominantly middle class organization led by women who
possessed high degrees of organizational skills and
competence.

These aspects may make NOW atypical. Many

movement organizations are likely to be less media savvy
and less able to calIon such resources.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to choose NOW as
a case study organization for understanding and
assessing the possibilities of using news as a movement
resource, though,

is the fact that NOW sees itself, and
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is positioned by others In the movement, as an
essentially strategic and pragmatic organization.
Spanning the boundary between more radical (and
marginalized) organizations and mainstream media and
political organizations, NOW is an organization of selfconsciously "militant pragmatists" whose aim has always
been to both enter and change the system. As such it is
a compelling example of an organization which struggles
constantly with the tensions of incorporation In
relation to news and other political institutions. It is
this self-consciously strategic and boundary spanning
position that makes NOW an excellent organization to
which to address strategic questions about news. For NOW
th~

problem is no longer whether to use the "master's

tools"

(in this case media), but how and at what costs

and in what contexts. Like many other contemporary
social movement organizations, NOW leaders have
developed strategies to work both within and outside of
the dominant institutions.
At the least, we can draw from NOW's experience,
questions about media and communications strategies
which we can then address to other organizations In
other historical contexts. At a time when social
movement studies are moving towards communicative,
constructivist and "consensus-mobilization" models of
social movements and social change (cf. Klandermans,
1988; Melucci, 1989; Gamson, 1989), developing a
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strategic understanding of news media as a symbolic
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resource (or not) in that process, can only enhance our
general understanding of communication and social
movements more generally.8
In the end, though, generalizability may be in the
eye of the beholder, so I have included in the study
(chapter four) a brief political profile of NOW as a
movement organization so that readers can decide for
themselves whether and how far to generalize from NOW's
experiences in interaction with news media.

Chapter Overview:
Chapter Two, Movements, Media and Social Change:
Towards A Dialogical Model places the case study first

within the literature of critical social movement/social
change theory and then within news theories. The chapter
reviews recent work on the communicative or "symbolic
challenge" of the new social movements and argues that a
dialogic understanding of media-movement relations

lS

essential to our understanding of these processes.
Chapter Three, Research Design and Methods,

describes in detail the key research questions of the
study, the data collected and drawn upon, and the
measures and methods of analysis developed to answer
these questions. As both an institutional analysis,
drawing on NOW's historical records, and a content
analysis of media outcomes of that interaction, the

chapter is broken into three parts, first describing the
institutional analysis, then the content analysis and
then the relationship between the two.
Chapter Four, A Brief Political Profile of NOW:
Militant Pragmatists, offers a brief historical profile

of the National Organization for Women, the feminist
organization that is the subject of the case study.

I

outline NOW's historical formation, describe its role in
the US women's movement, and map its political agenda
and identity shifts over time.
Chapter Five, The Structuring Role of Resources:
The Political Economy of NOW's News Access,

focuses on

questions of resources and media access. The chapter
investigates what kinds of resources were important In
producing media access, describes NOW's resource
mobilization practices and relates those resources to
its media access.

I

argue that the resource base of any

organization is going to structure its ability to access
media, and that particular kinds of resource (such as
communicative competence, information, organization and
money) are especially important. The chapter also notes,
however, that there is no straight line between resource
mobilization and media Usuccess U -- rather resources
make it possible to produce media strategies which
produce access, thereby turning material resources into
symbolic power.
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Chapter Six, NOW Media Strategies: The
Possibilities and Constraints of Media Pragmatism,

describes how NOW understood and developed media as a
political "resource."

The chapter describes how NOW

developed media kits, appropriated news conventions into
their own communications, and built relationships with
key women journalists.

This strategic approach to news

was not always shared by other women's movement groups
and in this chapter I also briefly describes the media
strategies of other movement groups to contextualize
NOW's media strategies within the women's movement as a
whole. The chapter also draws on accounts of covering
the movement produced by women journalists, and
illustrates the dialogic relationship between news and
feminism as it was manifested in the concrete
relationships between feminists and journalists, who
were both working within constrained organizational
contexts. I argue that NOW's media strategies were an
example of reflexive appropriation of news conventions,
and as such they produced both particular kinds of
success and limitations for the organization.
Chapter Seven, News Outcomes 1: Patterns in Access,
voice and Agenda Control, 1966-1980, describes and

assesses patterns in NOW's news access and discusses the
organization's ability to transfer its issue agendas to
news. Defining "success" in terms of access, VOlce,
placement and control, the chapter analyzes patterns ln
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the Times' processlng of NOW's access and issues. I
argue that NOW achieved some limited success in becoming
llexpertll

sources, but that the Times systematically

processed NOW's feminist agenda through a traditional
liberal public-private framework.
Chapter Eight: News Outcomes 2: Patterns in the
Times' Processing of NOW's Identity, 1966-1980. This

chapter describes patterns in the Times treatment of NOW
in terms of its organizational identity and its
legitimacy as a llspeaker ll for women's issues over time.
I argue that NOW did not undergo either a
straightforward umarginalization" or llincorporation. ll
Rather the organization, partly through its own efforts,
and the efforts of sympathetic journalists (and through
the general legitimating effects of longevity) became
somewhat institutionalized as a source, but that
legitimacy was limited in important ways by the topic of
the stories and the context of NOW's coverage.
Chapter Nine, News as a Political Resource? An
Overdetermined Dialogical Model, summarizes the study's

findings about NOW's interaction with news media. It
discusses the role(s) of resources, strategies and
ideology in NOW's strategic mobilization of news and
publicity as social movement resources, and discusses
the generalizability of NOW's experience with news media
to other social movement groups. Finally, the chapter
discusses what,

if anything, NOW's experience can
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contribute to general news theories. I conclude that
NOW's interaction with media, and the outcome of that
interaction was in fact overdetermined by resource,
strategy and ideological factors on both sides. As such,
deterministic models (such as Gitlin's strong hegemony
model,

for example) are inadequate to explain these kind

of interactions. I suggest that we need to develop an
understanding of these interactions as dialogical
interactions.
NOTES

1Movements do, of course, have access to other forms of
mass communication. Self-published newsletters and
newspapers, as well as electronic communication
possibilities opened up by new computer networks (such
as PeaceNet) may make a significant difference to
movement mobilizing in the future. However, such
chqnnels are currently limited to internal movement
communication -- that is they are written by and
distributed to people already interested in or active in
the movement. If we are to understand a movement's mass
communication possibilities, that is its ability to
influence ideologies, issues and identity formation
processes at the societal level, then access to existing
mass communication channels becomes central because that
is how most people will, initially at least, hear about
movements and their ideas.
2 For example, how will we know "incorporation" when we
see it? The "strong hegemony" model is discussed at more
length in chapter two, but it is worth noting briefly
here that the problem with the concept of
"incorporation" as used by Gitlin (1980), for example,
is that it presented as a self-evident category -- i.e.
as a somehow already known and definable outcome of
interaction -- rather than as a process that needs
empirical description.
3This lack of focus on mobilization and communication
processes is also typical of the older grand theories
that put forward the working class as the central agent
of social change, but did not investigate or elaborate
how such mobilization would work. Ferree and Miller
(1985) call this a classic confusion of a class in
itself with a class for itself.
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4 Journalists and activists may also be members and
strategic users of many other discourses too, but here I
am limiting the discussion to feminism and news.
5 See chapter three for a more thorough discussion of
the problems of identity as a predictor.
6 See chapter three for more discussion of these
factors. See also Barker-Plummer, B. (1993). From Gates
to Dialog: Towards a Communication Model of the NewsSource Relationship. Presented to the Political
Communication Division, International Communication
Association, Washington DC.
7 Hall et al. (1978) attribute the definitional control
of state sources in the news to their social location
outside of the news, but they do not investigate the
process through which this external location is
translated into definitional control, so they cannot say
how or why such "success" comes about.
For example,
what resources, practices, or strategies produced that
definitional authority? Is it possible that other kinds
of sources could also create definitional authority for
themselves if they followed the same strategies? As
Schlesinger (1991) and Miller (1993) have also noted, it
is only through understanding the source strategies, of
even very powerful sources, that we can understand how
news access is related to power, and whether that access
can be extended to more groups in society.
8 For example, studies on the contemporary labor
movement have stressed the emerging importance of a
strategic understanding of communication and media
strategies (cf. Ryan, 1992; Douglas, 1989), and
activists and theorists of the peace movement have come
to see media as a ground for struggle over public
understandings rather than as a force for automatic
exclusion (cf. Hackett, 1991, Bruck, 1992).
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Chapter Two
Movements, Media, and Social Change:
Towards a Dialogical Model

The overdetermined nature of social life and social
research has been well described in recent social
theory, such that the analysis of any social institution
or practice must be seen as part of a larger system of
interconnected patterns in the structuration of
resources, power and agency (Resnick and Wolfe, 1987;
Kellner, 1990; Giddens, 1984). Even so, researchers have
to start somewhere in their attempts to understand
processes of social reproduction and change, and Resnick
and Wolfe (1987) suggest that we deal with this
complexity by choosing an "entry point" that offers
opportunities to analyze how different forces in the
system interact.
The "entry-point" of this study is the complex
relationship between a social movement and news media.
Social movements, especially the "new" social movements
(NSMs) such as the women's, environmental, and peace
movements, have come to be seen as the central
transformative agents in modern societies, and as such
to be critically implicated in processes of social
change (Habermas, 1981; Giddens 1987; Touraine 1985)
News media are also centrally implicated in processes of

social reproduction and change (Hall et al, 1978;
Kellner, 1990, etc.) and form one of the most crucial
bottle-necks in the communication of new knowledges. As
such the media-movement nexus offers a rich entry point
into understanding how new critical discourses emerge,
how they are strategically articulated and mass
communicated by movement organizations, and how they are
processed for mass audiences by news organizations -- In
short it allows us to investigate questions about the
possibilities for social change through communication in
mass mediated societies.

The Symbolic Challenge of the New Social Movements

Social movements, especially the nnew n social
movements (NSMs)

-- such as the women's, peace, and

environmental movements -- have recently corne to the
fore in contemporary politics and in contemporary social
theory as the central agents of social change in modern,
complex societies. In the eyes of many political
observers the new movements have taken the place of the
working class as agents of change (Laclau and Mouffe,
1985; Habermas, 1981; Giddens, 1987; Offe, 1985; etc.)
As Boggs (1986) has described them, the NSMs are the
most important nemerging forms of radicalism in the
west.n
The contemporary emergence of the NSMs has been
explained in a variety of ways, but most of these
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accounts point to the new movements as arising ln
response to a general crisis of legitimacy in modern
political institutions. Habermas (1981),

for example,

sees the new movements as the outcome of larger social
contradictions which he describes as a lllifeworld/system
world overlapll that has produced a general lllegitimation
crisis.ll In this framework the NSMs are involved in
attempts to resist the increasing rationalization and
technicizing of everyday life that is endemic in
contemporary capitalist societies and to encourage
and/or renew participatory democracy. Movements are thus
centrally involved in the reclamation of the llcivic ll
aspects of social life, in attempts to reclaim and
extend the public sphere in resistance to the
encroachments of the state and corporate spheres.
Boggs (1986, p. 223) has also noted the importance
of this civic or democratizing aspect of the new
movements. Though he is less sanguine than Habermas ln
his assessments of the likely success of the NSMs
democratizing efforts, he notes that their potential is
to radically reshape contemporary politics:

Popular movements linked to the demands of antinuclear activists, ecologists, urban communities,
women, minorities and youth, correspond to changing
economic realities, social and cultural forces, and
political constellations that are only beginning to
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r
coalesce and that, In time, promise to reshape
class and social conflict. These new phenomena
amount to an emergent social bloc that would
revitalize civil society against incursions of
the bureaucratic state, commodity production, the
spiraling arms race -- against bourgeois hegemony
in general (p.223).

By all accounts the new movements have challenged
both traditional and critical models of social change
(Touraine, 1985; Giddens, 1987). Part of the difficulty
the NSM's pose comes from their much less tangible
relations to concrete class bases than the Hold H social
movements such as the Labor Movement. Made up mostly of
a particular fraction of the middle class (e.g.
teachers, professionals, social workers,

students,

etc.), the new movements evince no simple relationship
between their goals and their members' material or class
base. In fact as Larana et al.

(1994) have noted the new

movements have a disturbing tendency to Htranscend class
structure. H
The new movements have been linked not to the
moment of production in capitalist relations, as the
labor movement had been, but rather to the moment of
consumption. As Castells (1983, p. 320) has put it,
H[new social movements] do not relate directly to the
relationship of production, but to the relationships of
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consumption, communication and power." This distinction
as Rodriguez (1995, p. 10) notes, is crucial if we are
to understand why the new movements are likely to affect
society symbolically as much as materially:

If social class was a category constructed to
explain conflict over material production, social
movement is a category built to explore conflicts
over the production of symbolic goods and
social meanings.

The primary challenge of the new movements is best
understood, then, as a symbolic challenge -- as a
challenge to how we understand our relationships to each
other and to our physical environments. The "success" of
the NSMs is linked to the production and communication
of new ideas or new identities.
This symbolic focus does not mean that the new
movements are not interested in material issues. A key
goal of the women's movement,

for example, has been and

will be, equitable distribution of wages and job
opportunities across genders. Similarly the
environmental movement's mobilization against
destruction of the natural environment is often based in
a political economic analysis of who benefits from such
destruction and its Bcosts" to us all. But the key point
remains that strategically the new movements for the
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most part have envisioned their goals in communicative
terms -- i.e. as the production of a new "consciousness"
of gender, racial, ecological and other everyday
relations. And they have tried to reach these goals
through persuasion, education and publicity, rather than
through violence, or challenges to production such as
strikes or collective bargaining. l
The NSMs focus on identity and communication
issues, coupled with their tendency to focus on the
"politics of everyday life" -- such as issues of
interpersonal relations, cultural identity and family
relations -- rather than traditional political lssues,
has caused some observers to dismiss them as "extrapolitical" movements which are not important unless, or
until,

they interact critically with state institutions

(Offe, 1985; Eder, 1985). But as Boggs (1986, p. 4)
notes, the challenge of the NSMs is only partially aimed
at traditional political arenas. For the most part the
NSMs are as concerned to reach directly to publics as
they are to persuade policy makers, and it is in this
symbolic work, in which they seek to change general
self-understandings and public knowledge that their
central challenge lies:

... the fact that they [the new social movements]
have nowhere overturned the status quo should not
obscure their historical importance in posing new
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issues, shaping consciousness, and openlng new
areas of political discourse. Indeed, many timehonored debates have already been fundamentally
recast in both substance and tone.

Movements as Mass Communicators, Movements as Media

It is this role as knowledge producers, and
communicators of that new knowledge to other
organizations and publics, that makes the new movements
so central in contemporary explanations of social and
ideological change. The NSMs are both the creators and
the carriers of new knowledges, new identities, and
essentially new ways of seeing and living social
relations (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991; Touraine, 1985;
Habermas, 1981). As Snow et al.

(1988, p. 198) have

described it, the new movements are key players in the
"politics of signification:"

Movements function as carrlers and transmitters of
mobilizing beliefs and ideas ... they are also
actively involved in the production of meaning for
participants, antagonists and observers. Movements
can thus be construed as functioning in part as
signifying agents and, as such, are deeply
embroiled, along with the media and the state, in
what Stuart Hall (1982) has referred to as the
"politics of signification."
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Melucci (1985, p. 797) focuses on this
communicative capacity of the new movements when he
notes that the movements' challenge is essentially a
"symbolic" or "prophetic" challenge because movements
function as important sources of identity in society.
Indeed, besides mass media, the NSMs may be one of the
critical resources in modern societies from which
citizens build identities. These "identity resources"
are produced by social movements as they mobilize, and
it is this knowledge production capacity that makes the
new movements critically important. As Melucci (1985)
notes, this understanding is one that envisions
movements as a kind of media themselves.:

Actors In conflicts are increasingly temporary and
their function is to reveal the stakes, to announce
to society that a fundamental problem exists in a
given area. They have a growing symbolic function;
one can probably speak of a prophetic function.
They are a kind of new media.

This "symbolic " function of the new movements

lS

at the heart of their importance. It is in their
mobilization of information (and consequently meanings
and the possibilities for identity-building and the
redefinition of social relations) that the new movements

produce challenges to the system. Like media they
collect, process and disseminate information from which
individuals can create new identities.

Movements and Strategic Communication
For the most part, knowledge production by the NSMs
lS

quite deliberate and strategic. 2 Indeed it is one of

the distinguishing features of the new movements that
they focus so centrally in their strategizing both on
mobilizing information and on the process of pUblicity
-- of making known publicly what they consider to be
problematic (Fraser, 1992; McLaughlin, 1993). Despite
quite small numbers (relatively speaking) of members for
example, the environmental movement and the feminist
movement have been prodigious producers of information,
studies, new knowledges and new ways of knowing.
The women's movement has been particularly
implicated in this process of making public areas of
social life that had previously been seen as "private"
or at least unproblematic The now publicly accepted -if contested -- political categories such as "sexism,"
"sexual harassment,"

"date rape," and so on, are the

outcome of this process of publicizing that the women's
movement has seen as so important to its success (cf.
Fraser, 1992; McLaughlin, 1993)
It is also a key aspect of the new movements in
fact that they are self-reflexive about their roles in
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problematizing areas of social life and producing new
identities. The US women's movement,

for example, with

its development of "consciousness raising" as a movement
practice has created a practice in which both making
"public" and the creation of new identities are central.
Consciousness raising (CR) allows participants to bring
to discursive consciousness areas of life that were
previously experienced on a practical level, and then to
rebuild identities based on that new recognition. For
example, consciousness raising practices allowed women
to realize the power embedded in traditional family
roles and chores, 1n everyday language forms and modes
of address, and in the commercial representation of
women in popular culture (Koedt et al. 1973; Freeman,
1975) .

At the social level, this problematizing role 1S
also apparent as the women's movement works to
communicate these insights and to "raise the
consciousness" of society. Indeed it is one of the most
profound effects of the women's movements of the united
States and western Europe, that they have placed on the
public agenda mUltiple "problems" or issues that
previously had not even been seen as political. This
"agenda," which includes issues such as reproductive
rights, equal opportunity, sexual discrimination in
education and employment, child care and family leave
policies, and so on, is in fact the outcome of
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continuous, self-reflexive publicizing by the movement
of areas of social life that had previously been seen as
either "private" or unproblematic. Most recently as
Fraser (1992) has noted, we can also understand the
struggle over Clarence Thomas's confirmation, and over
sexual harassment issues more generally, as part of this
process of bringing to social consciousness -- of
bringing to publicity -- the embedded power
relationships involved in workplace expressions of
sexuality.
Such attempts at "publicizing" are of course not
unproblematic or straightforward, and as Fraser (1992)
notes,

formidable forces can be arrayed to re-privatize

or to re-inscribe gendered power lines around who has
the right to decide what shall be made public. But it is
an indication of the relative force of the women's
movement's "symbolic challenge" that such "issues" are
even on the public agenda at all.
This central focus in the feminist movement of
making public and discursive , areas of life that had
been previously experienced as private, is fundamentally
reflexive process and is critical to understanding the
real challenge of the NSMs. As Giddens (1984) has noted,
the "structures" of modern society, far from existing
outside of our lives and pressuring us from above, are
in fact reproduced in interaction. We bring to bear on
every interaction the embedded "rules" and
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maldistributed "resources" of our social systems, and
for the most part power relations are reproduced at the
level of practical consciousness -- i.e. as nondiscursive agency, through a kind of "going on" in the
world (Giddens, 1984). One way to challenge such "going
on" is to bring activities pursued at the level of
practical consciousness to the level of discursive
consciousness -- to make public -- the power,
assumptions and history embedded in such interaction.
Through their focus on publicizing previously "private"
areas of social life the women's movement (and perhaps
the NSMs in general) are involved in fundamentally self
reflexive symbolic work. It is this reflexive production
of

~mancipatory

knowledge that

1S

the real "challenge"

of the NSMs. It is these kinds of reflexive
appropriations of knowledge about everyday routines that
make it possible for individuals to re-produce
structures differently across time -- to produce change.
The New Social Movements, through their reflexive
production of knowledge about the power embedded in
everyday life are critically important in producing such
change (Giddens, 1987, p. 48):

Organizations and social movements, it might be
argued, are the two ways in which reflexive
appropriation of knowledge about the social world
is mobilized in the modern world.
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Movement Communication and Agenda-Building

One of the key social arenas in which this
strategic symbolic work of social movements takes place
is that of public policy agenda-building. In the general
symbolic struggles over what areas of social life will
be subject to public debate, social movements may have
emerged in the last few years as key players, especially
at very early stages of problem formulation. 3
As Kingdon (1984) and others have noted, public
policy issues -- that is the issues or experiences that
will be seen by policy makers as important and
actionable -- are not self-evident in society. Rather,
the particular list of problems and solutions that
become central is the result of ongoing struggles and
negotiations by interested political actors. The public
-agenda- in this sense, is created through the
interaction of various sets of political actors -- the
executive branch,

(especially the president and his

staff, but also his political appointees), civil
servants/bureaucrats, academics and researchers, media,
and interest groups (Kingdon, 1984).

According to

Kingdon, this set of ·players· takes part in various
recurrent -stages· of policy development and each are
more or less important at different stages. These stages
are outlined as (1) setting the policy agenda (2)
specifying alternatives from which a choice is made (3)

forcing an authoritative choice such as a vote or
presidential enactment and (4) implementing the
decision.
Kingdon's analysis

lS

important In that it moves

public policy analysis away from assumptions about the
objective importance of some issues rather than others,
pointing out how policy formation is in fact a
fundamentally political struggle. His perspective opens
up the policy process to include a variety of actors who
may influence the outcome, whereas previously policy
studies tended to focus on policy making as the domain
of technicians. However, Kingdon's policy building model
is also missing some crucial steps. Despite his focus on
the inherently constructed nature of the policy agenda,
Kingdon's model of policy building still begins with the
selection by policy elites between a set of somehow
self-evident "issues."

(The first "stage" of the Kingdon

model is one in which elites choose between available
issues). But how did these "issues" get to be issues In
the first place? How did there come to be a list of
possible choices from which policy actors could choose?
How were such areas problematized at all? Perhaps
because he does not focus centrally on either media or
movement organizations, Kingdon does not address these
questions.
But surely the process of making concerns into
issues is not trivial. The social, communicative, and

4S

strategic creation of a social problem is in fact a
significant part of the overall politics of
signification. In this process -- the precursor to
policy elite choices -- political actors take a social
experience, or concern and make it a public issue. They
select among experiences and work to strategically frame
and construct a certain set of them as (a) problematic
(b) public and (c) important.
In fact it is at this early stage In agenda
building -- the "problem formulation" stage-- that
social movements may be the most important players. The
new movements, as observers have noted, are centrally
involved in the production of new "problems." The issue
of sexual harassment is an example of this phenomena. It
lS

not that sexual harassment did not occur before the

1970s, but that it was not framed as a public problem
before then. It was through the symbolic work of the
feminist movement that sexual harassment became first
problematized and then publicized, as a systemic
problem.
This problematizing work is closely linked to what
Goffman (1986 [1974J) and others have called framing in
which the ways that events or issues are presented can
significantly alter the ways that they are understood by
audiences and policy makers (cf. Iyengar, 1991; Kahneman
and Tversky, 1984). Framing can be either intuitive or
strategic. In public policy agenda building it is likely
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to be a process of strategically creating an
interpretive framework that contextualizes information
in specific ways and so encourages a particular
interpretation by audiences (Gitlin, 1980; Gamson,
1992) .
Movements are In fact significant producers of
these frames at the societal level. Indeed it may be
that framing and other llsignwork" is the central
activity of movements (Snow, 1988, p. 198):

We use the term framing to conceptualize this
signifying work precisely because that is one of
the things social movements do. They frame, or
assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events
and conditions In ways that are intended to
mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to
garner bystander support, and to demobilize
antagonists.

The importance of how an lssue lS framed cannot be
overestimated in political struggles. Golding and
Middleton (1982) and Iyengar (1991) have illustrated,
for example, what a difference it makes to policy and
public opinion whether poverty lS understood as a
structural or a personal problem. Similarly Hall et al.
(1978) describe how llmugging" can be framed and reframed
by authorities to bolster or challenge public images of
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minority groups and to contribute to the abridgment of
their civil liberties. Stone (1989, p. 282) has ln fact
suggested that this fundamentally symbolic work

in

which lssues are identified, publicized and linked to
other lssues -- in at the heart of all policy agenda
building:

Difficulties become llproblems ll

human problems

amenable to human intervention

through narrative

construction by interested groups in the policy
arena. This making of problems, of causal stories,
is the precursor to any agenda setting activities.
Actors construct stories that explain the roots of
a problem and its solutions and then tell that
story [or sell it] to policy makers. The llwinning ll
story is the one that becomes the standard
explanation (p. 282).

The agenda building process, then is essentially a
definitional struggle in which different groups produce
their own (interested) narratives about what is
important and what should be done by policy makers.
Movements may playa central role in this process,
especially at very early stages in which they are key
framers of what areas of social life may be seen as
problematic at all.
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However, we are still very far from understanding
how it is that this symbolic work, this problematizing
and framing,

is achieved (or not) on a day-to-day basis.

For example, how do "movements" select aspects of social
life for attention and how do they "make" them public
issues? Is the process of problematizing an activity of
movement leaders, or do movements collectively define
problems? Are all movements equally capable of "making"
public issues? What frames are likely to work and which
do not? What skills, resources and contexts are
necessary for this symbolic work to proceed? And, most
critically for this study, where

lS

mass media in this

process? If movements "make" social problems through
strategic framing, how is it that those frames corne to
be shared (or not) by others? Do media unproblematically
transfer movement frames? Or are movement issues and
frames transformed in important ways by mass media
organizations and discourses?

Media Roles in Movement Communication:
News as a Resource in Agenda-Building

The symbolic challenge of movements must In fact be
located in their mass communication strategies. It is
through their articulation and publication of knowledge
-- either in their own media or through their
interactions with established media institutions -- that
movements are likely to be able to produce influence on
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the public agenda or on individuals' understanding of
issues. If we are to understand the potential symbolic
challenge of the new movements, it is essential that we
begin to focus on how social movements articulate and
mass communicate their messages.
In this process of diffusion, movement interactions
with commercial news media are critical. As the major
source of political information for citizens in modern
societies, news media are still one of the most critical
bottlenecks in the distribution of new knowledges by and
about emergent social movements. Whether (and how) the
new movements can strategically produce access to news
media, and what kinds of control (if any) they can
exerClse over the representation of their lssues and
identity must be key questions in any assessment of the
transformative potential of the new movements.
In addition to its ability to deliver messages to
large audiences regularly and cheaply (compared to
sending communications directly to millions of people),
news has also been shown to have significant and varied
effects on audience perceptions of public issues, events
and leaders. For example, news constructions of the
world have been documented to "set peoples agendas" and
tell them what is important

(McCombs and Shaw, 1978;

Iyengar and Kinder, 1987); to "prime" audiences
interpretations and evaluations of political issues and
candidates,

to influence how people will "frame" (or

SO

understand) social problems (cf. Iyengar, 1991; Gamson,
1992), and to llmainstream" peoples' political opinions
(cf. Gerbner et al., 1980), and so on. As such, news
access -- the ability to routinely speak and be heard
from within news accounts of the world -- is a highly
sought after symbolic resource in political life.
Gandy (1982, p. 198), for example, has argued
convincingly for the importance of news as a political
resource for corporations in the Unites States, who he
suggests, are "subsidizing" public decision-making in
their favor by providing information for journalists. As
Gandy explains, "An information subsidy increases the
demand for certain information by lowering its price to
the·consumer ... The journalist's costs of producing news
are reduced through a variety of techniques utilized by
sources to manage the information market." In this
framework, news

lS

a political resource, then,

because

it allows successful news sources to influence the
decision-making of audiences (Gandy, 1982, p. 198).
Besides subsidizing decision-making news access

lS

also associated with a certain authority In public life.
Because news discourse

lS

In political life -- that

a privileged form of knowledge
lS

it

lS

generally considered

to be an authoritative version of reality -- access to
news is also associated with high levels of cultural
legitimacy. As such, news offers sources another form of
power beyond the chance to distribute self-interested

Sl

information; it offers membership in a group of
"knowers."
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It is this association with authority that,

according to Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1989, pp. 3-4),
makes news a form of cultural capital

for its regular

sources:

News

lS

a representation of authority. In the

contemporary knowledge society news represents who
are the authorized knowers and what are their
authoritative versions of reality .... It indicates
who is in possession of knowledge as "cultural
capital," and thereby articulates who are members
of the "new class" who derive their labor and
property membership from the production,
distribution and administration of knowledge.

In this knowledge/power framework,

representation

In news confers authority on the source, because news
itself has come to hold a special place as an
authoritative version of reality.
Access to news

lS

a political resource for

organizations, then, because it is a modality

of power.

News voice translates into legitimacy in the knowledge
system for the speaker, and news' distributive capacity
allows the speaker to communicate that knowledge widely,
and so structure the public information environment. In

media-saturated societies, access to news

lS

a key part

of making one's "account count" in the public sphere
It would seem to be a fundamental democratic
question, then, to ask who is able to access news In
order to speak to other citizens, how such access is
produced strategically, and at what costs to
organizations.

But as Schlesinger (1991) has recently

noted, with few exceptions (cf. Gandy, 1982; Ericson et
aI, 1989), media scholars have tended to take a very
"media-centric" view of the newsmaking process and
ignore the activities of sources. However, as
Schlesinger (1991, p. 61) points out, it is only by
studying sources, that we will tie the study of news
back onto the study of communication and social
power/social change more generally:

The key issue at the heart of the study of sources
is that of the relations between the media and the
exercise of political and ideological power,
especially but not exclusively by central social
institutions which seek to define and manage the
flow of information in a contested field of
discourse.

News as a Social Movement Resource

If the question of source strategies has been
underdeveloped in media studies generally, work that

S3

r

investigates how critical sources such as NSM s might
access media,

lS

especially rare though questions about

the parameters of these relationships abound: For
example, should social movements be thought of as
sources in the same way that

corporate or governmental

sources are? What difference does it make when sources
are challenging or critical? Or when they are underresourced? Or they produce knowledge in forms that may
not be immediately obvious to journalists? All of these
are likely to be true of movement sources. Is news
likely to be a form of cultural capital for social
movements? And, if so, is it one that they can afford
both materially and ideologically?
Gitlin (1980) has suggested that movements are
untypical sources who will always be denied
authoritative access but instead will be ucovered u and
marginalized. Based on his case study of Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS), Gitlin (1980, p. 281) has
argued forcefully that news will never adequately carry
social movement discourses because of the economic,
organizational, and ideological connections that news
organizations and news discourses have to dominant power
relations In society.

Though movements will be

attracted to commercial news media as a way of "getting
the word out," Gitlin concludes that news media are
likely to cover them and their concerns in ways that
will be counter-productive to critical social change. He

54

argues that commercial media, through their professional
"routines" and practices -- which are themselves
embedded in capitalist and profit-oriented ideologies
will serve to "frame" critical social movements and
their activities in trivializing or marginalizing ways.
In this hegemonic model, news media are central players
1n the systematic suppression of critical voices:

.... an opposition movement 1S caught in a
fundamental and inescapable dilemma. If it stands
outside the dominant realm of discourse, it is
liable to be consigned to marginality and political
irrelevancei its issues are domesticated, it's
deeper challenge to the social order sealed off,
trivialized and contained. If, on the other hand it
plays by conventional political rules in order to
acqu1re an image of credibility -- if, that is,
leaders are well-mannered,

its

its actions well-

ordered, and it's slogans specific and "reasonable"
-- it is liable to be assimilated into the
hegemonic political world viewi it comes to be
identified with narrow (if important) reform
issues, and its oppositional edge is blunted (p.
281) .

But Gitlin's conclusions may be too much too soon.
SDS was one, early, and relatively short-lived

55

r
organization whose own development of media strategies
was quite limited. But more importantly, the reform or
revolution dichotomy that Gitlin invokes here, In which
movements must either be marginalized if they are
radical, or

incorporated if they are liberal, raises

certain difficulties. It is an overly deterministic
framework based on qualities of movements that are far
from self-evident. For example, this approach begs the
question of how we corne to know what a movement "is" at
all. As Melucci (1985, p. 792) has observed, though
historians and observers often talk about "movements" as
if they were already constituted entities, who act in
coherent ways, in fact "movements" are social
constructions that are created and maintained through
communication practices across time. And one of the
forces with which movements interact in forming
identities, are media themselves. As Van Zoonen (1994)
has suggested, it is not really a question of whether
news covers a ngiven n (liberal or radical) social
movement in a "true" way or not, but a question of how
the various "identities," strategies and organizational
practices of a movement interact with the complex,
though structured, selection "rules" of news media to
create particular outcomes.
Gitlin's radical/reformist framework, however, not
only assumes that movements have some essential quality
that can be used as a predictor (i.e. radical or
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reformist) but it gives us only two "outcome"
possibilities (trivialization or incorporation)
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for what

is a complex, communicative interaction between two sets
of organizations and discourses across time. Social
change, especially ideological change, is never such an
all or nothing process, and as more resent studies of
movements have suggested a movement's identity
(especially the new movements) are much more complex and
contradictory than a reformist/revolutionary dichotomy
would allow (cf. Melucci, 1989).
Perhaps the most limiting aspect of a closed
hegemonic model such as Gitlin's, is that it seems to
deny the ability of social movement actors to learn
about and strategically use dominant systems and
discourses -- in this case journalistic routines and
practices -- as resources themselves. 4 Movements can,
potentially at least, learn about news organizations'
routines, practices and discursive logics, and take part
in framing themselves.
Giddens (1984) has suggested that this kind of
reflexivity --

the ability to access and discursively

use the urules u as resources -- is itself a fundamental
aspect of human agency, and one that challenges
deterministic explanations for human practices in many
different circumstances. In the context of social
movements this reflexivity and strategic use of

constraints may sometimes make news discourse a movement
resource.
Ryan (1991) suggests,

In fact,

that it

lS

through

the strategic use of the very journalistic routines that
Gitlin credits with destroying the student movement,
that challenging groups can begin to strategically
"frame" themselves in newsworthy and culturally resonant
ways. In a study of how one local labor union
repositioned itself in news media through strategic
reframing of its issues from ·special interest" to
·justice,· Ryan describes the day-to-day strategic
communication practices, or "framing contests" that
could become part of many movements communication
strategies. She notes that although the relationship is
a struggle, it is not a closed or hopeless one.
It is still of course an open question how
successfully movements and other speakers of critical
discourses can ·use N media logics and conventions for
their own purposes of course. What kind of effects is
such use likely to have on a movements own discourse or
identity? Is it possible to translate some ideas through
news conventions and have them retain their integrity to
some extent? Does reframing ideas for media mean
essentially reframing them altogether?
Besides the reflexive strategies of movement actors
is the complex and contradictory nature of news itself.
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News organizations are rlven with contradictions
deriving from their need to respond to economic,
political and professional forces.

In fact as Hallin

(1992) has suggested, we must see that news itself is
overdetermined, making any simple processing of other
discourses unlikely.
Gamson (1989),

for example, has suggested that the

particular way news represents political issues can be
attributed to at least three different sets of factors:
first,

the strategic activities of sources; second, the

activities of professional journalists within the
routines of news organizations; and third, the cultural
context in which some ideas and themes have more
-re~onance"

than others, that is to say, the ideological

content and context of news events. To this list we
might also add the relative competition for access at
anyone time between sources (Schlesinger, 1992; Gandy,
1982); the economic imperatives of news organizations
(such as their routine use of -information subsidies"
and audience maximization techniques) which affect, both
positively and negatively, the chances of movements to
access news (Hallin, 1992; Gandy, 1982); and the
relative influences of contextual shifts such as elite
policy configurations that can make movements more or
less "newsworthy."
This overdetermination does not deny the very
systematic ways that news media can be seen to process
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reality. Given the highly conventionalized style of news
discourse (in which events are more important than
processes, institutional elites are the most prominent
sources, and the "beat" system which encourages the
definition of news as information which emanates

from

government bureaucracies), it is quite likely that news
will systematically recombine movement discourses and
ideas in ways which conform to such conventions.
However, none of these factors has sufficient
determining force in all circumstances to make the
construction of news stories inevitable. As Bruck (1989,
p. 113) has noted, despite the general sense of
ideological closure that critical news studies have
often described, news is still an overdetermined and
"leaky" ideological system:

Given the capitalistic, industrial, and
bureaucratic structure of the news media's
operation, the finding that the media reproduce the
dominant ideology does not come as a surprise.
Rather it means that the news media do perform
their functional job. What is of interest then

1S

how the media accomplish their reproductive labor,
when they fail to do this, what alters this
operational functioning, what opportunities for
change exist, how these opportunities are
differentially distributed, and what conclusions
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can be drawn for alternative or oppositional
practices and movements.

Towards a Dialogical Model

The media-movement relationship
characterized as dialogical

lS

perhaps best

-- that is, as an

interactive, reflexive, relationship that takes place
over time. It is a relationship in which both media
workers and movement strategists are knowledgeable,
strategic agents, seeking to learn about and use each
other's discourse. Such learning, and the incorporation
of that knowledge into future interactions, can be seen
as a form of strategic interaction

(cf. Goffman, 1969;

Habermas, 1984).
Giddens (1984) has outlined a general dialogical
model for social relations that he calls a
·structurationist· model that is useful here. In a
structurationist framework the relationship between
structure and agency in society is seen as dialectical.
Structures are conceived as being both constraining and
enabling and agency itself (activity that is perceived
to be autonomous by actors) may in fact chronically
reproduce power relations through unintended
consequences. In a structurationist framework, change is
produced through the reflexive appropriation of
knowledge about the routines, rules and structures that
are constraining actors' understandings and behaviors.

61

However, because the consequences of rules and routines
are not always understood completely (because of both
resource and competence deficiencies) such change is
likely to be partial and contradictory.
A structurationist or dialogical approach to the
media-movement relationship directs our attention to the
aspects of that relationship that are highly structured
-- news organizations do bring highly conventionalized
categories and expectations to bear on social movement
communication -- but it also highlights how these
structures can be used reflexively to produce an
indeterminate outcome. For example, if movement
strategists learn about and use the conventions of
lib'eral journalism in their own communications, the
outcome of media-movement interactions is likely to be
different than if they simply present their perspectives
in their own frames and wait to be processed by news. In
this context the question for movements becomes, not how
will we be processed by media, but what can we say by
using news languages, and how far can we stretch news
conventions to say what we want. Because media-movements
relationships play out over time, these incorporations
of knowledge about previous behaviors and rules, can be
mobilized In future strategies to produce different
outcomes. As Giddens has illustrated, it is this kind of
reflexivity that challenges any deterministic model.
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Understanding the media-movement relationship as a
dialogical one, then, opens up our understanding of
media and movements from one of "coverage" -- in which
news representations of social movements are (implicitly
at least) compared to some ideal representation of
reality

into one in which two sets of actors are

seen to be working within constraints to create and
recreate different constructions of reality. Seeing the
media-movement relationship as two-way does not preclude
an imbalanced interaction, nor deny that one
organization holds more power than the other. Dialogic
interactions corne with no guarantees. Oppositional
social movements are always likely to be less well
resourced than either news organizations or the other
corporate or state sources with which they compete for a
place in the media agenda. Becoming involved in
interaction with news media at all, will certainly
involve expenditures that movements can barely afford.
And, perhaps most critically, it may also involve
ideological costs. Framing a critical discourse
successfully for news consumption may mean re-framing it
In crucial ways. But to say that a relationship

lS

difficult, complex, subtle, and unbalanced is not to say
that its outcomes are inevitable. As Hackett

(1991, p.

281) notes in his conclusion to a study of the Canadian
press and peace movement,

"The press is not a level

playing field, but sometimes it is possible, even
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playing uphill, to score points, to win a match, and
perhaps occasionally even to redefine the rules of the
game."
When we see movements and media engaged in
strategic interaction, or dialogical struggle, instead
of inquiring how a movement is covered by the news
organizations, we can ask: How do movement strategists
and journalists interact? How have movement
organizations understood their relationship with news
media and how have they experienced its constraints?
What strategies have they developed to control their
interactions with news media and how have those
strategies fared over time? In short, what has worked
and what hasn't and why?

Assessing Interactions:
What structures dialog? What constitutes "success?"

In a dialogic framework,

then, news is seen as the

overdetermined outcome of complex and reflexive
interactions between sources and journalists in shifting
political and resource contexts. The question for
researchers becomes how to investigate and/or assess
such a relationship. In a dialogic framework,

for

example, we need to ask, what factors structure or
influence the dialog? What aspects of organizations and
discourses make it more or less likely that sources will
be "successful" in controlling a media dialog? Indeed,
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what constitutes success? If we want to move beyond

t

describing media-movement interactions, and into
assessing them, these questions are fundamental.
In this study I identify and investigate three
general factors that structure media-movement relations:
resources (such as money, skills, competencies,
organization, and so on), strategies (for example,
developing and uSlng news conventions, or building
relationships with women reporters) and
ideology/identity factors

(that is the ideas, policies

and self-presentations of the organization). These three
factors have all been shown to be influential In
structuring media interactions. 5 Gandy (1982; 1989), for
example, has noted that source organizations' access to
journalists is based in their ability to provide
Hinformation subsidies H for journalists, which itself is
tied to their overall resource base. In this model news
access

and control over the representation of public

lssues

is tied to the ability of actors to routinely

provide information that journalist will use in their
news stories. As Gandy (1989) notes, access to
journalists (and influence over public debate) is not
determined only by resources, but those organizations
that are able to produce cheap, easy, reliable
information for journalists have a better chance than
others.
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The question for social movement groups In
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interaction with media becomes whether they too can
mobilize enough resources to provide llinformation
subsidies ll to journalists. In this study I investigate
NOW's resource mobilization asking what resources seem
to be important in gaining access to media. I also
assess NOW's ability to mobilize these resources over
time. I ask what kinds of human,

financial, and

information resources were used in producing NOW's level
of media access.
Strategic sophistication, especially In negotiating
the constraints of news practice and news discourses,

lS

also likely to be a factor that structures news access
for' sources. As many studies have noted, news itself

lS

the product of conventions and routines both at the
level of practice (beats, institutional source use, and
so on (cf. Gans, 1980; Fishman, 1989)) and at the
discursive level where judgments of what kinds of issues
and topics are newsworthy and the linguistic framing and
construction of news stories is also highly
conventionalized (van Dijk, 1988). How source
organizations adopt and adapt to these conventions

lS

likely to have a serious effect on their relative
llsuccess" in influencing news and through news, public
debates. In this study, then,

I investigate NOW's

development of strategies through which the organization
sought to control its interactions with news media. I

ask what kinds of strategies NOW developed to interact
with and control its interactions with media, and
whether these strategies were "successful" or not 1n
allowing the group to control its identity and form its
agenda.
Ideology and identity factors have also been shown
to be important factors in predicting media
interactions. Gitlin (1980),

for example,

focuses on

ideology as a structuring factor in media interactions
when he suggests that news will always incorporate
"reformist" groups and marginalize "radical" groups. But
this framework is very problematic. First, because it is
difficult to tell at anyone time what a movement
group's ideology or identity is (the leaders of a group
may hold a very different perception of its identity
from its members,

for example), and the relative

autonomy or independence of movement groups' identity as
a predictor is hard to justify. As Van Zoonen (1992)
notes, a group's "public identity" is in fact often
created in interaction with (or in anticipation of) news
media itself.
Still, it 1S likely that a group's identity will
structure its interaction with news media,

in some ways.

Even if identity/ideology does not directly predict
access or representation, it my be that a group's
political identity or ideological position will
structure both its media strategies in some ways, and
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its reception by journalists. Different political
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groups, for example, do take different strategic
approaches to media and over time a group may change
both its overall political identity and its media
strategies as a consequence of that overall shift. In
this study I deal with the problem of identity in a
number of ways. First, I track how shifts in NOW's
political identity (its aims, goals, agenda, leadership,
and so on) affected its interactions with media. Second,
the study compares NOW's media strategies to other
groups In the women's movement, in order to
contextualize its strategic choices within a movement
wide framework. Third, in the assessment phase of the
study, I track how these shifts in NOW's identity over
time were represented in media content. This approach

lS

essentially comparative and contextual; it involves
comparing NOW's "internal" identity

with its "public"

(media) identity, in relation to its shifting media
strategies. Of course none of these "identities" is more
"true" than any other-- the internal recorded "identity"
of NOW was as likely to be strategically produced as its
"public" identity, even if for different purposes. And
none of the various components of this identity
structure (NOW identity, media identity for NOW, and
media strategies) are static; all are shifting over
time, In ways that make comparisons difficult. But it

lS

only the kind of approach that looks at both discourses

and the strategic interactions between them that can
begin to make sense of the structuring roles of
identity/ideology, strategy and resources in explaining
media access. In fact in this study I do not ultimately
argue for the independent determining force of anyone
of the factors, but rather for a dialogic news model
that would be able to account for all of them. 6

Assessing Success in a Dialogic Framework:
Access, voice and Control

In a general sense we can define success In this
study as the relative ability of movements to use the
rules of news as resources rather than experience them
as

~onstraints.

But this is somewhat vague. What

empirical outcomes more specifically would constitute
the success of particular media strategies? Should NOW
be represented in the same way that they would represent
themselves? And what should that representation cost the
movement organization? Is news access successful if it
takes all of an organization's time and resources?
In this study I use a four tiered system of
assessment of NOW's Usuccess U that involves three
different kinds of success

access, voice, placement

and control. Access simply refers to the appearance and
placement of stories about NOW. An appearance is the
minimal requirement for voice in the public sphere.
Voice

refers to whether NOW is allowed to the extent to
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which NOW is allowed to speak and under what
circumstances. Voice is essential to the movement's
ability to define events and lssues in ways that would
produce influence. Placement refers to the context of
NOW's stories and the associated value of different news
sections. Control

In this study refers to the amount of

control NOW strategists exercised over the presentation
of their issue agenda and their organizational
identity.7
These four dimensions of success, I would argue,
can be assessed in most communicative interactions. In
any conversation or debate for example, we seek first of
all access

or standing as a participant, then we seek a

chance to contribute in our own

vo~ce

, and we are

usually also concerned with the context of our
contribution (i.e. is it strategically placed so as to
gain other peoples attention). We would also prefer that
the debate or conversation be structured in ways that
legitimate our positions and interests.
These dimensions of success are also analytically
separable, and can be understood, hierarchically. We can
say for example that access is basic to all other
levels, that voice is an additional level of successful
interaction, and that legitimate representation or
control of one's identity makes a voice more credible
and more likely to be listened to. Control, over one's
identity and one's agenda -- communicative autonomy --
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1S 1n this framework the ultimate ·success· of strategic
interaction.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

My aim in this study, then, 1S to both describe and
assess NOW's relationship with news media within a
dialogic framework. I have suggested that NOW's access
to, and success in controlling, such a dialog is likely
to be affected by shifts in resources, strategies and
identity. Accordingly the study pursues answers to three
main research questions:

(1) What did gaining routine access to news media

cost NOW?
dialog?

(i.e. How did NOW's resources structure the
What resources were important in making news

access possible in the first place? How were resources
associated with ·success· in the interaction?

Were

resources a determining factor in creating a successful
news dialog (as defined by access, voice and control)?
If so, are the resources that structured NOW's access to
media likely to be available to all social movement
groups?

(2) What role(s) did NOW's communicative and media
strategies play in structuring the dialog? (i.e. What
strategies did NOW leaders develop to access and control
media dialogs?

How important was reflexive strategizing
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l.e. knowledge of the "rules" of news -- to NOW's
access and success? How did knowledge of the "rules"
structure the dialog?

Are these reflexive strategies

likely to be available to all social movement groups?

(3) What role(s) did NOW's ideology/identity play
In the in news access or news representation?

(i.e. How

did NOW's ideology and identity structure the dialog?
How was the organization's identity re-presented by
news? What can we tell from this "processing" pattern?
Was NOW's identity (either internal or strategically
produced public identity) a determinant in news access
and control? How much does NOW's ideology explain the
interaction?)
NOTES

1 Some new movement groups have organized boycotts of
products, which is a strategy that in some ways mirrors
a strike in that people withdraw their support -- but it
is at the level of consumption, not production.
2 Most empirical studies of social movements indicate
that NSM members are quite self aware and reflexive
about their communicative roles, so that theories that
characterize the NSM as "carriers" or "functions" in
society are to some extent denying this reflexivity.
Unfortunately much of the NSM theory is written in this
functionalist way.
3 Zhongdang Pan made this connection for me between
movement and policy building literatures, personal
communication 1993.
4 Gitlin's (1980) study does present SDS leaders as
quite reflexive and subtle in their political analyses,
and perhaps over time their media strategies and media
representation would have developed differently.
However, his conclusion in which he asserts that news
media will always trivialize "real" opposition is quite
clearly deterministic.
5 These factors are drawn from a review of news source
studies by the author that suggests that resources,
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strategies and ideologies are the key structuring
factors in explaining access to news, Barker-Plummer, B.
(1993). From Gates to Dialog: Towards a Communication
Model of the News-Source Relationship. Paper presented
to the Political Communication Division, rCA, Washington
DC.
6 Chapter three, methods, describes these analyses in
more detail.
7 These measures are described in more detail in chapter
three, methods.

Chapter 3
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Research Design and Methods:
Parallel Institutional and Content Analyses

The NOW-news relationship

lS

conceptualized as a

dialogic relationship, that is as an interactive,
reflexive, and complexly overdetermined relationship
that takes place on mUltiple levels -- between
journalists and activists, news and movement
organizations, and feminist and news discourses.
Investigating and assessing such a complex interaction
involves choosing a particular entry-point from which to
understand and assess the interaction. In this study I
"cut into" the NOW-news interaction in a particular way:
I investigate and assess the interaction from the point
of view of NOW, as a news source and as a new social
movement group. The study describes the development of
NOW's media strategies over time and then assesses the
success of these strategies through an analysis of their
influence on news content. Studying the interaction from
NOW's perspective (rather than that of journalists) not
only expands our understanding of new social movement
communications, but also adds to our understanding of
newsmaking from the perspective of sources more
generally.

Study Design:
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Parallel Institutional and Content Analyses

The study involved both an institutional analysis of
NOW (1966-1980) and a content analysis of the New York
Times (1966-1980). The institutional analysis draws on

NOW's records to characterize NOW's development of media
strategies over time and to describe the role of
resources, strategies and organizational identity In
structuring NOW's media representation. The content
analysis describes patterns in NOW's representation in,
the Times and uses these patterns to assesses the
relative llsuccess" of NOW's media strategies.

(Both of

these analyses are described in more detail below.)
These two parts of the study were designed and
executed in tandem, so that they would parallel one
another as much as possible. Questions for the content
analysis were derived from the institutional analysis,
and both NOW's and the Times' discourses were analyzed In
standardized ways (e.g. agendas and identity factors)

In

order to be able to compare NOW and the Times'
representations of NOW and its issues and identity. For
example, the content analysis tracks the gender of
reporters who wrote NOW stories, because interaction
with, and support of, women reporters was a central NOW
strategy. And both the institutional and content analyses
track how each discourse (NOW and news media) represent
and rank women's issues.

Overall, the framework for assesslng NOW's "success"
used in this study (and described in more detail below)
has logical links to the organization's own intentions
and activities. Because these are quite different kinds
of organizations and discourses, these links are not
always perfectly symmetrical. In some instances the
content analysis has had to operationalize NOW's media
goals in ways that are assessable in news content
analysis. For example, it is relatively straightforward
to track NOW's strategic interaction with women
journalists by also tracking whether most stories are
written by women reporters. But success in NOW's more
general goal of becoming a serious public voice for
women's lssues,

is not so readily assessed. In this study

it is operationalized as a mix of access, voice (being
quoted) and identity control over time In news content
(see below for more description of the assessment
framework) .
Generally, though, the institutional and content
analyses were designed to work together logically. NOW
sought to access news in order to spread the word about
feminism,

to build an agenda for women's issues, and to

build a legitimate public identity for itself as a
serlOUS spokesperson for women's issues in America. The
study "tests" these goals in the news content. It tracks
NOW's basic access to news across time, asks whether NOW
was able to produce "voice" in media, and assesses
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whether the organization was able to control either its
identity (in terms of legitimacy) or the representation
of its issues and concerns

(in terms of agenda

comparisons) .
The institutional and content analysis are thus
linked through a strategic conceptual framework which
relates NOW's media goals to their outcomes in news
content over time. By linking the institutional and
content analyses levels and methods, this study crosses
some traditional boundaries in media studies, which tends
to produce either content analyses or institutional
analyses. But

I

argue that it is only by linking these

levels of analysis that we can begin to untangle the
independent role(s) that news practices and conventions
play in processing social change. Having access to both
an institutional analysis (what NOW was saying about
itself and its issues and how it was communicating these
concerns) and to news content (what the Times was saylng
and doing) makes it possible to suggest which shifts In
NOW's public agenda and identity were the results of
NOW's own shifts in agendas, identity or strategy, and
which were the results of the Times' nprocessingn of NOW.
As Bruck (1992, p. 142) notes, news discourses must
be seen in relation to other discourses for both
strategic and epistemological reasons. We have to be able
to show both the discourses that news workers draw from,
and the resulting outcome of news-source interactions,
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before any inferences about news processing (or source
success) is possible:

In news analysis, we need to make the analytical
separation between the discourses the media produce
and the discourses they use as material to build
on, to process and deliver. We need to be
interested in the structures of transformation.

The study also crosses some traditional boundaries
In methodological terms. For example, it uses both
quantitative techniques (e.g. quantitative content
analyses and agenda-setting models to compare NOW and

the'Times agendas) and also more qualitative,
interpretive methods (to describe and assess NOW's
identity control strategies and their outcomes in news,
for example) .
This kind of methodological breadth is necessary In
case study methodologies where the universe of relevant
data is not imposed by the researcher, but is defined by
the wide ranging activities of the research subject. This
complexity (of mUltiple forms of data) is compounded in
this study, however, by the different levels of media
analysis involved, as well as by the overall conceptual
framework of the study which seeks to untangle the
role(s) of various factors -- resources, strategies and
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ideology --

which have generally been studied through

different research traditions.
Bringing these different levels, data forms and
structural factors together in one study means also
bringing together their different historical and logical
"baggage" of definitions and measurement traditions. For
example, questions of the structuring role(s) of
resources in media access are addressed in a politicaleconomic approach (using historical/critical, sometimes
quantitative institutional analysis methods) and
questions about ideology and representation are asked in
a qualitative text-based analysis. Questions of "success"
or "control" are addressed using available social science
techniques such as ranked agenda comparlsons, and
quantitative content analysis techniques.
Overall, the case study is conceptually rather than
methodologically driven. Rather than framing all
questions in terms of one method, choices about how to
measure various aspects of NOW's experience, were driven
by both the research questions themselves (which were
drawn from various research traditions) and the forms of
data available to answer those questions. In the rest of
this chapter I describe how these various questions,
methods and levels of analyses come together to produce a
comprehensive analysis of the media interactions of one
new social movement organization.
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I. THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Institutional analysis, as Gerbner (1973, p. 559)
has described it, is a method of analysis that gets at
the process of decision-making, the structuration of
power roles, and the development of strategic actions and
routines on the part of organizations in their production
of knowledge or goods. In this part of the study I
engaged in an historical institutional analysis of NOW In
order to understand how a new social movement
organization managed, day-to-day, the communication and
media strategies that are so central to the symbolic
challenge of the NSMs overall. What were the day-to daypractices involved in the strategic articulation and mass
communication of challenging ideas and identities? How do
NSMs decide on issues, frames and problems to communicate
to media? What resources and skills does such symbolic
work take? How do NSM groups understand their
communicative work? What role(s) do they see for media In
the communication of new ideas? And how does their
interaction with media work out day-to-day? How do NSM
organizations negotiate their way into mass media
channels? What are the constraints and possibilities of
media as a resource for a new social movement
organization?
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1.1 General Research Questions:
The Role(s) of Resources, Strategies and Identity

Many different factors might be involved in, and
influence, a movement organization's interaction with
media. In this study I organize the discussion around
three general factors that structure media-movement
relations: resources (such as money, skills,
competencies, organization, and so on), strategies (for
example, making use of journalistic conventions, or
building relationships with women
ideology/identity factors

reporters~

and

(that is the ideas, goals and

self-presentations of the organization). These three
factors are drawn from three different research
traditions, but all of them have been shown to structure
media interactions in important ways.1
Resources are likely to be critical In structuring a
movement organization's media efforts. Gandy (1982),

for

example, has suggested that news access is "bought" dayto-day by corporations and bureaucratic government
organizations through the production of information for
journalists, which he calls "subsidizing" the news.
Similarly, Ericson et al

(1989), have noted that the

journalist-source relationship is maintained day-to-day
through the production, release, or holding back, of
information and access to information by institutional
sources.

The production of effective information subsidies is 82
clearly resource intensive. The question becomes whether
movement organizations can become producers of such
subsidies. Can social movement organizations mobilize the
resources necessary to gain media access? What kind of
resources are necessary to "subsidize" journalists? And
are these likely to be available to most emergent
political groups? In this study I look closely at
questions of resources and organization. I ask how NOW's
overall mobilization -- of staff, money and organization
-- was associated with its development of media
strategies, and ultimately with its voice in the public
sphere.
The ability to develop successful strategies to
negotiate media routines is also likely to be important
in explaining movement success in media interactions. As
mUltiple studies (cf. Gans, 1980; Tuchman, 1978; Fishman,
1980) have shown, news is the outcome of some very
conventional and routinized practices on the part of
journalists who tend to follow the same round of sources
and institutions -- "beats" --

In the production of

news, and to be guided by similar judgment patterns for
"newsworthiness" in deciding how to respond to or frame
stories (cf. Gans, 1980).
In any source study it

lS

a fundamental question,

then, how sources negotiate these conventions of news
practice and news discourse. For example, will source

organizations become the uobjects U of these practices -i.e. be ucoveredu -- or

can they develop strategies to

negotiate, counteract or subvert these routines? Some
critics have suggested that news, because of its own
ideological basis in elite/ruling class interests, will
always frame or define challengers in marginalizing ways
(cf. Goldman and Rajagopal, 1991; Gitlin, 1980;

Hall et

al. 1978). However, more recent work (cf. Ryan, 1991;
Hackett, 1991; Andersen, 1992) has begun to illustrate
how some movement groups (e.g. labor union groups and
peace movement groups) have managed to negotiate news
framing practices successfully and thereby ure-frame"
themselves.
The question of whether movement groups will be
framed by media, then, or whether they will succeed in
framing themselves is a critical question that can only
be answered by investigating media strategies as well as
media outcomes. In this study I track NOW's understanding
of news media practices and conventions and its
development of media strategies to counteract and
negotiate this terrain. I ask how did NOW come to
understand news practices and conventions? What kinds of
strategies and techniques did NOW develop to interact
with and control the effects of these journalistic
conventions?
A group's ideology or identity is also likely to
influence its relationship with news media. Some critical
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researchers have in fact suggested that ideology (of both 84
news and sources) is the determining factor in
interaction with news. Gitlin (1980),

for example, has

suggested that news will always marginalize some kinds of
identities -- "radicals"-- and will incorporate others
which he calls "reformists."
This view of ideology/identity as a predictor of
media success/failure is problematic, however. Movement
identities are not stable, taken for granted entities
that can be determined and used as predictors. They are
strategically produced social constructions, which may,
in turn, be constructed in ways specifically to appeal
to, or negotiate, media constraints. A group may well
project an identity for itself or frame issues in ways
that will appeal to media while still considering its
long-term goals and identity as "radical." Ryan (1991),
for example, notes how a labor movement group reframed
its public identity from one of "special interests" to
one of seeking a decent wage and human "dignity" while
the group's policies and goals stayed the same. Movements
and movement groups have no "authentic" identity, only
the ones they create for themselves or which are created
in interaction with other organizations and discourses.
Still, it is likely that a movement group's more
general identity construction strategies (its political
identity) at anyone time will also influence its media
strategies. So, in this study I investigate the role(s)

r
of NOW's identity in structuring its interaction with
media in two ways: first, by tracking the relationship
between NOW's more general political identity (i.e. its
shifting construction of itself and its goals, alms and
policies) and its media strategies,2

and second, by

comparing NOW media strategies to the media strategies of
other women's movement groups with different overall
identities. This approach carves out a place for
llidentityll in structuring media interactions, not as an
independent and well defined predictor of media success
(or failure) by itself, but as a factor that indicates
NOW leaders' and members' perceptions of the organization
and its goals at any particular time, and so is likely to
also structure their development of strategies to
communicate with news media.
To summarize, the institutional analysis of NOW
asks:
(i) What resources and skills did NOW's media work
involve? What kinds of resources did NOW leaders mobilize
to produce access to news media? And are these resources
likely to be available to all emergent groups? Overall,
what are the costs of access to media for movement
organizations?
(ii)

How did NOW manage to produce access to media

day-to-day? How did NOW understand news as a resource and
what strategies did it to negotiate and control its

8S

interactions with media? Did these routines and
understandings shift significantly over time?
(iii) What role did NOW's political identity -- that
1S

its issue focus, goals, and self-perceptions and so on

at different times -- play in structuring its media
interactions? How did NOW's media strategies overall
compare to other movement groups.

1.2 Data Collection

The Institutional analysis drew mainly on NOW's
historical materials which are archived at the
Schlesinger Library for Women in History, Radcliffe
College, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and secondarily on
the Women, Media and Politics collection at the Ellis
Library, University of Missouri-Columbia. The
Schlesinger archive requires permission from NOW's Board
for access and I would like to thank the National
Organization for Women National Executive Board for its
permission to access these papers. The Ellis paper are
the personal papers of Kathy Bonk, NOW's media
strategist for many years, and are open to the public.
The archival materials were used to provide
information on NOW's resources, strategies, policies, and
political identity creation over time. Documents used in
the study included financial and budget papers, strategy
and policy papers, and minutes of Board and Task Force
meetings. They also included materials on press

86

strategies (such as notes on leaders' preparations for,
and post-mortems of, interviews with journalists and talk
show hosts), press releases sent at various points in
time, advance publicity materials and strategy notes for
NOW demonstrations and public events, memos, notes and
strategy materials about various NOW campaigns
(especially concerning the ERA campaign), congressional
testimony, and various "public" documents such as
leaflets, posters, brochures and so on. The availability
of the day-to-day records of the short-lived NOW New York
Public Information Office (1973-1975) were particularly
invaluable resources, as were the early "media kits" and
training manuals produced by the national office for
volunteer workers in the local and state chapters.
These papers are of course only the records of NOW's
day-to-day understandings, statements and practices and
not direct observations of that process. But they are
nevertheless a rich resource for understanding the NOWnews interaction over a long period of time,

from the

perspective of NOW itself.

1.3 Measurement and Definition Issues
1.31. Resources. In this study I define resources
widely to include income, membership, aspects of
organization, skills, leadership, and communicative
competence. Some of these resources can be easily
quantified and measured and others cannot. For example, I
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measure NOW's income and membership quantitatively but
other attributes of the organization which are also
critically important -- such as education and competence
of leaders and availability of information and knowledge
cannot be easily codified. Some resources are thus
described and assessed descriptively while others are
measured more objectively (see chapter five).
One of most important resources for NOW and other
NSM groups is membership. Most income in NSM groups

lS

derived from membership dues, and large membership
numbers are also recognized as strategic assets in terms
of perceived representativeness.
In this study NOW's membership (and relatedly its
income) was ascertained from various different sources,
tracked across time, and then correlated with NOW's media
access. As the results indicate (see chapter five),

there

seems to be a clear relationship between general
resources and media access. However, there are some
important caveats in assessing the accuracy of NOW
membership numbers. As other observers of social movement
groups have also noted (cf. Knoke, 1989; Gamson, 1975;
Zald and McCarthy, 1979) the actual documentable numbers
of members of a social movement organization at anyone
time are very difficult to ascertain. First, because SMOs
do not routinely keep excellent records, second because
strategic "over-counting" is endemic, and third, because
the meaning of "membership" itself is problematic. Some
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groups,

for example, count all people who have ever paid

membership dues, others routinely purge their rolls and
drop all non active members every few months or weeks.
NOW in general has had a policy to count only active,
paid up members as members, but purging rolls is itself a
resource intensive activity which may not have high
priority in an action driven organization, and in any
case such claims are difficult to verify. The personal
data/membership forms of all NOW members that would be
needed to reconstruct or verify membership claims are not
available in the NOW archive. In fact such materials are
unlikely to have been kept at all before computing
technology made it easy to do so.
Wherever possible in this study I have tried to
verify membership and income numbers across sources (e.g.
by comparing numbers from NOW records with other
historical studies when available). But even so there are
still some missing years that I cannot account for (which
do not seem to be available even to the national
organization), and some sets of conflicting numbers for
various years. When numbers conflict across sources my
strategy has been to use NOW's own reported figures. When
confronted with differing numbers from NOW,
highest reported figure.

I used the

In general I have been less

concerned with the absolute accuracy of the figures than
with the fact that all reported figures trend in the same
direction, which is to say generally increasing over the
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time period reported here (1966-1980). Figure 3.1 (next
page) illustrates some of the different reported figures
from NOW and other studies for membership across time
from various sources, but indicates that they all follow
the same general trend. Income figures also follow this
curve closely because they are derived from membership
dues for the most part.

1.32 Strategies. Media strategies In this study are

defined as those practices, routines and understandings
which organizations develop in order to control their
interactions with media. These may take a number of forms
-- for example, the development of traditional public
relations skills or attempts to "educate" reporters may
be media strategies. But conscious and deliberate exit
from, and avoidance of, media may also be seen as a
strategic response. To have media strategies,
organizations must only show some evidence that their
interactions with media have been considered and planned
-- that is that they are goal oriented and intended to
have some effects on media representations.
This study investigated NOW's media strategies over
time through an analysis of its historical records. As I
note In more detail below (section 1.5, Limitations),
NOW's records are not indexed, so complete confidence In
finding all relevant material is impossible. However,
after a search and analysis of all materials in NOW's
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archive (1966-1982) that were marked as being media,
publicity or communications related (both generally and
within various issue areas), and a search and analysis of
the day-to-day records of the Public Information Office
(1973-1975), the public relations task force, and other
related task forces

(e.g. media reform task forces,

images of women task force, and so on), I have confidence
that the search accessed most of the available papers
relating to NOW's interactions with media over time. The
documents for analysis included press releases for
various events and activities as well as general
background press materials on NOW as an organization and
background materials on various issues and topics; public
relations and media kits created by NOW leaders for
training NOW chapters and national staff; letters,
statements, and other press materials from the documents
of the PIO (including letters exchanged with reporters,
editors and TV producers); strategy notes for interviews
and background notes and materials on reporters and media
organizations; scrap books of news stories with some
commentary and analysis; references to media strategies
and media coverage in National Board minutes, and so on.
This range of materials from different time periods
in the organization's history made it possible to
reconstruct NOW's understandings of, and interactions
with, media over time.
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Figure 3.1
NOW Membership Over Time
Various Measures*
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Klein, 1984; Boneparth, 1982; Carabillo et al.,
1993, etc.

1.33 Ideology/Identity. Organizational identity is a

complex concept involving aspects of a group's goals,
ideas, political and cultural issues, historical
development, perceived roles, and overall philosophy.
NOW's identity/ideology is tracked In this study through
analyzing the group's descriptions of itself and its
goals at various times In NOW's own records. The study

drew on minutes of Board meetings; public statements of
purpose and priorities (e.g. the 1968 Bill of Rights and
the 1975 Manifesto of NOW); press materials; convention
materials; legislative and commission related materials;
policy statements; records of public speeches and
internal debates, and so on. These materials made it
possible to track major shifts in NOW's goals and selfperceptions over time, as well as to indicate at various
points what NOW's issue priorities were (i.e. its
agendas). This historical reconstruction of NOW's
llinternal identityll and policy agendas at various points
in time was then compared to its representation (NOW's
media or llpublic ll identity) in the Times in order to
assess NOW's relative llcontrol ll over its own legitimacy.
(See content analysis below) .

1.4 Limitations of the Data,
Limits of the Institutional Analysis

Some of the limitations inherent in this and other
parts of the study are the result of limitations in the
institutional data. NOW's records from 1966-1982 are
available at the Schlesinger Library and can be accessed
with permission from NOW's National Board. These records
have been inventoried by a librarian and a master list
details the contents of hundreds of boxes. However
entries on this list are not always informative and the
collection has not been indexed or categorized in any
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systematic way.3

In fact the contents of the boxes are

still in much the same order they were when they arrived
at the library -- that lS, they are the results of NOW
office staff emptying file cabinets into them.
Consequently the boxes contain loose papers, file
folders,

ring binders, and assorted materials that are

organized sometimes by years, sometimes by theme or
issue, sometimes by task force,

sometimes by project,

sometimes by leader's name, and so on.
This lack of sorting/indexing ralses difficulties
for the researcher, making it impossible

to know if one

has ever collected all relevant materials. 4 In this study
for resource analysis purposes I searched out all
materials marked as budget and membership. For policy and
identity related questions I read and copied all national
board meetings minutes, policy statements, convention
materials, and general public statements about NOW at
various times (from congressional testimonies and media
Ubackground" packages, and so on). For media strategies
questions I collected all media and press related
materials that were marked as being media or
communications related within lssue areas (e.g. press
releases, public relations and media kits, press packages
sent to reporters on various events and issues), and read
all materials from the Public Information Office

papers,

and from task forces on public relations and so on.
Overall I spent around two months in the Schlesinger
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archive and a week in the Ellis library archive gathering 9S
materials. But

I

cannot be certain that missing data (for

example, missing membership figures for a few years in
this period) are not somewhere in the archive, nor that
important materials about press relations that were filed
In non obvious ways (e.g. within one of the multiple task
forces that I

did not have time to investigate) are not

excluded.
This lack of reliable sorting In the archive
contributed to one particular critical difficulty for
the study. As

I

indicate in the next section, a major

aim of this study was to compare NOW and news discourses
across time in terms of issues and lssue agendas (i.e.
ranked priorities of issues). This proved to be
impossible to do systematically based on the evidence
available in the archive. From the archive, no clear
hierarchization (agenda) could be determined reliably
for NOW issues at regular points in time. Partly this lS
because the organization itself is resolutely multiissue, but partly it is a difficulty raised by the lack
of confidence a researcher has in finding all relevant
materials in the archive. For example, even if a
reliable llunitll of analysis could be determined in order
to construct NOW agendas year-by-year or month-by-month,
the researcher could not be sure that a reliable or
representative sample of materials containing this unit
could be found. 5 Consequently in this study the agenda-

comparison aspects of the study are cut back and I rely
on historical policy statements from NOW about its
agenda and three public llagendas ll

(1968 Bill of Rights,

Manifesto and 1989 Bill of Rights) which NOW put out at
different points in its history as clear statements of
priorities

(see section 2.46 for more explanation).

II. THE CONTENT ANALYSIS: ASSESSING NOW's "SUCCESS"

In order to assess NOW's relative success 1n
interaction with media the study also drew on an
original content analysis of 377 stories about NOW or
quoting NOW in the New York Times,

1966-1980. The

content analysis was linked from the outset to the
instit'utional analysis and so it sought to track
elements of NOW's media construction that were
especially relevant to the institutional analysis.
Because NOW's practices and discourse are
structured in some different ways than news discourse,
this paralleling is not always as elegant as it might
be. 6

For example,

it is possible to track NOW's

strategic goals in terms of simple access - 1.e. did
they make it into the news at all -- but it 1S more
difficult to operationalize and assess some of their
other strategic goals in interactions with media. The
1ssue of identity control is one of these areas. NOW
sought to llcontrolll its image in media, but there 1S
little indication

in the institutional materials that
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the group had any systematic definition of what this
would entail, and so a direct assessment of whether they
·succeeded· in this goal needs to first provide an
operationalizations'of what such ·control· would entail.
In this study I deal with this difficulty of direct
comparisons between NOW and news by introducing a
general, multi-dimensional framework for the analysis of
NOW's ·success· in interaction with news which has
meaningful links, if not perfect symmetry, with many of
NOW's aims and strategies (outlined in section 2.2
below) .
Overall, the content analysis seeks to map the
outcomes of NOW media strategies, including its efforts
to access media, to gain voice, to be represented
legitimately and to build a women's issue news agenda.

2.1 The New York Times as a Case Study Organization

This study only assessed NOW's ·success· In one
news outlet and so is consequently limited in its
generalizability. As one newspaper the Times may make
decisions differently from other papers, and certainly
there would be different patterns of access of the study
also included television news. 7
However,

if one has to choose one newspaper as a

starting point for this kind of analysis, then the New

York Times is a good choice for a number of reasons.
First, the New York Times plays a central role in
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American political life where it is often presented (and
accepted by professional journalists throughout the
country) as the pre-eminent journal of record in the
American media sector. As such, the Times coverage of new
movements and ideas is often the harbinger and active
trend-setter for other mainstream media responses.
Secondly, the Times is the newspaper, with the Washington

Post, that

lS

read most frequently by policy makers and

government leaders, the audience that NOW was often
trying to reach. Finally, and most compelling, the Times
was considered to be one of the most valued outlets by
NOW leaders themselves. Success in accessing and
controlling one's agenda in the Times was seen as success
by NOW leaders.

2.2 Measures of Success: Access, voice and Control
The issue of ·success· in source-news interactions,
as in any kind of communicative interaction, is highly
problematic. In this study I assess the relative
·success" of NOW as a source around four different
dimensions: access,

vo~ce,

placement, and control

(identity and agenda) .

Access, simply refers to patterns In NOW's
appearance in the news columns, and is the minimal
requirement for voice in the public sphere.

Voice refers to whether NOW is allowed to speak for
itself and in what circumstances. This ability to be
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quoted in the news has often been seen as associated with 99
communicative power (cf. Sigal, 1973; Brown et al., 1987;
Barker-Plummer, 1989). Brown et al.

(1987),

for example,

have calculated the percentages of various types of
quoted news sources and have argued that the overrepresentation of elite, official, male sources indicates
the limits of diversity in political debate in the United
States. However, the relationship between being cited and
controlling the representation of one's organizational
identity or issues is surely one that is quite
problematic, which is why this study also includes
placement and control measures.
Placement refers to the context of NOW's stories and
the associated value of different news sections.
Placement in news has long been seen to indicate relative
importance -- front page issues are more important than
other kinds,

so placement patterns can be read as a

measure of relative legitimacy assigned different kinds
of stories by editors.
The fourth "level" of success for a source used
here is control. Control refers to the ability of a
participant in communication to be taken seriously as a
legitimate speaker and to be able to introduce and
define issues. Control is thus a measure of one's
influence over the debate.
In this study I operationalize control in two ways.
One aspect of control assessed here involves NOW's
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ability to control the representation of its own issue
agenda -- that is the range and ranking of its issues -in news. This kind of influence

lS

usually

associated

with the agenda-setting tradition. It is an assessment
of relative influence over what other people will
consider important and has been utilized in studies of
media effects (cf. Weaver et al., 1988) and in a study
of the influences of political candidates and parties on
election news agendas (cf. Semetko et aI, 1991). Hall et
al.

(1978) have also suggested that it is this ability

to control the agenda -- to be the
of public agendas

which

lS

Hprimary definers H

the source of state and

officials' symbolic success In using news media.
Agen?a control is assessed here by comparing NOW's
agenda at various points with the Times re-presentation
of that agenda and judging how much control NOW
maintained over its agenda.

(See section 2.48 for

detailed description of this analysis).
The second aspect of control that is assessed here
identity control -- assesses how much control NOW was
able to exercise over its organizational identity,
especially in terms of legitimacy. This concept of
Hsuccess H is one that is tied to the relative legitimacy
of a speaker in the debate. Such perceived legitimacy
likely to be associated with a source organization's
ability to frame, define, or control issues. Gitlin
(1980),

for example, seems to be invoking this kind of

lS

success measure (or in his case,

failure) when he notes
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that news framed SDS as an illegitimate political voice
and so harmed the organization's ability to define issues
or to be taken seriously by publics. Ericson et al.'s
(1989)

idea of ser10US news access as a form of cultural

capital also involves the idea of successful news access
as one that allows routine, serious representation that
results in public legitimacy.
In this study I assess legitimacy and identity
control through a qualitative analysis of NOW's framing
in the Times

which is compared to, and understood in the

context of, NOW's legitimation strategies.

(See section

2.47 below for a detailed description of this analysis.)
Th~se

two dimensions of control are likely to be

related, but they are not the same thing. A movement
group's Hsuccess H at the level of control can potentially
be different in these different dimensions. For example,
a movement group can be marginalized as an organization
but still have influence on media agendas. They can place
their issues on the agenda without being taken seriously
as the spokesperson for that issue.
These dimensions of success may be understood,
hierarchically. We can say for example that access 1S
basic to all other levels, that voice is an additional
level of successful interaction, and that legitimate
representation or control of one's identity makes a
voice more credible and more likely to be listened to.

II
t

Control, over one's identity and one's agenda, lS in
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this framework the ultimate "success" of strategic
interaction.

2.3. Data Collection: The Sample

The content analysis sample consisted of 377 stories
from the New York Times, 1966-1980. This sample
constitutes a census

of all stories which are indexed

under NOW, or which were cross referenced under NOW for
the period 1966-1980 in that newspaper. This means that
all stories (excluding letters to the editor) which were
about NOW or in which NOW was mentioned, cited, or
featured prominently, should be included. As a census of
all NOW related stories we can infer from this sample
that patterns indicated here are indicative of how NOW
and its agenda are represented by the Times overall in
the 15 year period.
This sample also has some serious limitations. As a
census of all stories about NOW in the New York Times
1966-1980, it cannot account for stories in which NOW's
information

was used but in which the organization was

not mentioned or quoted. This is a significant drawback
because there are many scenarlOS in which journalists may
have used NOW information without crediting NOW -- for
example when they cite anonymous sources
said"),

("sources

invoke general sources ("women's groups have

claimed"), or when they simply draw on this kind of press

material for background information. This may mean that
the constituted sample underplays NOW's influence on
women's issue agenda building beyond stories in which

lS

features prominently.
The size of the news sample also may have been a
drawback. Though this census sample contains all
locatable stories about NOW in the Times over the 19661980 period, it still constitutes a modest amount of news
material with which to analyze placement across multiple
categories and agenda relations. With a sample this size
analyses of particular traits over time are especially
difficult to do because cells become very small. Most of
the patterns In this study need to be retested on a
bigger sample of stories about feminism,

though how such

stories would be located is a difficult question. One of
the positive aspects of this sample, created as it is
around NOW the organization, is that it does not prejudge
which issues are feminist issues. A sampling procedure to
create a larger sample for analysis would have to
carefully consider how that sample would be constituted
without prejudging which issues would be defined as
feminist issues.

2.4. Coding, Measurement and Analysis:
Operationalizing "Success"
Each story was coded by one coder, and 20 percent of
the stories (randomly selected, proportionally by years)
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were then recoded by a second coder. Coder reliability
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figures across these two coders are cited for each
measure individually below. The average coder reliability
figure for all measures reported here was .84.
Each of the four conceptual Hlevels H of success
access, voice, placement and control -- were
operationalized and measured in the following ways.

2.41 Basic access
Measurement. Basic access was measured in two ways.

First through a simple count of the number of stories.
Second, a count of paragraphs was also undertaken. The
paragraph count gives a more nuanced account as it
includes information about how much coverage NOW produced
over time, as well as how many individuals stories. 8
Analysis. Access measures (both stories and graphs)

were plotted over time, to ascertain trends in NOW's
access over time (see chapter seven). Access measures
were also correlated with resource measures

in order to

investigate links between resources and access (see
chapter five) .9

2.42 Access Strategies
Measurement. Stories were also coded for access

strategies -- that is each story was coded to determine
what event, strategy or activity by either NOW or a
journalist had occurred to produce the story, and these

patterns were then tracked over time and compared to
NOW's activities. For example, the analysis asked, was
the story the result of a public demonstration, protest
or publicity gesture, or the result of journalist
enterprise, such as an interview? Was the story
initiated by NOW filing a law suit or was it coverage of
a NOW conference?
The overall aim of such an analysis was to
determine, if possible, how much of the news about NOW
was produced through NOW's own action. In contrast how
much was generated from journalist "enterprise," as well
as to determine,

if possible, which of NOW's

communicative strategies were most likely to gain news
coverage. 10
Access strategy categories were:
(a)

Public Events (which included marches, strikes,

demonstrations, boycotts, anniversary or special
occasion public events. When these were also accompanied
by news conferences, the public event was coded as the
source of the story)
(b) NOW Meeting/Routine Event This category
included stories about NOW conferences, conventions or
chapter meetings.
(c) Court-Related (Legal). This category included
stories that were predominantly generated because NOW
interacted with the court system.

105

(d) Legislature or Commission Context. This
category included NOW's interactions with legislatures
and commissions, both state and national.
(e) Journalist Enterprise. Any story In which it
was not clear what the event, strategy or hook was, or
that was clearly an interview or special feature, was
coded as journalist enterprise. It is likely that some
of the stories in the "journalist enterprise" category
were also instigated by subsidies sent out by NOW, but
unless a study or news conference was explicitly
mentioned, the benefit of the doubt was given to
journalist-enterprise.
(f) NOW Overt News Subsidy. This category include
stories that seem to have been generated because of a
NOW report, award or other "overt" subsidy. Note that
this category does not account for NOW subsidies of news
that do not mention or cite the organization, because
this sample is compiled by collecting together all
stories indexed and cross referenced under NOW.
(g) Other. This category contained stories
generated in unusual contexts. This category made up
about 5 percent of stories.
Often more than one origin for the story could be
detected. For example, if a protest march was being
reported and a news conference had also been convened by
NOW to discuss the event. In these cases, policy was to
code the "main" event that was taking place -- i.e. in
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the case of a news conference accompanylng an event, the 107
event was coded.
Coder agreement between two coders for this item was
75%. Coder reliability was .65. 11 Most of the
disagreement encountered here was not in finding
events/strategies that resulted in the story, but in
agreement between coders as to which event or strategy
was the most important -- i.e. choosing which event or
strategy to code as the causal factor. Code sheets
indicate that both coders were able to identify the same
~

of initiation or access strategies in the texts but

they disagreed some of the time as to which news
initiation strategy was the main event, and so which to
code.
Analysis. Access Strategies were tracked over time

to see which strategies had produced most coverage
(chapter seven, 1.3), and then cross tabulated with (a)
gender (b) placement and (c) voice in order to determine
whether patterns in access strategies were related to
other strategic factors. For example, the access
strategy/gender cross tab sought to determine if NOW's
strategic interaction with women reporters interacted
with particular story initiation contexts (chapter seven,
1.2) .

2.43 Reporter Gender
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Measures. Because one of NOW's main strategies in
interaction with news was to interact with and support
women reporters, and because the topic of the news
stories was feminist lssues, the gender of writers was
coded from bylines when it could be determined. About 2/3
of all stories could be identified this way.

(140 of 377

stories did not have bylines.) .Coder agreement on the
gender of writers as indicated by bylines was 100% across
a three-part option (male-female-unknown). Coder
reliability was 1.0.

Analysis. The gender of writers was then tracked
across time to determine patterns in coverage overall and
was crDSS tabulated with (a) placement

(b) access

strategy (c) voice and (d) topic to indicate whether
interactions with women reporters were also associated
with other "success measures." For example, I wanted to
know if women reporters' stories were also likely to be
the stories generated in particular contexts -- were the
NOW stories written by women reporters likely to be those
initiated by journalist enterprise,

for example? This

might indicate the existence of a cadre of sympathetic
reporters and/or of gendered patterns of assignments in
the newspaper.

2.44 voice
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Measures. "Voice" was measured simply by coding
whether or not the story directly quoted NOW. Give that
all of these stories mentioned NOW, those in which NOW
was not quoted were coded as NOW being "talked about."
Unfortunately the voice measure did not include
coding for the number of times NOW was quoted, nor did
it indicate whether they were "counter-quoted" by
another source, though these would also have been good
measures of voice and should be included in future
studies. Coder reliability here was .98.

Analysis. Voice patterns were tracked across time to
indicate what proportion of stories NOW was quoted in and
what proportions they were talked about. Voice was also
cross tabulated with (a) gender (b) placement and (c)
access strategy to determine of voice for NOW was linked
to story contexts, reporters gender or news placement
(chapter seven, 2.1).

2.45 Issue/Topic
Measures. All stories were also coded in terms of
the topics of the story. They were coded first for
headline topic -- which is usually a good indication of
the overall most important topic of the story. They were
also coded in terms of issues mentioned (1-6 issues ln
this study). A comparison of frequencies of stories by
topic indicated that headline and Issue 1 (first issue

mentioned) breakdowns were very similar. For the most
part the analysis uses headline topics as indications of
the general topic of the story. Coder reliability was
.82.

Analysis. Topics of stories were first plotted
overall

(aggregate frequencies)

to indicate general

levels of attention by the Times to NOW issues (chapter
seven,

section 4.1).

Second, the story topics were plotted year-by year
In order to see what aspects of NOW's discourse the Times
found most important each year,

thus constructing a news

agenda for each year chapter seven, 4.2).
Stories categorized by topics was also cross
tabulated with (a) placement

(b) access strategy (c)

gender and (d) voice in order to detect patterns in the

Times handling of NOW stories depending on their topic
(chapter seven, sections 3 and 4). This cross tab data
would indicate of NOW stories were placed in different
sections of the paper based on the topic of the story,
and whether story topics were also related to reporters'
gender, access strategy and so on. These measures would
help explain the influence of NOW's identity/ideology on
its representation.

2.46 Placement
Measures. The stories were also coded on their
placement within the newspaper. Placement in newspapers

110

is allocated in terms of topics (TV stories In the TV
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section for example) but, placement is also an indication
news sorting of events in terms of what is considered
most important (and

I

argue here most "public" as opposed

to "private" concerns.)
Categories in this coding were: Front Page, News
Sections, Women's/Lifestyle Page, Regional Pages, and
Other (e.g. TV pages, business pages, etc. Coder
reliability was .74.
Analysis. First, stories' placement was tracked over

time in order to ascertain if NOW "succeeded" in getting
its ideas into the news sections or the front page, which
is where they wanted to be placed. Placement was then
cross tabulated with (a) topic (b) gender (c) access
strategies and (d) voice in order to ascertain whether
placement was linked to topic of the story, the gender of
the reporter or the access strategy which initiated the
story.

2.47 Control Measures I: Agendas

Besides access, voice and placement the study also
tried to assess NOW's relative control in interaction
with media along two dimensions -- agenda control and
identity control. Agenda control measures compare NOW's
agenda to the Times' representation of that agenda.
Agenda control is seen to have occurred (i.e. NOW has
been successful) if the Times representation of NOW in

terms of its range and ranking of issues resembles NOW's 112
own agendas at various times.
Agenda Measures. This use of agenda comparlsons lS

somewhat different from most studies of agenda-setting
which focus on the relationship between media and
audiences. However the agenda-setting methodology has
recently been extended to embrace a larger concern with
the formation of media agendas themselves which is called
-agenda building"

(cf. Semetko et aI, 1991). It

is in

this second context that I use the methodology in this
study to compare NOW and news agendas -- to assess NOW's
ability to control its own agenda in interaction with
news media.
Th~

move from media-to-audience agenda setting to

organization-to-media agenda setting brings with it some
problems for the agenda setting method of categorizing,
ranking and correlating agendas. As Semetko et al.

(1991)

also note, the organizations and discourses that
influence news agendas are often already formed and
encoded in ways that are not easily compatible with news
categories and forms. This makes the comparison between
agendas at the institutional level a more complex process
than that between news and audience agendas, where
audience priorities are constructed through surveys that
use the same terminology and categories as news itself.
For example, Semetko et al.

(1991) try to assess the

influence of presidential candidates and parties In

Britain and the US in "setting" the news agenda during
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elections, but they note with some frustration that the
effort of making these discourses comparable is itself
part of the problem. 12
This difficulty in comparing two different forms of
discourses was also apparent in this analysis. First
there were problems with constructing reliable agendas
for NOW at regular intervals. Not only is NOW's political
identity at anyone time usually resolutely multi-issue
(see chapter four) but NOW's records are not organized in
a systematic enough way to create reliable agendas for
NOW for every year. Consequently the agenda control
measures in the study are limited to three different NOW
"agendas" -- the 1969 NOW Bill of Rights, the 1975
Manifesto and the 1989 Bill of Rights for the 21st
Century -- which are clear statements of priorities by
the organization. These agendas are then correlated with
the Times agendas for the same years, and then for the
next year.
Some adjustments had to be made to the news analysis
also. For the most part the Times
conventionally,

"agendas" were created

(i.e. by ranking issues in terms of the

frequency of stories in particular categories) but some
standardizing had to be done to make it possible to
compare NOW and news agendas. For example, a key category
of news stories had to be dropped during the ranked
correlations because it had no logical equivalent in NOW
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discourse. The largest category of news stories In the
Times about NOW is the category of NOW/feminism which
contains stories about NOW events and strategies rather
than focusing on any particular issue. There is no
equivalent category in NOW agendas (this is an artifact

of news coverage) so that this category (and "other") had
to be dropped in order to rank and correlate NOW and news
stories.

(Semetko et al

(1991) also note that in their

analysis of political parties and news agendas a large
category of event/strategy oriented stories also had to
be dropped from the analysis.)
The agenda correlations here also involved longer
than customary time lags between agenda comparisons. The
time lags used here -- in which NOW agendas are seen to
influence the Times' representation of these agendas
are yearly. NOW and the Times' agendas (for NOW) are
correlated first In the same year, and then one and two
years later.
This time lag is longer by far than agenda-setting
usually allows

lags usually range from a few weeks to

a few months. But these time lags are reasonable in this
particular context. Most agenda setting work is conducted
during elections, whereas NOW's relationship with news
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analyzed here as an ongoing interaction across 15 years.
During elections news handlers are sending out materials
daily and hourly, and new issues are put on the agenda
every day. It makes sense to assess relationships between

news and audiences, and news and politicians, within the 115
short term in this framework. However NOW's interactions
with news were much less frequent than this. They took
place a few times a month usually and more often in times
of crisis (this is an estimate from the number of
available press releases and documented interactions with
reporters) and new priorities were raised in the
organization monthly and yearly (at conventions and board
meetings), not daily. The NOW-news interaction was
consequently one that was much slower and relationships
between changes in one discourse and changes in the other
are consequently likely to be spaced father apart. It is
this slowness that makes an over time analysis essential,
and which 'makes year lags as used here reasonable
responses to the limits of the data and the logic of the
interaction. These changes in the agenda-setting
techniques are important ones, however, and they place
limits on how far results from this study can be
understood in the larger agenda-setting context (see
section 2.5, Limitations for more discussion of this
problem) .
The starting points for the time-lags involved here
were chosen based on the availability of NOW agendas in
these years -- 1968 and 1975. NOW's pUblication of
agendas in these years coincided with key decision points
in the organization. The Bill of Rights in 1968 was the
founding document of NOW after the first two years as it

became institutionalized and set public goals for itself.116
The Manifesto in 1975 was a public signal of significant
change in NOW's direction as the new leaders took over
the organization.
Analysis. The limited agenda comparisons done for

the study,

then, were (i) correlation of NOW's 1968, and

1975 agendas with the Times' agendas for the same years
(1968 and 1975),
with the Times

(ii) correlation of NOW's 1968 agenda
1970 agenda (1969 had too few stories)

and (iii) NOW's 1975 agenda with the Times' 1976 and 1977
agendas.

2.47 Control Measures II: Identity Control

AS'well as strategically accessing news media, and
using that access to introduce new issues into public
debate, NOW leaders wanted to create and maintain a
public image for the organization itself as the serious
"voice" for American women. Organizational legitimacy was
seen to be essential in making other kinds of political
activity possible. In this section of the analysis I
assess the relative "success" of NOW's strategic control
of its identity control and its attempts to build a
legitimate identity for itself in the public sphere.
The study tracks NOW's representation in the Times
and assesses

that representation in the context of the

organization's own shifting identities and strategies.
NOW's "public" identity was thus compared to its

Hinternal H organizational identity, and its relative
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Hsuccess H is assessed in terms of that comparison.
Measurement. NOW's identity was tracked in the

Times through a systematic qualitative/interpretive
analysis of the language, descriptions, and frames used
to construct the organization. Frames here refer to the
ways in which information is organized and presented, ln
this case from information about NOW framed by
reporters. Goffman (1986 [1974]) has describes a frame
as a cognitive organizing device that "allows its user
to locate, perceive, identify and, label a seemingly
infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its
terms." Underlying the concept of framing is the
understanding that the way lssues or groups are
constructed can have serious consequences for how they
will be perceived by individuals and policy makers
(Kahnman and Tversky, 1984; Iyengar, 1991; Stallings,
1990; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989).
In the context of media studies, researchers have
noted that one of the most important roles of news is in
the ways that it frames new or emergent issues, events
and organizations for audiences (cf. Gitlin 1980; Gamson,
1992; Ryan, 1991). Framing an organization in different
ways in news may lead to its being perceived as more or
less legitimate or credible by news readers. Ryan (1991,
p.207),

for example, identifies a number of ways in which

media frames can legitimizes or delegitimize groups. She

notes that groups can be de-legitimized by being named

inl18

ways that they did not choose for themselves (such as
"leftist" rather than democratic)

by having their

i

identity set off by quotes or qualifiers (such as
"alleged" or "calling themselves")

i

by having their

concerns trivialized (i.e. focusing on dress or
mannerlsms rather than content)

i

or by being "balanced"

by sources that are of quite different stature. Gitlin
(1980. p. 27) offers a similar series of news framing
"mechanisms" of delegitimation when he notes that
coverage of SDS

featured trivialization (making light of

movement language, style, age and goals), polarization
(emphasizing counter demonstrations and balancing the
grou~

with the ultra-right as equivalent llextremists"),

emphasis on internal dissent, marginalization

(showing

demonstrators to be deviant or unrepresentative), and so
on.
In this analysis I draw on Ryan (1991) and Gitlin's
(1980) methodological insights in tracking the linguistic
cues and frames for NOW that would indicate legitimacy
(or not)

in a particular story (e.g. polarization or

being described in quotation marks), but I am also
concerned with more macro patterns of shifts in news
representations of NOW over time and in different
contexts. Neither Gitlin (1980) nor Ryan (1991)

followed

media-movement relationships over long periods, and so
consequently processes of struggle over legitimation that

L

may have taken place had the groups continued to interactl19
with media, or the researchers continued to observe, are
missed. Gitlin (1980),

for example, studied SDS's

representation closely only over one year (1965-1966)
He argues that studying early framing is the best way to
see the emergence of media frames before they "harden"
into place as cornmon sense. But what if they do not
harden at all but change In some other way? NOW's
representation over time suggests that in fact early
marginalization can move into later,

if limited,

legitimation. Because NOW is one of the few movement
groups to continue to exist over time, we have a unique
ability to see in its experiences with news media whether
a marginalizing framing can in

be turned around

whether persistent efforts at reframing can be
successful.
Analysis. NOW's "identity" as represented in the

Times

is compared to and assessed in the context of its

own internal identity constructions and legitimation
strategies. The organization's self-descriptions in its
policy documents and public statements which was document
in the institutional analysis is now compared

its

representation in the Times. For example, NOW
leadership's general shift in 1975 in which they
exercised less control over NOW's public image in 1975
and allowed more internal dissent to be publicly talked
about is tracked to media content at that time, and the

overall legitimation (or not) patterns in news
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representations are compared to NOW's identity strategies
at that time.

2.5 Limitations of the Content Analysis

Some

of the limitations of the content analysis

derive from the news sample, others from limitations in
the operationalizations and measurements.
The sample drawn here constitutes a census of all
stories about NOW in the New York Times 1966-1980 which
means that it cannot account for stories in which NOW's
information

was used but in which the organization was

not mentioned or quoted. As noted above this is a
significant drawback because there are many scenarios in
which journalists may have used NOW information without
crediting NOW. The size of the news sample is also
problematic, making it difficult to analyze trends over
time adequately.
Limitations of the content analysis are also tied to
problems of operationalization and measurement. Assessing
"success" in

interaction is problematic in any context,

and this study is no exception. The framework of access,
voice, placement and control offered here, and the
measurements used to assess these concepts, are only
exploratory and sketchy beginnings to what will be a long
development process. I have drawn here also on some
available measurement techniques (such as agenda setting

methods of rank order correlations) which seemed to be
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the best available for my purposes but which are
stretched to their logical limits in this context.
Changing the usual time lags in agenda setting, for
example, even when it seems justified by the slow pace of
NOW-news interaction, may significantly distance this
analysis from others in that research tradition. Combined
with the difficulties involved in standardizing movement
and news discourses for comparisons overall, it may be
that agenda setting techniques are not the most
appropriate for this kind of analysis. Clearly more work
needs to be done in operationalizing both agenda and
identity control.

Chapter Summary

The parallel institutional and content analyses
research design here allows us to both track and assess
the media strategies of a new social movement
organization. The two-part logic of the study's design is
essentially if we are to understand the role(s) of news
in processing social movement discourses -- it is only by
comparing news constructions to others that we can
untangle roles for sources and roles for news.
Because this is a case study which seeks to
understand the relative role played by several different
kinds of factors

(resources, strategies and ideology) it

involved multiple methodologies. The study involves

historical, quantitative content analysis and
interpretive text analysis to get at the complex multilayered relationship that NOW built with news. Overall
the study is conceptually driven, and it draws
eclectically on methods and measurement techniques that
seem to show promise in the various contexts addressed.
NOTES

I,
r
r
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1 These three factors are drawn from a reVlew of the
three major approaches to news studies -- political
economic, sociological and ideological/hegemonic
(Barker-Plummer, 1993).
2 For example, in 1975 NOW's identity underwent a shift
and so did its relationship to media. The Majority
Caucus took over with a wider feminist agenda than
leaders had had before, and their attitude towards media
coverage of NOW was much less controlling than the
previous leadership because they were concerned to
present a diverse and welcoming identity for the
organization rather than a carefully controlled and precensored one. Thus a shift in political identity
generally also made for a shift in media strategies, and
indeed shift in news coverage -- during this period (as
I describe in chapter eight) news coverage of NOW became
much more diverse, complex and critical.
3 The master list lists items in the following ways "a
manila folder marked ERA 1976" which is less than
useful.
4 Finding relevant materials is somewhat haphazard
researchers have to simply order up boxes that, from
their contents list, look like they might be useful.
5 The "unit" of analysis in news agendas is usually the
story. A possible "unit" in NOW papers might be a
mention of an issue on the agenda for the national
convention agenda, or national board meetings, but even
these materials are not reliably available.
6 This difficulty in comparing two different discourses
is not unique to NOW. Recent studies that have tried to
track the influence of institutions on media agendas in
other contexts -- for example presidential candidates
and political parties on news election agendas (cf.
Semetko et al., 1991) have also noted the difficulty in
paralleling these discourses adequately for comparison.
See discussion later in section 2.46 which describes the
agenda setting measures.
7 Extensions to the study will include Times coverage up
to 1995, and TV coverage 1966-1995.
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8 Paragraphs in the Times and other newspapers are on
average about 3-5 sentences. This is a more convenient
measurement than column inches for coders, and overall
gives a reliable measure for comparative purposes.
9 Log measures of graphs, income and membership were
also calculated so that income. membership and access
could be charted together (chapter seven, 1.2)
10 Sigal (1973) is the source of this distinction
between journalist enterprise and other kinds of
stories, but it is vulnerable to criticism too because
interview or features may also be instigated by
information subsidies of some sort -- e.g., press kits
that indicate leaders to interview, or suggestions by
media strategists that prompt "features" and so on.
11 Coder agreement as a simple percentage was 75%. When
calculated as a reliability figure, which takes into
account patterns of expected (random) agreement, the
figure moves down to .65.
12 In the end the Semetko et al. (1991) study compares
issue ranking in candidate speeches in media to issue
ranking in news reports about the election overall. This
is problematic in terms of the relative lack of
independence of these sources -- both are mediated -but it is one way to produce standardized formats to
compare.

Chapter 4
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A Brief Political Profile of the National Organization
for Women: Militant Pragmatists

The National Organization for
so that men could also be members

Women -- so called
-- was formed in 1966

by a group of women who were attending the Third
National Conference of the State Commissions on the
Status of Women. They had been dissatisfied with the way
the conference was going for a few days. Most of their
critical reports on women's status were being ignored
and they felt that the conference was being "managed" to
make the Administration look good while avoiding any
definitive policy statements. Finally, after having
their attempt to introduce a motion on enforcement of
existing sex discrimination laws (such as Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act), denied, the group got
together and formed the National Organization for Women.
According to NOW's first president, Betty Friedan,
(1976), they sat down together at a banquet table, wrote
out NOW's name and mission on a cocktail napkin, each
chipped in $5 for a startup kitty and NOW was born
(Friedan, 1976; Carden, 1974; Carabillo et al., 1993) 1
From these early days of a handful of elite members
and a few hundred dollars, NOW grew into the biggest and
most important mass-based feminist organization in the

United States, and perhaps In the world. It now has a
paylng membership of 250,000

(and many non paying

supporters), hundreds of chapters allover the United
States, and a budget around ten million dollars. It has
become the best known of all feminist organizations in
the national policy arena, and its targeting by right
wing politicians and movements as "the enemy" in many
different campaigns suggests that it is also recognized
by its enemies as a core organization of US

political

feminism.

NOW in Movement Context

NOW was formed In the midst of a burgeoning
"movem~nt"

of women In the United States. This movement

or llsecond wave" of feminist activity In the United
States (the first had taken place around suffrage
earlier in the century) comprised a loosely related set
of individuals, texts and organizations, all focused in
one way or another on challenging gender inequities and
extending women's rights and roles in society. The
movement ranged from small local groups of a few women
engaged in consciousness raising to a national, mass
based organization like NOW. The many different groups
involved in the second wave -- from women's bookstores
and clinics to Washington based research organizations
-- shared few specific strategies or members but they
did share a central focus on issues of gender inequality
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and a sense of being part of a larger ffmovement ff of
feminism (Echols, 1989; Freeman, 1975; Koedt et aI,
1973; Carden, 1974; Hole and Levine, 1971.)
Freeman (1975, p. 50), an activist and movement
historian, has suggested that we can best understand the
complexity of the second wave women's movement if we
think of it as breaking down very generally into a
"younger" and an "older" branch. In the "older" branch
Freeman places national organizations, such as (NOW),
National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) , Women's Equity
Action League (WEAL), and so on, which she sees as being
concerned with

political action in the public domain.

In the ffyounger branch ff Freeman places less structured,
and more openly radical groups such as The Feminists,
Redstockings, and so on.
Freeman's older/younger categorization focuses not
on ideological differences

(because all feminisms want

to fundamentally restructure human relations) but rather
notes that the ffolder ff and ffyounger" branches of the
movement had different kinds of organizational forms and
tended to pursue similar goals through quite different
strategies.
Other observers have preferred to see the movement
breaking down along a radical-liberal dimension (cf.
Echols, 1989), but as Freeman notes, this left-right
spectrum has never worked very well for feminisms. These
distinctions obscure as much as they reveal about
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feminisms, almost all of which challenge In some ways
the public-private underpinnings of both liberal and
radical political discourses, and almost all of which,
if instituted. would indeed have radical outcomes
(Freeman, 1975, p. 49):

The terms "reformist" and "radical" by which the
two branches are often designated are convenient
and fit our preconceived notions about the nature
of political activity, but they tell us little of
relevance ... Some groups often called "reformist"
have a platform that would so completely change our
society it would be unrecognizable. Other groups
called "radical" concentrate on the traditional
female concerns of love, sex, children, and
interpersonal relationships (although with nontraditional views). The ideological complexity of
the movement is too great to be categorized so
simply . . . . Structure and style rather than
ideology more accurately differentiate the two
branches, and even here there has been much
borrowing on each side (p. 49).

Generally speaking, says Freeman, the differences
between the older and younger branches were in style not
substance. Both sets of groups were concerned about
structural inequities in access to employment, education
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and politics, but they chose different strategic paths
to engage with these problems.
The "older" branch groups focused for the most part
on legal and governmental strategies (for example
challenging sex discrimination in the courts or pushing
for EEO inclusion of gender discrimination). They also
usually had more links to existing institutions and many
of their leaders were already involved in "women's"
politics in other ways before forming these groups. The
women who formed NOW,

for example, had been working on

women's politics in various government departments,
unlons, businesses and universities for years before the
formation of NOW and they had been talking for a long
time about the need for an organization like NOW that
could serve as an "independent voice" for women's issues
in ways that they could not from within their own
organizations (Friedan, 1976; Carabillo et aI, 1993)
This kind of connections to existing political forums
made the "older" group quite different from the
"younger" groups in terms of age, experience and
expectations.
The younger branch groups were first of all mostly
made up of younger women, and they were more loosely
organized into a plethora of different, often local,
groups. Their activities varied from consciousnessralSlng to political "zaps" and protests and who
experimented with alternative forms of association. To
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the younger groups, personal transformation was as
important as public change and they tried to embody
their politics in practice through problematizing issues
of hierarchy, specialization, and routinization in their
organizations. It was the younger groups for the most
part who later set up many of the alternative feminist
service organizations (such as clinics, magazines and
bookstores) .

IS there "a" NOW? Strategic Identity Creation

NOW is a particularly difficult organization to
classify. Even Freeman's classification of NOW as
belonging to the "older" branch (because of its
bur~aucratic

form and "insider" strategies) only holds

true in the first few years of its existence and in fact
may only ever have been true at the national level. At
the local level NOW chapters did not always organize
bureaucratically at all -- in fact many chapters bore
more resemblance to younger movement consciousness
raising groups than to national NOW with its Board and
specialized roles. And after 1973-1975, even the
national organization began to seem "younger." By that
time most of the younger movement groups had disbanded
or disappeared and many women flocked to NOW as one of
the few viable forms of organized feminism. After 1975,
NOW itself became a central site of struggle over what
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US

feminism would be. because it has changed its

identity so much over the years.
On a left-right spectrum NOW leaders and members
have usually been left of center, but they have also
quite often put gender issues (such as abortion rights)
before traditional political distinctions and supported
candidates from both Republican and Democratic parties
who worked for these lssues.
In terms of class issues, NOW has also shifted over
time. NOW was founded by an upper middle class elite
group, and it has never been an organization to whom
class analysis was central, but it has developed over
time a strong position on the rights and problems of
poor women. NOW was one of the few national women's
organizations to speak out,

for example, on forced

sterilization and more recently on welfare cuts and
their devastating effects on poor women with children.
In fact,

searching for nann identity for NOW may

itself be part of the problem. NOW's npublic identityn
has always been seen by its leaders as flexible. In the
early years (1966-1973),

for example, much of NOW's non-

radical positioning had less to do with its members
philosophies than with the short term political goals of
its national leaders who were concerned that they be
taken seriously by news and other political leaders (and
so were concerned not to seem too radical) and who were
constrained by the very real problem of maintaining the

130

support of the organizations (for example the
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traditional women's organizations and labor unions) that
were still underwriting NOW financially.2
Over time NOW has encompassed both a radical
commitment to long term social change, and a strategic
pragmatism In the short term. This pragmatism is what
makes it possible for NOW to take strategic action in
the short term -- including framing itself as mainstream
if necessary -- while maintaining a long term
transformative vision. As Carden (1974) notes, this
blend of radical intent and pragmatic strategies

lS

often misunderstood as a lack of vision, when in fact it
is a kind of "double vision" in which NOW members
maintain their commitment to long term radical change
but are good enough readers of the contemporary
situation to realize that short term actions are more
likely to succeed (Carden, 1974, p. 105):

NOW's approach to social problems is pragmatic.
Ideally many NOW members would like to transform or
even eliminate societal role expectations for women
and men but they do not believe they can achieve
this goal directly: instead, they work for change
by exerting pressure on the existing social
structure. This pragmatic approach (which is shared
by other Women's Rights groups) is commonly
misinterpreted. Many people believe that NOW and

similar groups want to modify the present society,
not to restructure it (p. 105).

This kind of strategic pragmatism makes NOW hard to
pin down on dualistic scales -- such as the

radical or

reformist scale -- because such scales assume an
essential or "authentic" identity which is simply not
the case for most movements or movement organizations.
NOW's identity shifted over time because of leadership
and membership shifts, historical changes and, perhaps
most importantly changing strategies of selfpresentation. Van Zoonen (1992, p. 6) notes that this
kind of shifting is typical of social movement
organizations. It is our frameworks that are wrong In
trying to see movements as consistent, goal oriented
identities when they are in fact

(strategic) social

constructions:

the collective identity of movements is never
stable; it is a social construction, arising from
symbolic negotiation within movements, as well as
from interaction with their political and social
environment.

If we have to apply a label to NOW's organizational
philosophy, it is perhaps best characterized as being a
kind of militant pragmatism that allows its members and
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leaders to see themselves as revolutionaries -- and
indeed to want radical societal changes in terms of
gender identities -- but also be able to present
themselves in strategically appropriate ways in the
short term and to be able to engage in interaction with
the existing (sexist) political system over specific
issues.
A long-time NOW member and chronicler of the
organization has called this position a upassion for the
possible u and it 1S changes in what NOW's leaders and
members consider to be upossibleu 1n specific historical
circumstances which caused shifts 1n NOW's identity and
policy over time,

rather than any change in the

orgariization's commitment to, or desire for,

radical

social change.

NOW's Policy Agendas:
Core Issues and Agenda Expansion Over Time
Over time, changing memberships and political
contexts affected NOW's political agenda, but there have
always been certain core areas that NOW has remained
focused on throughout its history.

For example, equal

rights for women in all areas of social life and
especially under the law has been a guiding principle
for NOW since its founding. The NOW Statement of Purpose
written in 1967 notes that NOW's central aim is to bring
women into Utruly equal partnershipu with men.
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This concern for equality took a number of
directions over the years, the most obvious being
ongoing organizational support for, and mobilization
around,

the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.

NOW declared its support of the ERA in 1967 (and in so
doing lost the support of its organized labor members)
and the ERA remained a core NOW issue ever since. In the
late 1970s , in the days leading up to the 1982
(extended) ratification deadline it was also an issue
that brought in thousands of new members and at one
point around a million dollars a month in contributions
to support NOW's ERA work.
The defeat over the ERA, which failed to be
rati'fied by its 1982 deadline, was a serious blow to the
organization. NOW had invested huge amounts of money,
skills and energy into the ratification battle and its
failure caused serious loss of morale in the movement.

Sex Discrimination
This core concern for equality was also manifested
In NOW's other key legal area; sex discrimination. NOW
and other feminists had been instrumental in getting
"sex" added as a category to the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and NOW worked to have it included in all civil
rights legislation thereafter. Indeed NOW was one of the
key political players in the "making" of sex
discrimination as a legal category and as a political
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issue at all. NOW members pressured and protested the
EEOC to review sex discrimination in employment
complaints when the Commission was reluctant to consider
sex as a viable category at all. Over the years NOW has
been a legal and moral resource (and litigant)

for women

suffering sex discrimination in employment allover the
United States. The organization was instrumental, for
example, in influencing the EEOC to file
of its biggest sex discrimination suits

(and win) some
(such as the

AT&T and US Steel settlements of the 1970s) in which
women and minority employees were awarded millions of
dollars back pay due to discrimination in hiring and
promotions .
. NOW's sex discrimination concerns also extended
beyond employment to cover inequalities and sex
discrimination in education (in schooling and teaching),
in access to credit and insurance, and in sports and
housing. NOW's pressure was important in the passing of
the Equal Credit Act and its work on desegregating
school sports, especially Little League, made them
infamous in the early 1970s. NOW research and reports,
along with the AAUW and EEOC on university hiring
practices were also influential In promoting reform In
university promotions and tenuring practices resulting
in the tenuring of more women.
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Abortion Rights
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Two other essential lssue areas that have remained
among NOW's core concerns, though they have both evolved
over time, are abortion rights and child care. NOW
declared itself unambiguously in favor of reproductive
freedom in 1967,

(and again lost some of its board

members). NOW's framing of abortion rights as "the
rights of women to control their reproductive lives" was
the first time that a feminist framework had been
provided for access to abortion (Hole and Levine, 1971,
p.

89):

NOW's position made it the first women's right
organization to put the civil libertarian argument
for abortion into clear feminist terms -- the right
of a woman to control her body.

The long term dominance of this frame for abortion
(which held until recent right wing counter-frames about
the "rights" of fetuses)

lS an indication of how social

movement communications can successfully influence
public understandings.

Child Care

Child care was also a new and controversial issue
when NOW first espoused it In 1966. When NOW first
articulated the importance of accessible and affordable

child care centers as the right of working parents,
Richard Nixon was declaring such centers to be communist
plots. The development of affordable (preferably state
funded)

day care remains a key NOW concern, but 25 years

later it has also made it ways into both the Democratic
and Republican party platforms.
NOW's core concerns were codified In the 1968
"National Organization for Women Bill of Rights" which
demanded:

I.

Equal Rights Constitutional Amendment

II.

Enforce Law Banning Sex Discrimination In
Employment

. III. Maternity Leave Rights in Employment and In

Social Security Benefits.
Tax Deduction for Horne and Child Care Expenses

IV.

for Working Parents
V.

Child Day Care Centers

VI. Equal and Unsegregated Education
VII. Equal Job Training Opportunities and

Allowances for Women in Poverty
VIII. The Right of Women to Control their

Reproductive Lives

As

lS

clear from both its title and language, the

1968 Bill of Rights was strategically articulated by its
producers to link to the US Bill of Rights. This use of
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constitutional language (of individual rights and
equality) is something that NOW continued to do over
time, though as we shall see, by 1989 the language of
"rights" had been extended much further to include the
"right" to a toxin free environment and a peaceful world
order. 3

Sexual Orientation

One issue area that later became central to NOW but
lS conspicuously absent in NOW's first policy statements
is that of sexual identity or sexual orientation. Though
NOW leaders have often perceived themselves and the
organization as being in the vanguard of the movement,
and"of "leading public opinion," they were slow to take
on board issues of sexuality and lesbianism though these
were important movement topics. Friedan, NOW's president
from 1966-1970, is widely seen as the driving force
behind the organization's avoidance of questions of
sexual identity, despite the fact that it was a central
part of the movement discourse more generally. Friedan
(1976, p. 141) herself admits to wanting to "avoid" the
lssue, not because of personal feelings, but because of
its controversial nature:

I didn't want that issue [lesbianism] even to
surface and divide the organization, as it surely
would have in 1970, and almost did, later.
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Like many other internal conflicts In NOW, this one
has some roots in NOW's ongoing concern with its
"public" identity. National NOW leaders,

(as I explain

further in chapter six), were continuously concerned
with how NOW was perceived by journalists and other
traditional political institutions and this focus on
external audiences often had containing consequences
within the organization.
NOW's position on lesbianism and sexual orientation
has changed dramatically since Friedan's early
statements. A 1971 national conference resolution
brought lesbian rights onto NOW's agenda and a 1975
resolution made the issue a priority for NOW. But for
many feminists the legacy of NOW's initial rejection of
lesbianism, and a lingering historical memory of an
alleged "purge" of lesbian members,

remains part of the

organization's identity that NOW leadership has to
respond to 20 years later. Patricia Ireland notes:

The perception [that NOW

lS

unfriendly to lesbians]

is clearly outdated, and it's not to deny history.
But I think the history was greatly exaggerated by
the pain that it caused. 4

1970's:

Expanding Agendas, Interconnected Issues

and "Cultural" Feminisms

Throughout its history, NOW has retained its
concern with discrimination in education, employment,
economics, housing and sports. But from these initial
topics has grown an expansive set of concerns that now
include issues of racism, poverty, gay civil rights,
welfare reform, media reform, violence, health and
family relations. In fact by the 1990s, NOW was such a
multi-issue organization that Patricia Ireland, NOW's
president quipped that NOW 1S uyo ur genuine full-service
feminist organization. u5
Some of this expansion 1n feminist concerns was the
result of leadership and membership changes. By the mid
1970s many of the less centralized Uyounger" feminist
groups had disappeared from public view. They had either
institutionalized into service organizations (such as
feminist women's clinics and rape counseling centers) or
disbanded as members moved on to other projects. In any
case by 1975, many of the UyoungerU feminists who were
still interested in working in organized political
feminism had joined NOW.
At the 1975 NOW National Conference, for example -tellingly entitled UOut of the Mainstream and into the
Revolution u -- almost the entire standing NOW Board was
replaced by a Umajority caucus" of younger, more
militant, leaders, and NOW headed into a period in which
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radical, long term goals were emphasized and the
-mainstream- rejected: 6

The Majority Caucus believes that NOW should not
identify as a mainstream organization ... Because
struggling solely for an equal place in the
American mainstream ... means accepting whatever
currently prevails in the mainstream as desirable,
including an overvaluation of traditionally male
jobs, activities and roles ...

[and it] prevents our

uSlng tactics that people in the mainstream don't
like, such as street demonstrations, abrasive court
actions and uncompromising pursuit of the issues. 7

These new members and leaders brought with them a
vision of feminism more expansive than NOW's early
leaders, and they were much more likely to be associated
with what Echols (1989) has called -cultural feminism-- an articulation of feminism that focused on revalorizing women's -traditional" roles as much as (or
rather than) integrating women into the traditionally
masculine spheres. 8
In NOW policy terms this changeover meant an
expansion of NOW's concerns from the traditionally
-political- to a wide range of issues, as well as a new
focus on reaching out to women in -traditional- roles,
such as homemakers and care professionals. Eleanor
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Smeal, one of NOW's most dynamic leaders in this period, 142
defined herself as a "housewife" and urged NOW as a
whole to develop strategies to reach out to women In
traditional roles. 9
New NOW task forces and committees began to be
formed that covered a variety of feminist concerns as
women began bringing feminist frameworks to bear on
religion, media, child rearing and all aspects of life.
The 1975-1977 NOW conference program,

for example,

offers insight into how broad a range of concerns were
covered by the mid 1970s. The 1977 conference offered
132 workshops on more than 50 topics, which as well as
the traditional workshops on ERA strategies, EEO
compliance, child care and education, also included;
lesbian custody strategies, feminist therapy, sexual
harassment strategies, strategies for setting up and
running battered women's centers, single parenting
workshops, assertiveness training, and displaced
homemaker rights among many others.
At the 1975 conference, not only were there a
number of new topic areas introduced (such as women's
history and household violence ), but new connections
were made between topics (such as a workshop on racism
and rape, and one on classism, racism, and sexism) .
"Old" topics were also reframed in more radical ways,
such as the workshop on reproduction, which in 1975
focused on techniques for self examination and self-

abortion rather than on abortion legislation or medical
reform. 10
Some shifts in NOW's public identity and agenda
over time were the results of changes in the political
contexts and In its strategic choices. But much of the
permeability of NOW agendas also came from the fact that
NOW is a mass based organization, with hundreds of
thousands of members all working on different projects.
There are currently more than 700 NOW chapters around
the country involved in a multitude of tasks from
protests, law suits and lobbying to running clinics and
child care centers. It

lS

this grass roots base that has

often been the impetus In changing NOW's direction and
keeping the national organization from getting too much
of an uinside the beltwayu orientation. Having a
dispersed base means that NOW's national leadership is
directly accountable to the membership of the
organization. ll

It is also NOW's existence as a mass

based organization dispersed across the country that has
made it possible for NOW to function simultaneously on
so many different fronts.
Over the last 30 years NOW chapters and national
leadership have taken on the government, the phone
companies and the ad agencies. They have succeeded In
changing national divorce and credit laws, as well as
local newspaper advertising policies. They have
influenced school reading lists and national prison
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policies (in having gynecologists made available to
women prisoners). NOW members have organized millions
around the ERA and they have set up set up domestic
violence centers that cater for a few families at a
time. They have worked to end the involuntary
sterilization of poor women and to end promotion
discrimination in board rooms. They have influenced
divorce law, credit law, abortion law, government
contracting, school sports, local television hiring,
Little League and rape laws. Over 30 years the
organization has influenced the lives of thousands of
women in hundreds of ways.12

NOW and the Future

NOW's current political agenda reflects both the
organization's core issues and their expansion into new
areas. The (1989)

UNOW Expanded Bill of Rights for the

21st Century," outlines NOW's priorities for the next
century and it includes their ongoing concern with
equality as well as their more general framework of
interconnected inequalities. The NOW Expanded Bill of
Rights demands:

1.

the right to freedom from sex discriminationi

2.

the right to freedom from race discriminationi

3.

the right of all women to freedom from
government interference in abortion, birth
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control and pregnancy and the right of
indigent women to public funds for abortion,
birth control and pregnancy serVlceSi
4.

the right to freedom from discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientationi

5.

the right to freedom from discrimination based
on religion, age, ongolng health condition, or
a differently abled situation;

6.

the right to a decent standard of living,
including adequate food, housing, health care
and education;

7. the right to clean alr, clean water, safe toxic
waste disposal and environmental protection;
and
8.

the right to be free from violence, including
freedom from the threat of nuclear war.

As the 1989 Bill of Rights illustrates, NOW's
vision of feminism has expanded over time to include
many more aspects of life and policy. The organization
has made connections across issues and groups to include
question of environmental degradation and poverty, race
and health into its analyses. Women's -rights- in the
21st century, according to NOW, should include not only
freedom from sex and race discrimination, but also
freedom from a polluted environment and the right to
live in a peaceful context. This is a long way from the
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original NOW 1968 statement of purpose that wanted to
bring women into the mainstream, and even more expansive
than the

1975 "majority" caucus who wanted to bring NOW

out of the mainstream. The 1989 Bill of Rights for the
21st Century has expanded NOW's feminist concerns to
cover global ecological issues, education, war and
peace, and the fundamental right to a "decent standard
of living." The rhetoric of "rights" and "freedom" that
NOW began with is still evident here, but it is a vision
of HrightsH far beyond the traditionally Hpublic H or the
traditionally Hpolitical. H In fact should NOW be able to
produce any of these HrightsH it will indeed produce
radical change.
As an organization NOW continues to be the central
feminist organization in the US, and perhaps in the
world. But by the 19908 NOW had also been joined by many
other more specialized women's issue organizations in
Washington, some of which are NOW offshoots. It is
consequently involved day to day in coalition politics
as much as single-handed projects. Beginning in 1985,
for example, a Council of Presidents from the various
women's groups formed. The Council in 1991 contained 40
groups representing 10 million members and drafted a
"women's agenda." Together they adopted a set of policy
priorities for legislative work. Boles (1991, p. 45)
notes that this Council has tremendous potential:
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Although not yet a formal coalition organization,
several indicators of incipient
institutionalization are present; regular meetings,
organized media campaigns, annual conventions, paid
consultants, and conferences with the president of
the United States and congressional leaders.
Significantly this new coalition agrees not only on
legislative priorities but also on the essential,
noncompromisable components of an acceptable bill
in each policy area.

NOW's central role in this new political alliance
structure is not uncontested. The organization's
tendency not to compromise on core issues has sometimes
made them unpopular, and their sense of their own
historicity has garnered for them a reputation among
some other groups for arrogance and insensitivity.
Nowadays NOW far from being seen as HreformistH is often
seen by its Washington colleagues as too militant and
unbending. As an anonymous critic notes in a recent

Times article:

They're

positioned to be so outside that

they're left with nothing but their anger. It's
exhausting. I'm not that guilty. You're not that
guilty.13
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Other observers are willing to grant that NOW still 148
has a unique vanguardist role to play. The head of the
AAUW,

for example, is glad to note that NOW still take

on the issues that are "harder to hear:"

This is how we learn as a society. You need both
leaders and followers. NOW selects the issues that
are harder to hear. They push the edge out and then
an AAUW comes along and sounds reasonable. 14

In any case, despite several dozen news articles
that have predicted NOW's demise over the last 10 years,
the organization is still working on various fronts for
women's rights. And few people would disagree with Toni
Carabillo that NOW is still not only a core organization
of the US women's movement. but a symbol of its fates
more generally. As she notes, NOW as an organization has
never been alone in the movement but its fortunes have
always been reflective of the movement as a whole. "The
fact is," says Carabillo (1993, p. viii)

"if the

National Organization for Women were to collapse and
disappear, it would be taken as a signal of the end of
this era of feminism.
NOTES

1 These accounts differ in interpretations (e.g. some
observers wonder just how spontaneous the formation was)
but they converge on the facts.
2 In the longer run these links had to be abandoned.
Labor groups left NOW as it endorsed the ERA in 1968 and
traditional women's groups withdrew their support on the
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issue of abortion reform and NOW became more openly
independent in its statements and policies over time.
3 The permeability of HrightsH language as a social
movement resource in the United States is a very
interesting question. Framing a movement's goals in
these terms -- i.e.
as HrightsH -- has considerable
resonance and power, but it also comes with the
vulnerability to counter-framing along the same lines
e.g. the HrightsH of fetuses challenge the Hrights H of
women.
4 The Advocate, December 17,1991, p. 41.
5 The Advocate, December 17, 1991, p. 43.
6 The HOut of the Mainstream H title was a deliberate
reference to NOW's first public statement that it
intended to bring women Hinto the mainstream H of
political and social life in America. See NOW Statement
of Purpose, 1966.
7 NOW (1975) .HOut of the Mainstream into the
Revolution,
bookleL produced by the Majority Caucus
for 1975 National Conference. NOW Collection,
Schlesinger Library.
8 Echols (1989) argues that Hcultural feminism H became
dominant in the younger movement by the mid 1970s, and
that it was largely responsible for the de
politicization of the HyoungerH (radical) branch of
feminism which became much more Hlifestyle H oriented and
much less interested in interacting with traditional
Hpolitics. H
9 Smeal also had graduate training as a political
scientist, so her choice to frame herself as a housewife
was in fact a strategic choice.
10 NOW (1975) NOW National Conference, Philadelphia,
Forums and Workshops program. NOW Collection,
Schlesinger Library.
11 Besides a national office, and local chapters, NOW at
anyone time also has a number of active Htask forces H
which combine national and local energies in specific
topic areas. This three-tiered structure of national
board, task forces, and chapters, was added to in the
ERA mobilization effort of the 1970s and early 1980s
when it became necessary for NOW to also have state
level organizations. Policy within NOW is set each year
by the national conference which is attended by local
chapter members.
12 NOW Task Force papers, NOW Collection, Schlesinger
library. See also Maren Lockwood Carden. 1974. The New
Feminist Movement. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
13 New York Times Magazine March 1, 1992, p. 54.
14 New York Times Magazine, March 1, 1992, p. 54.
H
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Chapter Five

The Structuring Role of Resources:
The Political Economy of NOW's News Access

For modern feminists In America, the fight for
political clout will need to be fought on the media
battleground, but not without adequate money,
resources and creative

analysis -- Kathy Bonk,

feminist media strategist.

For NOW, or any other social movement group to
affect public consciousness or identities through mass
communication, it must first be able to produce access
to news media. As one of the major sources of political
information for citizens, the commercial news media
still constitute a significant part of the public
sphere. However imperfect and distorted that sphere may
be, it is in commercial media arenas that much of the
civil debate about public policy and the legitimacy of
cultural practices is conducted in the United States and
western Europe (Garnham, 1986; Fraser, 1992; McLaughlin,
1993). If we are to understand the NSM's mass
communication possibilities, that is their ability to
influence ideologies, issues and identity formation
processes at the societal level -- what Melucci (1989)

has called their symbolic challenge -- then we must
understand their access to existing mass communication
channels because that is how most people will hear about
movements and their ideas.
So, how is such access produced? What resources and
strategies are important to engaging in (and perhaps
controlling) media dialogs? What are the "costs" of
access to media for social movements in terms of
material, strategic and organizational resources? And,
are such resources likely to be available to all
emerglng social movement groups?
In this chapter I investigate the role(s) of
resources in structuring NOW's access to news media.
Draw·ing on the organization's own records, on patterns
of news coverage, and on other historical accounts of
the movement, I argue that three major types of
resources were essential in NOW's media access, and may
be important to all groups seeking such access. First,
the professional communicative competence

and

institutional connections of NOW's leaders and
strategists was critically important. To a large extent
NOW's initial access to news (and so to the public
sphere) was realized as a result of the elite,
professional, educated (and connected) nature of its
leaders. Second, NOW's ability to generate and maintain
effective organizational forms

in this case a dual

structure of a centralized, hierarchical national
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organization and decentralized, distributed chapters -was also important in its ability to maintain relations
with media. The centralized national form allowed NOW to
act quickly and respond to reporters and editors
concerns, and its localized distribution across the
country in hundreds of different chapters allowed it to
ground its claims to represent all American women.
Third, NOW's ability to attract financial resources
to produce an ongoing budget for staff, technology,
information gathering, and salaries was paramount to
keeping the organization involved in media dialog. News
source-work is highly resource-intensive and before
issues of representation and control can even be
considered, movement organizations must mobilize enough
resources to fund information collection, communication
and other organizational tasks. The chapter illustrates
how each of these factors structured NOW's ability to
dialog with news media day to day.

I. "Human Resources:" The Class and Professional
Backgrounds of NOW's Leaders

NOW's first "resource" in its interactions with
news was the group of women and men who joined together
to form NOW, and the skills, competence, political
connections, and even personal self-esteem, that they
brought with them.
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Offe (1985), Eder (1985), and other new social
movement

(NSM) observers, have stressed the importance

of the class base of the NSMs in understanding their
characters and effectivity. The NSMs, according to Offe,
are typically made up of educators, social workers,
communications specialists and other fractions of the
Unew middle class.

u

Indeed it is this anomalous class

base of the NSMs that disturbs many of their critics,
because it defies clear connections between the NSMs
class base and their goals (Larana, Johnson and
Gusfield, 1994).
NOW's leadership In the early days (and still
today) conformed closely to the typical NSM class base.
NOW's first Executive and National Boards were drawn
from among exactly that new class fraction that Offe
suggests is typical -- educators, communications
specialists, government administrators, social workers,
and other professionals.

The first NOW executive board,

for example, was made up of seven university professors
or administrators,

five state and national labor unions

officials, and four business executives. They were all
highly educated and skilled in organization. Many were
already part of an elite political network of
administrators concerned with Uwomen's issues u at the
state and national level. Four of the group had served,
or were serving on. state commlSSlons on the Status of
Women. Seven of the original group held Ph.D.'s, one was
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an MD, and three were from religious vocations. One of
the members was an ex-EEO commissioner, another was
still working for the EEOC at the time of her election. 1
In later years the organization continued to be led by
highly educated, and competent women, who were social
scientists, lawyers, writers, and professional
organizers. 2
The professional and class background of NOW's
early leaders was important in a number of ways. First,
their associations with other established organizations
meant that NOW leaders had access to organizational
resources. Although Friedan (1979, p. 76), describes the
beginning of NOW as one in which

II

any money to start the movement ...

Nobody ever gave us
II

the women and men

who founded NOW were all connected In some way to other
institutions and as such they had access to
organizational resources not directly attributable to
NOW. Resources such as telephones, support staff,
mailing privileges, computer technologies, and so on,
were available to the early board members through their
professional lives. In fact in the first two years of
NOW's existence much of its business was conducted out
of the offices of the UAW in Chicago where Board Member
Caroline Davis had her organizational base. 3
Besides unions, government departments,
corporations, and universities also contributed,
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intentionally or not, to the early mobilization of NOW
(Friedan, 1976, p. 85):

A lot of employers less sympathetic to women's
cause than the leadership of U.A.W. would be
surprised to know that their Xerox machines,
mimeograph machines, and WATTS lines were doing
NOW's work, as a result of that women's
underground,

in every office. It was the only way

the work could get done; our treasury in those days
seldom had more than several hundred dollars.

This dependence on other organizations in the
beginning is a fundamental reason that NOW was able to
mobilize at all, and it was these borrowed resources
that made it possible specifically for the organization
to produce communications about its identity and
purpose. NOW's first press release announcing its
formation was produced by Muriel Fox from her public
relations firm, and much of the organizational work for
NOW's first conference was supported by the UAW. In
short this link to other organizations -- and access to
their resources

was crucial to NOW's ability both to

form and to represent itself as an organization. 4
Second, the educational, professional and class
background of NOW's leaders gave them distinct
communicative skills and competencies which they drew on

ISS

In their interactions with news media. All of the
original board were college graduates, many had graduate
degrees and some were in fact professional
communications specialists. Muriel Fox,

for example, at

the time she was NOW's PR director was also a
professional public relations specialist running her own
company and Friedan was a professional writer.
As observers of media sources have noted, source
work involves a high degree of communicative competence.
Tasks include the collection and processing of
information, the strategic framing of events and issues
in creative ways, and writing up events and information
into compelling "stories" or press releases for
journalists (Ryan, 1991; Ericson et aI, 1989). NOW
leaders were able to draw on their personal "resources"
of education and communicative skills to do this work.
A short transcript of NOW leaders in conversation
with a reporter (1971) shows this kind of communicative
competence at work with NOW

leaders effectively re-

framing a reporter's question:

Reporter: Do you feel that you are emasculating men

in any way?
Hernandez: On the contrary, we feel that we are

going to be humanizing men.
Heide: I think something should be said about the

very term "emasculating" because implicit in the
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word is a notion that for a man to be emasculated
is to leave him in the position that women have
always been in and that's very unacceptable. I'm
speaking of this in the social sense of the term,
the status. It's acceptable for women to be in that
status, but not for men. I think that's very
significant. S

Such competence -- what Gandy (1989, p. 109) has
called "communications competence" or the "the ability
to understand the world so as to act to change it" -is not a naturally occurring resource, but one that is
socially and politically produced through access to
education and training. It is therefore available to
some social agents and not others. As movement activists
with many years of higher education and professional
training , NOW leaders had high levels of communicative
competence.
As well as this specific communicative competence,
NOW leaders also manifested a strong sense of personal
efficacy and self esteem which made them consider social
change to be possible. This sense of efficacy, or
control in the world has been seen as a key structuring
factor in activism of many kinds (cf. McAdam, 1986;
Klandermanns, 1984; Gandy, 1991). However, as Bernstein
(1971, p. 193) notes, it may also be education and class
dependent.: "The class system has not only deeply marked
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the distribution of knowledge in society. It has glven
differential access to the sense that the world is
permeable." As educated members of the upper middle
class NOW leaders has ample access to the intellectual
and educational resources that produce both efficacy and
communicative competence.
The professional/managerial backgrounds of the
original leaders also meant that most of them had
already had some contact with news media organizations
and journalists in the past. They had encountered
individual journalists before and has some understanding
of journalistic norms and practices. As I describe in
the next chapter, compared to the "younger" feminist
groups they also had a sense of efficacy about media
access that was unusually high.
In particular Betty Friedan, NOW's first president
had extensive experience as a media spokesperson.
Friedan's book "The Feminine Mystique" had become a best
seller and she had been invited onto talk shows around
the country, becoming something of a public figure. In
choosing Friedan as the organization's figurehead, NOW
leaders

(including Friedan herself) hoped that her

visibility and her audiences would translate into media
visibility and members for the group. As an early member
of NOW commented, Friedan had a ready-made
llconstituency" which they hoped would then join the
organization:

(Carabillo, 1993, p. 85):
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Friedan was a public figure already and her name
had national recognition value that would be a
critical asset in attracting the attention of the
media. She also came with a built-in constituency
-- the hundreds of thousands of women who had
already read her book and who would flock to hear
her impassioned speeches.

Other members of NOW had also had extensive
dealings with journalists In their capacities as PR
professionals, union leaders or In managerial state
positions. NOW leaders were used to thinking of news as
a resource, and they transferred some of their
expectation about media from their workplaces to NOW
activities. In fact one observer of NOW in its early
years noted that NOW had very little of anything except
media skills (Freeman, 1975, p. 56):

Instead of organizational experience, what the
early NOW members had was media experience, and it
was here that their early efforts were aimed. They
could create an appearance of activity but did not
know how to organize the substance of it. As a
result NOW often gave the impression of being
larger than it actually was. It was highly
successful in getting publicity, much less so ln

bringing about concrete changes or organizing
itself. 6

Overall, then NOW leaders brought professional,
educational and communicative resource to the dialog
with news. The NSM theorists suggest this may be typical
of other ·new· social movement group, but it is an open
question as to whether such resources are available to
all social movement organizations, especially those
mobilizing outside of the ·professional" classes, is an
open question. 7

II. Organization as a Resource:
Bureaucracy, Centralization and Size
Organization -- the ability to coordinate
activities, communicate an identity, recruit members and
achieve goals -- is itself a resource that is critical
in the effectivity of social movements. The problem for
social movement activists and theorists has been In
deciding which

organizational forms are best to achieve

a movement's goals. Gamson (1975, p. 91-92), for
example, has argued that a certain level of bureaucracy
is associated with social movement organizations'
success because it helps them to achieve ·pattern
maintenance"

(that is readiness to act or react) .

Centralization, he argues, is also a resource because it
minimizes the chances of conflict and factionalism over
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organizational control. Overall, a degree of
bureaucratization is likely to be successful for
movement organization in Gamson's view because
-imitating the form of one's antagonist eases the
development of some sort of working relationship.While centralization may make coordinated activity
easier, however, it also leaves an organization open to
more centralized damage, and Gerlach and Hines (1970)
have concluded that some sort of decentralized structure
makes survival over the long term more likely. These
researchers and others (e.g. McAdam, 1986) also
highlight the likelihood of decentralized organizations
being able to recruit -affinity" groups -- that is
people who already know each other. Most social
movements have their roots in such pre-existing networks
of social or political relationships. Morris (1984), for
example, has described the fundamental importance of the
southern church base for the Civil Rights Movement, and
Evans

(1979) has stressed the linkages between the women

who organized the women's liberation movement alongside
NOW. Indeed, as I have suggested above, NOW was also
formed out of a preexisting network of women and men
actively involved in women's politics. 8
Decentralized and non-hierarchical groups have also
been valued for their ability to increase members sense
of equality and respect, and as such as being -practice"
for a more egalitarian future. They are thus sometimes
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seen to have a moral superiority over bureaucratic forms 162
which are said to "mimic" oppressive power relations.
The "younger" feminist movement groups, for example,
often experimented with radically egalitarian forms
where role specialization and individual leadership was
avoided (Freeman, 1975; Echols, 1989). Generally these
egalitarian forms are more successful at achieving their
moral/ideological goals (that is allowing members to
practice egalitarian ideals and to create a shared
identity) than they are at producing action in the
external environment. Freeman (1975) and Echols (1989),
for example, note that the egalitarian forms of the
younger feminist groups often resulted in inexperienced
workers being assigned tasks (because role
specialization was unfair) and so tasks would take more
time. Egalitarian groups, however, maintained a strong
commitment to radical political analysis and often
produced some of the movement's most influential
writings.
In NOW's case the organization's structure had
elements of both a centralized, bureaucratic structure
and a looser affinity group organization. At the
national level NOW exhibited a high degree of
centralization and role specialization -- key aspects of
traditional bureaucratic forms -- but at the local level
there was a much wider range of organizational forms for
chapters. Chapters ranged in forms from highly

formalized local organizations to loose knit or
radically egalitarian groups.9
The Executive and National Boards of NOW are the
governing bodies who act on behalf of NOW, but they are
constrained by priorities

set by the national

conference which is made up of grassroots members, so
both parts of the organization have some control over
its agenda. 10 Besides the national board and the local
chapters, NOW also comprises a number of Task Forces
which focus on particular topics. These task forces
focus on many different issues and keep NOW functioning
as a multi-issue organization working on many different
fronts. Over time the number and range of task forces
has ±ncreased. 11
Though coordination problems have plagued the
organization since its inception, generally both of
these aspects of the organization

its centralization

and its distributed chapters -- have worked as resources
for NOW ln

terms of its media access. The centralized,

specialized and hierarchical aspects of the national
organization have made it possible for the national
leadership to act quickly and authoritatively and the
distributed nature of the organization across the
country has helped ground national NOW's

claims to

speak for all women.
As a centralized organization, with a visible
formal Board and national office, NOW was able to
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coordinate its media activities and to send coherent
messages to media. Such coherence in message
construction is important if movements' are to keep
control of their own identity in media. Gitlin (1980, p.
137), for example, has noted how ambiguity about
leadership roles and suspicion of centralized authority
made it difficult for SDS leaders to control media
coverage of the movement. When SDS leaders did take such
spokesperson roles on, they were often criticized by
regional members for usurping authority.
NOW leaders had no such qualms about speaking to
media; indeed they felt that it was central to their
role to be a voice for women In the public arena. And
the structure of the organization -- with designated
leaders and relatively clear lines of authority and
accountability -- made it easy for a core group to
become media spokespersons for the entire organization.
In the early years of the organization this centralized
control was quite extreme. As I describe further in
chapter

SlX,

NOW's original leaders often misrepresented

the internal diversity of the organization strategically
in order to present a united front to media.
In general, though the clear sense of leadership
and accountability worked out well for NOW in its
relations with news media. Reporters had no trouble
identifying who was in charge of particular topics, and
national reporters could rely In being able to speak
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directly to NOW's president. 12 NOW's bureaucratic
organizational form meant that NOW kept Washington
business hours (9-5) and could be relied upon to be
available on deadlines. This ability to fit into news'
"phase structures" has been seen to be important In
determining which sources journalists will use most
(Fishman, 1980; Tuchman, 1978).
An important side effect of this centralization and
bureaucracy that also worked in NOW's favor was their
ability to respond quickly to a breaking issues when
necessary. As Gamson (1990) has noted, response time and
the ability to act quickly may be even more important In
news interaction than in interaction with other
instltutions . NOW's ability to respond quickly was
tested in 1981, for example, when Sandra Day '0 Connor
was nominated to the Supreme Court:

Within two hours after the President announced her
appointment, local NOW activists were contacted in
maJor media markets ... and briefed so that they
could respond to the inordinate media attention
that was focused on Judge O'Connor being the first
woman nominated to the Supreme Court. 13

In general, then, NOW's bureaucratic and
centralized structure made them available to reporters,
which made them more attractive sources. It was also an
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important element in their own development of media
strategies, speaking in one consistent and accountable
llpublic" voice, making it more likely that reporters
would listen.
Besides the professionalized and bureaucratic
national office, though, NOW had a distributed structure
of hundreds of local chapters. By 1977 NOW had more than
700 chapters around the country. This distributed base
caused NOW coordination problems, but it also carne with
some benefits in the form of legitimation.
NOW often had problems of coordination and
communication between the local and national
organization. For example, local and national members
often did not agree on each others' roles. NOW local
chapters felt at times that they did not know what the
national office was doing (in particular what it was
doing with their dues) and that they did not get enough
llhelpll from the national leadership in their local
activities. At the national level, leaders expressed
annoyance that the localities did not take a national
Vlew and that they seemed to expect national officers to
work as administrators for the organization rather than
as leaders with political vision (Carden, 1974).
In the mid 1970s this discontent carne to a head in
an extended dues-withholding protest where local
chapters refused to pass on membership dues to the
national organization. The withholding was accompanied
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by an electoral push from the grass roots which unseated 167
almost the entire standing NOW Board over a two year
period and replaced the leadership with members more
sensitive to issues of internal democracy and local
representation. 14
Despite these difficulties, though, NOW's mass base
was strategically useful in a number of ways. The
mushrooming of the organization across the country,

(and

even across the Atlantic when some American women set up
a Paris chapter), added to NOW's resources not only
through an increase in membership dues but also in their
credibility as a representative organization in the eyes
of policy makers and journalists. In almost every news
story about NOW analyzed in this case study,

for

example, the organization's Slze and its spread across
the country are

central to its definition. The

descriptor phrase,

"the largest feminist organization in

the country with (so many) members and (so many)
chapters" appeared in virtually every story in which NOW
was cited.
This kind of legitimacy may be especially important
to journalists when they are deciding whether or not to
take a new organization seriously in the face of
skeptical editors and supervisors. Simpson (1979), a
reporter who covered the movement, for example, says she
argued with her editors that the women's movement was an

important story simply In terms of size if nothing
else. IS
It's mass base made NOW a qualitatively different
kind of organization to reporters. Whereas many of the
"public interest" groups in Washington are not massbased but leadership groups

that is they are

supported by contributions and grants and have a board
and staff who act on behalf of an abstract "public" but
who are not responsible to any concrete membership -NOW's is directly democratic and represents women from
all across the country. NOW's mass base and its
geographical dispersion give it more legitimacy as a
popular organization.
In terms of political strategy, this
diversification has also been useful. The ERA
mobilization in 1970s and the reproductive rights
mobilization of the 1980s have each been led by NOW,
among others, because NOW had a reach that goes beyond
Washington to mobilize women across the country.
NOW's dual existence as both a centralized national
organization and in flexible local chapters, also
increased democracy within the organization by making
leadership accountable to a mass base. In fact it may be
this aspect of NOW's structure, through which leadership
comes "up" from the localities (and so has a less
"inside the beltway" orientation), that accounts for
NOW's ability

not to get more conservative with age, as
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oligarchic theorists suggest, but in fact to extend
their range of concerns and become more radical over
time. 16

III. Material Resources:
Membership, Income and Media Access

Besides the resources provided by NOW leaders'
competence and education, and its ability to maintain an
effective organizational form over time, a critical
resource for NOW was financial. It is only by mobilizing
at least some cash resources that movement organizations
can then pay for other resources such as information,
staff time, technologies, and so on.
o

NOW's main source of lncome was, and is, membership

dues. Table 5.1 indicates the trends in NOW's membership
numbers over time. In the first few years NOW's only
income came from membership dues. Later, In the mid
1970s and early 1980s, NOW leaders began to use direct
mail to ask for contributions from members and
sympathetic bystanders in addition to membership dues
and over time the percentage of NOW's funds made up from
charitable contributions has increased. 17 By 1984 such
contributions made up 30 percent of NOW's income of
$5,637,000

(64 percent still came from membership dues

and 6 percent from sales of NOW products) .18
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Figure 5.1
NOW Membership Over Time
(Thousands)
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In the late 1970s NOW also began to apply for
foundation support and grants, usually to fund
particular projects. Some grant money was forthcoming
for special projects to NOW and its sister organization,
NOWLDEF (National Organization for Women's Legal Defense
and Education Fund) .19 But for the most part,

feminist

organizations have been less successful In getting
foundation support than other civil rights
organizations. The majority of NOW's income still comes
from membership dues, making it a genuinely mass based

organization that has to be responsive to its membership 171
base.
Over time NOW has grown exponentially. Except for a
period of decline in the mid 1980s, available data on
the organization's membership and income base, suggests
a general upward trend over time. From an initial
reported membership of 300 in 1966, NOW grew to 15,000
by 1973 and then to around 50,

000 by 1977. In 1979 some

sources report as many as 100,000 members for NOW. By
1982 that figure was 225,000. After the ERA defeat In
1982, numbers dropped off to around 160,000 in 1985, but
by 1992 NOW was reporting 275,000 members, making it by
far the largest feminist organization in the world.
Because income for NOW is largely a result of
membership dues, this meant that NOW's organizational
income also grew rapidly over time. As Figures 5.1 and
5.2 indicate (next page), both NOW's membership and
income have generally increased over time, with a few
years of fall back in the mid 1980s. From an income of
$1500 In 1966, NOW's reported budget was over $1 million
by 1979. In 1978 the reported lncome for the
organization was $3.5 million, and in 1982, at the
height of the ERA fight the organization took in around
$9 million. In 1989 the organization reported an $11
million budget.
However, it is important that we treat these
numbers cautiously. As other observers of social

movement groups have also noted (cf. Knoke, 1989;
Gamson, 1975; Zald and McCarthy, 1979) the actual
documentable numbers of members of a social movement
organization at anyone time are very difficult to
ascertain. First, because SMOs do not routinely keep
excellent records, second because strategic over
counting is endemic, and third, because the meaning of
"membership" itself is problematic. Some groups, for
example, count all people who have ever paid membership
dues, others routinely purge their rolls and drop all
non active members every few months or weeks. NOW in
general has had a policy to count only active, paid up
members as members, but purging rolls is itself a
resource intensive activity which may not have high
priority in an action driven organization, and such
claims are difficult to verify.20
Wherever possible in this study I have tried to
verify membership and income numbers across sources
(e.g. by comparing numbers gleaned from NOW records with
other historical studies). But even so there are still
some missing years that I cannot account for and which
do not seem to be available even to the national
organization. In short, these specific numbers must be
seen as quite fragile,

though the general trends they

document are well supported across sources.
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Figure 5.2
NOW Income Over Time (OO,OOO's)
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Membership, Income and Media Access

Given that membership dues provided most of NOW's
resources, it was

also membership dues (and NOW's

resulting income) that made NOW's news access possible.
NOW's ability to research and process information for
journalists, to write up press releases and
backgrounders, and indeed to make themselves available
as sources to journalists, was based in its ability to
mobilize income
As we might expect, then, NOW's

lncreases In

membership and in income from 1966-1980 were also
reflected in its access to news media. As Figure 5.3
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indicates, there is a strong positive relationship
membership and income

between NOW's main resources

and its amount of coverage in the New York Times ..
As measured simply by the number of paragraphs devoted
to NOW itself, or in which NOW was cited as a source, in
the years 1966-1980, there is a clear relationship
between NOW's media visibility and its membership
numbers

(r=.772) and income ( r=.752).

Figure 5.3
NOW News Coverage by Income and Membership
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Table 5.1 summarlzes these relationships between
NOW's resources and media coverage over time, including
statistical significance measures. The relationship
between NOW's membership and their media coverage shows
a significant correlation (r=.7772, p<.Ol).

Table 5.1
NOW Resource and Media Access Correlations

Year

Year

Log of
Members

Log of
Income

Log of
Coverage

1.000

.9718**

.9869**

.6915

1.000

.9917**

.7772*

1.000

.7528

Log
Membert
Log
l:ncomet

* p< .01

**p< .001

tMembership, Income and Coverage were transformed
into log values because all of these values were
exponential over time. Transforming these data into
log values redistributes values along the curve
while retaining any relationship between two
curves. 21

The relationship indicated In Table 5.1 between
NOW's resources (membership and income) and its
coverage, could also, of course, be interpreted to flow
the other way. The amount of coverage NOW achieved In
media would also have helped to bring in members (and so
income). Indeed after the first few years, NOW records
themselves suggest that a significant percentage of NOW

members were attracted to the organization through
hearing about it in the news. 22 What is also clear from
NOW records, though, and from news content evidence (see
chapter seven),

lS

that much of NOW's early coverage was

self-generated. So that even if news did increase NOW's
membership, it did so only after the organization's
initial investment. 23 From the beginning it was NOW's
efforts at resource mobilization and active source work
that produced the group's access to news media. In later
years, some reporters would seek out the group proactively but for the most part the story of NOW's media
access is one of self- directed activity on the part of
NOW itself.

Summary and Discussion:
Resource Mobilization and Media Access

Clearly for NOW, access to media was structured by
its resource mobilization more generally. It was the
income from membership that allowed the organization to
spend money on media work. The class and professional
background of NOW leaders, which translated into
competence and media contacts, was also instrumental in
allowing it to interact with media. NOW's organizational
form, of centralization and also representation across
the country in chapters, made it possible both to
control communication to media and to be seen as
representative by media.
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That there should be a relationship between an
organization's resources and its ability to access media
1S 1n some sense a rather unsurprising claim. But in
fact it is one that is often obscured in both
journalists' professional ideologies, and in studies
about news-making, because it is a revelation that comes
from studying sources and not journalists. Journalists
themselves tend to stress the Hnews value H of sources or
of events as a way of explaining news content. Or
occasionally they admit to time pressures and chance.
Since most of the studies of news focus on journalists
themselves, they also tend to stress aspects of the

content

of source's messages, or of journalists

rou~ines or rationalizations. 24 But this general focus

on journalists and on content has obscured our
understanding of news as an institution whose
relationships with other organizations are structured 1n
a larger framework of resource s and power. Within this
larger framework access to resources and skills
structure whether it is possible for a source
organization to produce HnewsworthyH ideas.
This obscuring of the economic or material base of
symbolic struggle is in fact quite common in knowledge
production. As Bourdieu (1977, p. 183) has pointed out,
it is in fact exactly this confusion that allows the
knowledge/power relationship to remain hidden and the
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legitimacy of certain discursive forms

(such as news) to

be maintained:

Symbolic capital, a transformed and thereby
disguised form of physical "economic" capital,
produces its proper effect inasmuch, and only
inasmuch, as it conceals the fact that it
originates in material forms of capital, which are
also,

In the last analysis, the source of its

effects.

This model of media access -- In which NOW actively
mobilized resources, and then was able to channel these
resources into media visibility

may be both good and

bad for movement organizations. It lmproves on the
strong hegemony model for movements in that it suggests
that, to some extent at least, coverage of a movement
group may be produced through its own efforts -- that
lS, coverage may be least partially on resources rather
than ideology. However, as I have noted here, NOW's
ability to mobilize resources, may not be true of most
emergent political movement groups. For less savvy
social movement organizations, these "costs" of access
to news, and to VOlce in the public sphere, may be much
harder to achieve.
This focus in resources lS critical, then. Without
such resources no interaction with media is possible at
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all.

As Curran and Gurevitch (1991, p. 19) have

suggested, when it comes to symbolic power resources are
determining not in the ulast instance u but in the first:

This ... forces us to think of economic
determination in a more flexible way. Instead of
holding onto Marx's notion of determination in the
last instance, with its implication that everything
can eventually be related directly to economic
forces, we can follow Stuart Hall in seeing
determination as operating in the first

instance.

That is to say we can think of economic dynamics as
defining the key features of the general
environment within which communicative activity
takes place, but not as a complete explanation of
the nature of that activity.

The relationship between resources and symbolic
success is not a straightforward one, however. Resources
may make interaction possible, but they do not determine
success in controlling the interaction. While they tell
us about the general parameters of the relationship they
do not help us to understand how it is that material
resources can be translated into news VOlce. How did NOW
use its resources to produce voice in the public sphere?
What strategies did the organization develop day-to-day
to produce news access? In short, how did NOW translate
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material resources into symbolic power? I address these
more sociological/strategic questions in the next
chapter.

NOTES

1 NOW National Board Meeting Minutes, 1966. NOW
Collection, Schlesinger Library for Women in History,
Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Mass. The first Executive
Board members were: Dr. Kathryn Clarenbach, professor;
Betty Friedan, writer; Aileen Hernandez, member of EEOC;
Richard Graham, former head of EEOC; Caroline Davis,
union leader, AAUW. (Hernandez was elected subject to
acceptance, as she was still working for EEOC. Davis
later left over the ERA, which her union could not
support). The first National Board members were also
predominantly professionals, and disproportionately from
university and religious backgrounds: Colleen Boland,
Inez Casiano, Professor Carl Degler, Sister Mary Austin
Doherty, Dr. Elizabeth Drews, Muriel Fox, Betty Furness,
Dorothy Haener, Jane Hart, Dr. Anna Arnold Hedgeman,
Phineas Indritz, Rev Dean Lewis, Inka 0' Hanrahan, Grace
Oli~arez, Dr. Patricia Plante, Eve Purvis, Sister Mary
Joel Read, Charlotte Roe, Dr. Alice Rossi, Dr. Vera
Schletzer, Edna Schwartz.
2 Aileen Hernandez (1970-1971) was a professional
organizer with graduate work in government. Wilma Scott
Heide (1971-1973) was a behavioral scientist. Karen De
Crow (1974-1977) was a lawyer, lecturer and writer.
Eleanor Smeal (1977-1982), though she framed herself as
a housewife and was concerned with homemakers rights,
was trained as a political scientist. Molly Yard (19871991) was a professional organizer educated at
Swarthmore College, and current president, Patricia
Ireland, is a lawyer.
3 NOW Executive Board Meeting Minutes, 1967. NOW
Collection and Friedan (1976).
4 Social movement theorists have noted how new movements
and movement groups are created from the ranks of older
movements. Evans (1980) for example, traces the roots of
the women's movement to women who worked in the civil
rights movement and Hackett (1991) suggests that the
environmental movement has its roots in the student New
Left. But few observers have noted how this relationship
is also resource dependent -- new groups are often
formed using the resources of the old. In this case the
labor movement had a hand in helping to produce the
women's movement.
S NOW ACTS, September 7th, 1971.
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6 Freeman, Jo. (1975), p. 56.
7 In fact it may be that the focus on communication by
the NSMs is a side effect of the class and professional
basis of their members rather than any profound change
in movement political strategies generally. We need more
comparative work on groups from other class bases and
from other (non western, non post-industrial) societies
before we can call the NSM move a general social
movement shift towards HidentityH politics and away from
material concerns.
8 The debate about the best organizational form for
social movements, or the best form for particular ends
is a long and subtle one, and I am selecting from it
freely here. For more discussion on hierarchy,
centralization, and bureaucratization in social
movements see: Gamson, William. (1990. [1975] ) The
Strategy of Social Protest. Belmont, California:
Wadsworth., Gerlach, Luther and P. Hines. (1970)
People, Power and Change. Indianapolis, Ind.: BobbsMerrill,
Jo Freeman. (1975). The Politics of Women's
Liberation. New York: Longman. For a discussion of how
different theories valorize different social movement
forms, see Cohen, Jean. (1985). Strategy or Identity:
New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social
Movements. Social Research 52(4): 663-716.
9 Chapters are made up of 10 people minimum and they
should, formally at least, subscribe to by-laws and
procedures set down by the national board. They each
appoint a liaison to national NOW, and a designated
treasurer. But beyond this they are relatively flexible
according to the needs of the women involved. The larger
metropolitan chapters usually being the most active. The
New York chapter, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington and
pittsburgh, for example, have all been critical centers
of NOW activity
10 The Executive Committee consists of a Chairperson,
president, four regional directors, four vice presidents
(legal, legislation, public relations and finance), a
secretary, treasurer and a chairperson of the National
Advisory Committee. The National Board consists of 25
elected members; and the 13 national executive officers.
NOW started off with no paid staff, and has always
maintained a healthy fear of becoming a staff dominated
organization. But over time it has come to rely on a few
key administrative staff, and from the mid 1970s has
also paid key elected officials.
11 In 1974 for example there were around thirty
different national task forces, in 1977 there were more
than 50 task forces represented at the at the national
conference. NOW task forces include women and the arts,
child care, EEO compliance, credit, criminal justice,
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education, broadcasting/FCC, fund raising, women and
health, legislation, labor unions, marriage, divorce and
family relations, minority women and women's rights,
older women, image of women, public relation, women and
religion, rape, reproduction and population, sexuality
and lesbianism, women and sports, among others.
12 NOW Public Information Office papers, 1975.
13 NOWLDEF (1983). Media Project Report to the
Muskiwinni Foundation. NOW Collection, Ellis Library,
University of Columbia-Missouri.
14 The local chapters that withheld dues included
Harrisburg, Los Angeles, and others. They were also, not
coincidentally, the "home" chapters of board members
involved in a leadership fight at the same time. NOW
National Board Meeting minutes, April 5-6, 1975 .
15 Simpson, Peggy. (1979). "Covering the Women's
Movement," pp. 19-23, Nieman Reports, Summer.
16 NOW has expanded its base of concern from limited sex
discrimination goals to general feminist transformation
of all aspects of social relations. Today they espouse a
general feminist vision which includes concern with
issues of gender, class, war and peace, as well as
international connections between women. See for
example, the NOW Expanded Bill of Rights for the 21st
Century (1989) in which they espouse the right to
freedom from sex discrimination and race discrimination;
the right to reproductive freedom; freedom from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
from discrimination on the basis of age or health
condition; the right to a decent standard of living
including health, housing and education; the right to a
clean and safe environment, and the right to live free
from violence.
17 Such direct mailing to solicit funds is time
consuming and expensive, but it has the advantage of
bringing in one-time support which requires no further
output (as opposed to memberships which cost the
organization in support services such as mailing,
newsletters, and so on). NOW had mixed success with
direct mail campaigns in the 1970s. An early attempt to
reach Hhomemakers H through women's magazines garnered a
net loss. But another, narrower, Hreproduction H attempt
in 1974 brought in approximately $158,000 in new
membership dues over a number of Hthrusts. H In general
the public relations staff became more knowledgeable and
better at targeting as they learned from mistakes and
also began to hire consultants. NOW (1974, November).
PIO Report to the Board. NOW Collection, Schlesinger
Library.
18 NOW Budget records and Gelb and Palley (1987) pp. 4243.
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19 Grants were usually more easily granted to NOWLDEF
because it was a designated tax-deductible (501c(4))
educational organization. NOW itself has 501c(3) tax
status, a non profit but not tax deductible
organization. NOW retains this status even though it may
lose them some large donations because it is a
"political" classification. Groups designated 501c(4)
such as NOWLDEF are not allowed, for example, to endorse
presidential candidates.
20 The personal data/membership forms of all NOW members
that would be needed to verify membership claims are not
available in the NOW archive. In fact such materials are
unlikely to have been kept at all before computing
technology became routinely used in the mid 1980s. The
figures used here agree substantially with a recent
fact-based "chronicle" of the women's movement Carabillo
et aI, 1993, The Feminist Chronicles and with other
published sources.
21 Hartwig, F. and Dearing, B. (1979) Exploratory Data
Analysis. Sage Quantitative Applications in the Social
Sciences, Number 16, p.64
22 A 1974 NOW membership survey, for example, shows
around 40 percent of members saying they first heard
about NOW in the news. NOW Collection, Schlesinger
Libra-ry.
23 A regression analysis which might ordinarily clear up
some of the causal questions, is not useful here
because of the high degree of auto correlation -- all of
these measures are increasing over time.
24 Sigal (1973), for example, makes inferences from
news content about the institutional affiliations of
news sources, but fails to make a connection to their
resource base. Gans (1980) describes the news-source
relationship as a dance but it is not one in which we
see the source's steps. See Schlesinger (1990) also for
an analysis of British news studies that have also
ignored sources.

Chapter Six

NOW Media Strategies:
The possibilities and Constraints of Media Pragmatism

I thought all you had to do was carry a placard
around, and people would listen. I've learned how
to organize, how to raise funds, how to computerize
things, how to use the media. We've become experts
-- Ginny Foat, president, California NOW, 1982.

Clearly the ability to mobilize resources is
essential to beginning and continuing a dialogue with
media. And in particular, communicative competence,
organizational maintenance, a large membership, and
money seem to be especially important resources. But how
are these resources translated into media voice? How did
NOW translate membership, income and competence into
news voice? How did NOW leaders understand and manage
their relationship with media? What were the media
strategies that they developed and how did these
strategies contribute to the more general mobilization
and goals of the organization and to its political
identity?
While resource analysis sketches in the basic
requirements of access it cannot tell us about the dayto-day management of that access. In this chapter I
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describe how NOW leaders developed strategies to access
news and to control their interactions with media dayto-day. I argue that overall NOW leaders developed and
followed a general strategy of media pragmatism in which
they sought to understand and strategically appropriate
the conventions of news practices and news discourses
to reflexively use the llrules" of news as resources
(Giddens, 1984). They taught themselves and local NOW
members to llthink like journalists" in order to present
the organization in ways that journalist would take
seriously, and they spent considerable organizational
skill and resources in the "care and feeding" of women
journalists who were open to news about feminism .
. However,

this strategic appropriation of news

conventions carne at significant costs to the
organization. As I illustrate throughout the chapter,
NOW's media pragmatism, especially in the early years,
carne at considerable costs

in time, skills, and

ideological containment. Taking media conventions and
practices seriously (and encoding them into NOW's
communications) often meant that NOW leaders reframed,
or contained the organization's internal ideological
diversity in producing its llpublic identity.ll This
becomes especially clear when NOW's media pragmatist
approach is situated in larger movement context where it
contrasts sharply with a very different approach to
media taken by the llyounger" feminist groups. In the
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last part of the chapter I compare NOW's media
pragmatism and its llcostS" to the llmedia subversion"
strategies of the younger movement groups in order to
contextualize NOW strategies as reflexive, strategic
choices with specific consequences.

NOW'S UNDERSTANDING OF NEWS

From the beginning NOW leaders saw media,
especially the national, elite, news media as a powerful
movement resource. They wanted to use news media to
mobilize new members and to tell the public about the
movement:

Our major goals ln press relations are threefold:
1. To build NOW and the movement by reaching and
recruiting prospective adherents.
2. To win political and community support for our
goals.
3. To give the general public an honest picture of
the Feminist Movement. 1

If these alms seem at first glance somewhat naive
seeing the media as a route to an llhonest" picture of
the movement, for example -- they were not the result of
inexperience or ignorance, but in fact the outcome of
successful interactions with news media in the past.
These early NOW leaders had generally had extensive
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relations with reporters in the past, as spokespersons
for their professional organizations.

The NOW Board

members who were not lawyers were often communications
professionals, such as writers, public relations
specialists or journalists. 2 They knew about media
practices and used that knowledge to structure their
communications with journalists. It may have been their
success at being sources in the past that allowed NOW
leaders to be optimistic about their chances with NOW
and news.
This expertise with press relations was not
distributed evenly throughout the organization, though,
and one of the first strategies that NOW national
leadership embarked on was the training of local
chapters in media skills. They codified their knowledge
and experience with media into "Media Kits" which were
then distributed throughout the organization to local
chapters. It is clear from the advice in these kits that
national NOW leaders were quite sophisticated news
analysts. The kits stressed knowing reporters routines,
getting to know how local news organizations were
structured, and learning about the criteria of
"newsworthiness" -- similar "training" to that which
journalists themselves might undergo. 3
NOW Chapters were urged to find out about the
deadlines of local papers and stations; to know what
shifts had which reporters and editors working, and to
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send material or call when "sympathetic" reporters were
on the job. The kits also suggested that chapters should
designate press representatives whose job it would be to
get to know reporters and to coordinate media relations.
In fact local activists are enjoined to envision
themselves as journalists:

Think of yourself as a kind of editor. If a
reporter uses something you said that seems silly
or irrelevant and ignores the important comments,
it's partly your fault. Why did you say it? Only
say what you want used. This is especially true for
television which generally runs only a minute of
film for any particular story. Make them use what
you think lS important by refusing to answer
questions on camera about anything else. 4

The press kits also focused centrally on lssues of
"newsworthiness," and though they describe news values
as highly unpredictable, they are also able to make some
good generalizations. They suggest, for example, that
chapters are more likely to be covered if they stage an
Hevent,H or if they interact with a legitimate
institution already routinely covered, such as the
legislature or courts:
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The beginning of a survey of employment practices
mayor may not be news

but the conclusion will

be. A charge that some company discriminates
against a woman mayor may not be news -- but the
announcement that an EEOC complaint has been filed
will be. A speaker at a meeting will not be news unless she or he is a well known personality. In
the final analysis it's a trial and error game. S

IDENTITY CONTROL AND LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES

The same media "savvy" that had made it possible
for NOW to produce the media kits, made NOW leadership
very sensitive to how journalists would represent their
organization in the news. From the first days, news
representation was a consideration for NOW leaders. The
first NOW Board itself was chosen partly with media In
mind. NOW strategists considered that having so many
"professions" represented -- the original Board had
seven Ph.D.'s, one MD and three religious vocations
could only encourage journalists to take the
organization seriously. They aimed to present themselves
as a serious "civil rights" organization and to avoid
the marginalizing treatment that seemed to be the fate
of the student and women's liberation groups. They
borrowed the rhetoric and moral authority of the Civil
Rights Movement and called themselves "the "NAACP for
women:
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There is no civil rights movement to speak for
women, as there has been for Negroes and other
victims of discrimination. The National
Organization for Women must therefore begin to
speak. 6

NOW leaders saw themselves as creating a
revolutionary organization, whose long term goal was to
radically change society. But they were also centrally
concerned with action and with devising ways to make
change in the short term. This required being taken
seriously by journalists and policy makers and NOW
leaders were intent to control the organization's
representation in news media as a part of this more
general legitimacy battle.
NOW leaders tried to manage their relationships
with media by controlling, both who could speak to media
in NOW's name, as well as what they could talk about.
They delegated media interactions to a few key leaders
and they cautioned local chapters to be careful to keep
upersonal u and organizational statements separate in
their interviews. In their interactions with journalists
at the national level they would try to identify and
avoid topics or frames that journalists might use to
usensationalizeu the organization. Early casualties of
this control were the issues of sexuality and

lesbianism. The 1968 press guidelines make clear that
such topics are simply better avoided:

NOW officers and representatives are urged to use
careful good judgment when working with the news
media ... NOW spokesmen [sic] are urged to weigh
seriously any statement which might be
misunderstood or which might cause embarrassment to
our organization ( ...

) we do know that questions

involving the sexual and social relationships
between men and women are especially sensitive and
especially susceptible to ridicule by the press.
Special caution must be observed in statements
which go beyond official NOW policy in this area. 7

NOW leaders also tried to control the context of
their media appearances. One way to do this was by
insisting that opponents and counter-debaters on talk
shows were of the same "stature" as NOW sources -- that
is national and representative of a mas based
organization. As Karen De Crow, NOW's President from
1974-1977, expressed it, she did not want to waste her
time debating false opposites or "nut types:"

It is my general policy, as national president of a
national organization, to not appear with local
nut-types, although I will appear with national
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nut-types,

like Phyllis Schlafly ... I don't want to 192

give equal time ... in such a manner.8

NOW's attempts to control media interactions, did
not always corne off, however, despite careful planning.
At a 1973 conference for example, cameramen turned on
their cameras only for resolutions on lesbianism, rape
and prostitution, ignoring a multitude of other
resolutions. NOW audience members were furious and
demanded the complete removal of the cameras. Only an
intervention by the V-P for public relations, Toni
Carabillo, who appealed to members to have faith in the
lltruth" stopped the journalists from being thrown out:

We know what our own momentum

lS,

and we know what

we have overcome by way of biased coverage, and we
know the truth has a way of prevailing 9

The nCostsn of Identity Control Strategies

This sensitivity to what reporters would find
llsensational", however, also constrained what it was
possible for NOW to talk about publicly. Issues of
llsexual and social relationships," for example were
surely at the heart of the feminist movement itself.
NOW spokespersons were also advised to avoid the
use of other llhot" terms that would encourage media
workers to classify them in de-legitimizing ways.

Friedan, for example, suggested that NOW sources simply
avoid traditional political terms such as capitalism or
socialism altogether:

In San Francisco I met with some of the younger,
radical women ... I told my NOW sisters -- and the
young radicals too -- that we should stay away from
issues of -capitalism- and -socialism.- 10

This avoidance of -hot" political terms, was part
of a quite deliberate attempt on NOW's part in the early
years to differentiate NOW's identity from that of the
more radical movement groups. Friedan had corne to see
the--younger" groups as engaged in what she considered
-bedroom politics" which she thought de-legitimized the
movement. She wanted to continue to present the
organization as one concerned with -civil rights" and
the

more radical feminisms challenged the very ground

of -civil" life. 11
Though Friedan left the presidency of the
organization in 1970, this media strategy of
differentiating of NOW from the "younger" groups
continued through the early 1970s. A 1973 letter to the
Dick Cavett show, from NOW's Public Information Office,
for example, outlined NOW's self-perceptions, and the
identity it was trying to project. In this letter, for
example, NOW national strategists distance themselves
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from

other feminists whom they indicate are the "real"

bra burners

a term that harmed the movement as a

whole:

I would like to stress that the movement is hardly
one with trivial or insignificant aims. I am sure
you are all aware of the many inequities
experienced by women in our society -- including
discrimination in credit, employment, marriage and
divorce, and in many other areas. You may not be
aware, however, that the movement has grown from
one symbolized by the myth of bra-burners to one
made up of a large number of serious, dedicated
women and men who are working hard to bring about
change in our society for the benefit of both
sexes. 12

It was not until after 1975, when NOW leadership
was taken over by a "majority caucus" with wider ranging
interpretations of feminism that such differentiation
strategies declined. 13
Ericson et al.

(1989) have argued that this kind of

control by source organizations is common. Generally
organizations seek to speak with one voice, and to
minimize the appearance of any internal dissent or
illegitimate practices in their interactions with
journalists. They try to keep the "back" and "front"
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areas of the organization distinct In their media
interactions. HBackH areas are where the private,
conflicted, and perhaps illegitimate, business of the
organization takes place. HFrontH areas are public and
strategically monitored versions of the organization
that are made available to reporters. 14
But social movements may experience such rules
differently than other kinds of organizations. Movements
are usually more concerned with internal democracy and
their identity is usually more shifting and multiple
than other types of organizations. Both of these factors
make a movement group's Hpublic identityH more
problematic to control -- or as early NOW leaders saw it
to present as non-controversial -- than other kinds of
organizations.
And in fact NOW leaders' strategic attempts to
frame the organization as respectable and noncontroversial did sometimes backfire and disconnect them
from their membership and the rest of the movement. In
her resignation from NOW in 1970, for example, Rita Mae
Brown cited NOW's insensitivity to issues of sexuality
because they were more concerned with avoiding
controversy than accurately representing their
constituency:

Lesbianism is the one word that can cause the
Executive Committee a collective heart attack. This
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issue is dismissed as unimportant, too dangerous to
contemplate, divisive or whatever excuse could be
dredged up from their repression. The prevailing
attitude is ...
they)

"Suppose they (notice the word,

flock to us in droves? How horrible. After

all think of our image. "15

Though NOW's position on lesbianism and sexual
orientation has changed dramatically since Brown's
resignation (a 1971 national conference resolution
brought lesbian rights onto NOW's agenda and a 1975
resolution made the issue a priority for NOW), over
time, the organization's attempts to appear serious and
not -to be marginalized by media also made them
compromise on other issues, and brought them criticism
inside the women's movement. thirsty years later, it is
still this hostility to lesbian concerns and an alleged
llpurge ll of lesbians from leadership positions because of
public identify concerns,

that haunts NOW today.16

1975, The Majority Caucus and New Identity
Strategies

In fact these attempts by early NOW leaders to
llsoft-pedal" feminism were also part of the more general
critique of NOW leadership voiced by a new llMajority
Caucus" that emerged in NOW in 1974-1975 and took over
the organization from its original leaders.
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The caucus comprised a group of mostly "younger,"
more radical, NOW leaders who built a platform on their
commitment to a more open and democratic organization.
For the first time in NOW's history in 1975 the national
elections were bitterly challenged by a "slate" of
candidates with a coherent manifesto and platform. Most
of the caucus members were elected and they formed
majorities in 1975 on both the NOW National and
Executive Boards.
with the coming of new leadership and new attitudes
to feminism,

came some changes in public identity

strategies too. The new Board's desire for more
democratic and "upfront" leadership also extended to
their approach to media. The tendency of earlier
administration's to "soft pedal" particular issues with
media was critiqued and the Majority Caucus suggested
that NOW begin to loosen its identity control concerns
with media, because avoiding issues publicly could
translate into forgetting about them internally too:

Down playing some issues for tactical reasons

lS

always a risky procedure. When we fail to
articulate some of our goals we tend to drop them
not only from our immediate demands but from our
long term vision, It does not take much anxiety and
circumspection to turn a multi-issued revolutionary
movement into a one issue reform. 17
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After 1975, NOW's differentiation strategies, in
which NOW's respectability had been played up at the
expense of other movement groups, were also toned down.
In this later period NOW's relationship to the rest of
the movement was usually presented to media as one of
"sisterhood" rather than as the respectable arm of the
movement.
The new leadership's more democratic urge was
reflected in a new emphasis on communicating beyond the
national elite press and professional women to a more
general audience. As part of anew campaign to public
redefinition of housework as work

and to reach

homemakers with feminist messages, NOW

began to

interact with a wider range of media outlets including
appeal to a wider range of women in which women's
magazines and local newspapers became central targets.
The "displaced homemaker" campaign was one of the first
times feminist had reached out to women working at home
and it signified a quite dramatic shift in NOW's public
identity as one concerned mainly with women in the
public workplace. 18

WOOING WOMEN REPORTERS:
BUILDING A WOMEN'S ISSUE "BEAT"

Besides controlling the organization's identity in
media, NOW strategists also had a more general aim in

their media strategies; to build a media agenda about
emerging women's issues. Many of NOW's core issues in
1968 -- sex discrimination in employment and education,
child care facilities for working women, reproductive
freedom, and ERA ratification -- were for the most part
still non-existent "issues" in the public policy domain.
Before they could get the public to take this new set of
"women's issues" seriously, NOW strategists decided they
would have to get reporters to respond to them. So they
set out to "educate" and "raise the consciousness" of a
group of reporters to become interested and expert in a
new domain they called "women's issues."
There was a small cadre of these kind of reporters,
who "from the early days recognized the importance of the
movement. NOW media strategists identified these key
reporters and then worked to keep them and others
informed and educated on the legislative and legal
progress of women's issues and of the movement's
activities more generally. They sent these reporters
information and research, set up one on one interviews
with movement leaders, provided background analyses on
policy issues, and even periodically took them to lunch.
In building relationships with particular
journalists and providing information for them NOW was
acting like sophisticated sources from other kinds of
organizations. But NOW was faced with a more complex
problem than other mainstream organizations: the women
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reporters they were dealing with were also subject to
sexism and a lack of professional legitimacy in their
own organizations. Even when NOW had built relationships
with women reporters in the elite press, and even when
those reporters wrote stories about the movement and
about women's politics, the writers could not be sure
that unsympathetic or sexist editors would not cut the
story or revoke the reporter's assignment.
Marilyn Goldstein, who wrote a series on the
movement in its early days for News day,

for example,

remembers unsympathetic editors, one of whom cut out
much of her explanatory material on the movement's
orlglns or reasonlng:

I wrote a serles on women's rights and he told me
"Get out there and find an authority who'll say
this is all a crock of shit. I'm quoting to you. I
wrote of how the women's movement parallels the
black movement, and he pulled that all out. So
when people say "A good series, Marilyn," I say,
"If you really want to learn about the women's
rights movement, look in my waste basket.,,19

Nan Robertson,

for example, a long time New York

Times journalist also recalls how editors failed to take
feminism seriously. She recounts how two of the
movement's strongest journalistic allies, Eileen
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Shanahan and Grace Lichtenstein, both of the Times, had
to relegate women's issues to evening work:

Like Shanahan she [Grace Lichtenstein] had been
covering the burgeoning women's movement for two
years. Like Eileen, she had to ask her uninterested
male editors for permission to cover women's
politics, and when she got permission, she often
had to cover them in her spare time when her
regular reporting was done. 20

The early attempts by NOW and these reporters to
build a women's issue beat, was often set back by lack
of s·upport and resources from media institutions, who
could not "see" women's politics as news. Grace
Lichtenstein,

for example, a senior Times journalist

noted that an issue like changing rape laws was not
something that would get a male editor's attention:

There have been times when I found editors unaware
of things happening, like the [changes in] the
rape laws. Only women think in terms of rape laws;
the men ... know about capital punishment. 21

NOW's role here, then, was more important than that
of the traditional source. In many instances it was the
only source and had to be doubly reliable and useful to
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reporters. But it also served as a source of moral and
social support for women whose own "news judgment" was
being questioned. Without the support of

organizations

like NOW, these women would not have been able to (or
perhaps would not have thought of) writing about the
movement at all. In fact the interaction between
feminists and some women journalists was strong enough
that a number of these women later went on to sue (and
win against) their employer, The New York Times

for

discrimination in promotion, hiring and pay (Robertson,
1992) .

Advocate Journalists or Gendered Journalists?

These women journalists did not necessarily
consider themselves feminists. They noticed that they
could "see" that feminism was newsworthy in a way that
their male colleagues could not, but they attributed
this to their news judgments and "professionalism" more
than to any ideological factors. Peggy Simpson, for
example, a reporter who covered the movement recalls
that she was surprised when her editors could not see
that feminism was news, but she did not attribute her
own judgment to politics but to her news sense:

I thought of myself not as a feminist but as a
reporter covering a good story that for some reason
almost all of my male colleagues had ignored. 22
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Simpson and other women journalists covering the
movement for the elite press saw themselves as acting
like good journalists, and building up expertise the way
journalists do -- by finding expert sources. But they
were bringing their professional judgment to bear on
information and sources that male reporters ignored,
sources their editors simply didn't see as sources, and
issues they could not see as lssues.
Goldenberg (1978), has

suggested that we might see

these kind of reporters who are sympathetic to a
particular Vlew as "advocate" reporters. In a study of
"resource-poor" groups access to newspapers in Boston,
she noted that advocate reporters were essential
resources for these groups access to newspapers. And, ln
NOW's case too, it is also true that a small group of
reporters covered the organization and its issues
persistently despite set-backs. But to consider these
women "advocates" may be both too simple, and too mediacentric. Much of their coverage of feminism was
facilitated not by their own consciousness but by the
information subsidy work of NOW and other feminist
groups. Though these women reporters certainly played a
part in making women's issue noticeable as stories, it
is also true that without the proactive source
strategies of organizations like NOW, it is doubtful if
much of the early coverage of women's issues would have

been generated at all. 23

One reporter who covered the

movement, for example, recalls missing such information
in her early coverage of the ERA and then changing her
mind on the ERA when it became available to her. Without
arguments and information from women's groups,

she took

on board, uncritically, the arguments of another
legitimate source, in this case a state senator, who was
anti-ERA:

At that time I had not reported on any major
elements of the early women's liberation marches
and had never met anyone who called herself a
feminist. I did know a lobbyist from the Texas
. chapter of Business and Professional Women who was
unsuccessfully trying to get a state Equal Rights
Amendment passed. She never approached me, during
my two terms covering the Texas Legislature, and I
never called her, so a persuasive state senator
easily convinced me that women would be 1n terrible
straits if Texas protective labor laws and
community property laws were altered by the ERA. 24

The ability of some women reporters to UseeU that
women's issue were newsworthy, when their male
colleagues could not, 1S also more complex than any
simple uadvocate U status can account for.

It is more

likely to be the result of women reporters different
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life experlences and socialization. As women they would
have been exposed to sexual discrimination, sexual
harassment, problems child care, and so on, that their
male colleagues would not have experienced. This
differential socialization does not then mean that all
women reporters will see the world the same (and all
differently from their male colleagues), but that
gendered, racial and sexual identities (among others)
will play a role in what seems important to a reporter
even after professional socialization (Van Zoonen,
1989) .25

What lS clear here is that these reporters did not
consider themselves as either -advocates- or feminists
but as reporters whose life experiences as women
sensitized them to these new issues. 26 It was this
sensitivity combined with the information support work
of NOW and other feminist groups these women were then
able to produce stories about the movement that would
the influence public perceptions of what were previously
considered -private"
of life)

(or at least non problematic areas

into -public- issues. Whether or not feminists

have been able to retain control of the framing of these
issues, it is still an achievement to have -made" them
lssues. and this -making" was accomplished to a large
extent through interaction with, and subsidizing of,
women journalists.
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THE CENTRALITY OF INFORMATION SUBSIDIES
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PACKETS, BRIEFINGS, AND THE NOW NEWS SERVICE:

NOW was able to play this supportive role because
it invested so much time and resources in producing
information. Indeed, as Melucci suggests is true of
social movements more generally, in some ways NOW was
itself a form of media. The organization researched,
collected and processed information as a central
organizational activity. Much of this effort went into
education efforts within the movement. For example, NOW
information staff produced kits, newsletters and the
organization's newspaper, Do It NOW (later National NOW
Times), but a large amount of such effort was

focused

on journalists -- into producing information subsides
for journalists (Gandy, 1982).
This subsidy work was especially apparent during
the years 1973-1975 when NOW maintained a separate
Public Information Office in New York. During its
existence, the PIO built up for NOW an extensive network
of Hcontacts H in news,

talk shows, magazines, and

special interest newsletters. 27 The office put out an
average of 10 press releases a month in 1975, and
organized numerous appearances for NOW leaders on radio
and TV talk shows. They also monitored NOW's
representation in media and maintained clipping files of
NOW stories sent in from chapters across the country. In
a survey of NOW national conference stories in July

1974, for example, chapters sent back clips to the PIO
office from 12 different states. 28
In an ambitious effort to reach out into the
country beyond the national media, and as part of an
emerging state-based ERA campaign, the PIO also set up
one of NOW's first ongoing information subsidies, the
NOW News Service. The NOW News Service was aimed at
suburban news services who always needed material and
who could reach women NOW could not reach in other ways:

The service would have a double purpose:
(a) to reach small city and rural areas and supply
them with news of the ERA and other women's
lssues.
(b)

to establish a climate for the organization of

new NOW chapters. 29

The first NOW News Service packet in 1973 contained
an ERA feature story, a press release on NOW's August
26th strike, a feature on NOW's accomplishments, a brief
history of the feminist movement and a question and
answer column on ERA. It had a mailing list of about 500
news outlets. Future packets were similar, often
including easy to use question and answer formats or
ready to print editorial length pleces on the ERA or
other women's policy concerns.
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The NOW News Service succeeded in putting out a
number of these packages and received good responses
from regional news and women's page editors, such as
this letter from a Sparks, Nevada editor:

I'd like to use some of this material and would
like to see more of it. I was happy to have it you
.. , keep the news coming. 30

Though the News serVlce was curtailed for lack of
resources and staff time after only a few publications,
it was one of the first efforts by NOW to go beyond
promoting coverage of particular events or activities,
and to provide regular and ongoing information packages
of background information on women's issues to news
outlets. As such it was a harbinger of future NOW media
strategies like the gender gap campaign which aimed to
produce ongoing information about women's politics. 31

From Identity Control to Symbolic Politics:
The Making of the "Gender Gap"

By 1980 media strategies had become an integral
part of NOW's overall political planning. Whereas in the
early years, public relations personnel had sought to
place stories about NOW's events or concerns, by the
1980s, the media campaigns were integral to the overall
political strategies. Media plans began to be made with
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political strategy, and NOW's knowledge production
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efforts began to be aimed more and more at reporters.
Communication itself had largely become the
organization's goal.
During the ERA Ratification Campaign, for example,
especially in its last months, NOW threw enormous
resources into a last minute Hcountdown H publicity
campaign where the centrality of good media coverage to
overall political success was seen as central. The fight
over the ERA was a symbolic fight in the eyes of NOW
leaders, and one that could ultimately only be won in
the public media arena:

The future of the ERA in part depended upon the
public's perception of the issue and the media's
interpretation of the final months of the decadelong effort to ratify the Amendment ... Press
Hstrategies H became almost as important as the
legislative and legal strategies. Legislative
progress hinged on mobilizing public opinion and
publicizing the views and votes of individual
legislators. 32

Perhaps this move towards symbolic politics
apparent in NOW's

1S

most

1981 HGender GapH Campaign in which

it becomes clear how the creation and diffusion of Hnew H
issues is at the heart of social movement communication.

The ngender gapn was the name that NOW leaders
coined for a for a significant and persistent difference
they noticed in men's and women's voting patterns in the
1980 election. The ngapn

showed women as less inclined

to vote for Reagan than men. It was first noted by NOW's
President Eleanor Smeal who was trained as a political
scientist. Smeal noted the persistent difference in 1980
election poll results in a meeting in which the NOW
leadership were discussing the future of the ERA
ratification process., and NOW leaders set out to make
the llgender gapn a household term. They reasoned, that
if legislators could be convinced that women were a
significant and distinct voting bloc, perhaps they could
be persuaded to vote for the ERA. At this point In the
ratification process, the ERA was being blocked by no
more than a half dozen senators in a number states. 33
Beginning with a New York Times article based on
NOW's information,

newspapers an TV stations around the

country then picked up the idea of the gender gap.34
Over a period of months, NOW leaders wrote op-ed pieces,
distributed copies of gender gap stories from one outlet
to another, and responded critically to reporters'
questions about the gender gap. NOW hired political
scientists to cross tabulate poll results by gender, and
then sent out these ngender gap updates n to thousand of
reporters.
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The result of this continuous information work,
according to NOW media strategist Kathy Bonk, was a
months-long surge of coverage of the gender gap and
women's voting and attitude patterns in news outlets
throughout the country that brought attention to women
as voters, and as voters with different agendas than
men. After NOW stopped sending the updates, however,
Bonk (1988) recalls that the coverage stopped. She
suggests that the campaign did influence a few
specialist reporters, but that, for the most part, once
the Hupdates H stopped coming, the stories on women's
politics also dried up:

A few key political reporters and columnists ....
did spend time analyzing and monitoring women's
voting patterns. They became more informed and
better able to write accurately about the issue.
Too many headline writers and reporters, however,
covered the issue as a passing fad. When women's
groups stopped "selling" the gender gap, reporters
went on to the next fashionable issue. By 1986,
gender differences in polling were rarely
reported. 35

Bonk assesses the effects of NOW communications in
terms of the number of news stories it generated, but it
is less clear, and harder to assess, how such ideas as
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the "gender gap" affect peoples' thinking more
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generally. Melucci has called this more general effect
of movement communication its "symbolic" effect in which
public ideas are created or reformulated. The

"Gender

Gap Campaign" seems to be a good candidate for this more
diffuse communicative effect. The term itself is still
routinely used to talk about women and men as voters 15
years later. and its formulation may have changed
journalists (and others) ways of seeing women more
generally as an active and cohesive political voting
bloc. By persuading news organizations to report polls
broken down by gender, NOW may have ultimately changed
how reporters and policy makers saw "women" as political
agents more generally.
NOW leaders emerged from the ERA and gender gap
campaigns more convinced than ever of the importance of
media and information campaigns as part of a social
movement group's work:

Good media coverage lS crucial. If the media glve
the issues adequate play and stress the importance
of registering and voting, profound social change
lS possible. Everything depends on making sure that
women are fully informed on the critical issues and
are encouraged to get out and vote. 36

By the mid 1980s, NOW's media plan involved an
ongolng, continual, strategic interaction with media
over the construction of women's issues. NOW strategists
saw their role as one ln which they would produce
information for media, monitor media content, and use
that monitoring in the design of new information. And ln
the mid 1980s, with foundation support, NOW began a
research project that would help them to connect with
journalists more effectively. The organization compiled
a data base of around 3000 media personnel around the
country, and then undertook a year-long series of
meetings with media personnel across the country to talk
about the coverage of women's lssues on an ongoing basis
and to "establish positive working relationships within
the industry.,,37
These meetings with industry professionals were the
culmination of a media pragmatism that has from the
beginning tried to form NOW into perfect media sources.
By the mid 1980s media work was central to NOW's
political work more generally.

Media Pragmatism vs. Media Subversion:
NOW Strategies in Movement Context

The deliberateness and coherence of this media
pragmatist orientation becomes clear when we see NOW's
strategies in the wider movement context. NOW's general
media pragmatism was quite different from the media
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strategies employed by the "younger" feminist groups.
These groups took a different approach to media -- one
that can be characterized as media subversion rather
than media pragmatism. Where NOW sought to use the
media, the younger groups wanted to subvert its
processes and convert its workers. They were likely to
be hostile or difficult in their interactions with
journalists because they saw news media as a major part
of the problem, in society, not the solution. As off our
backs writers put it, in 1970, news was as sexist as

other American institutions, so unlikely to be a
resource:

·A major misconception

lS

the belief that the media

will deal with us seriously and present a truthful
picture of who we are. There

lS

no reason to assume

that the mass media are free of the sexism
pervasive in all other American institutions. The
mass media are primarily interested In lining their
own pockets and assuring themselves of the
continuance of their powerful position in society
by kow-towing to the interests of the ruling
class ... In the end the mass media will capitulate
rather than fight for the truth, for to meet the
needs of the people and the demands of objective
journalism would mean the end of the mass media in
their present form. 38
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In contrast to NOW's strategy of control and
careful use of media conventions, the younger movement
groups took an oppositional stance to media. Where NOW
tried to support women journalists with information, the
younger groups would either ban journalists from their
events, or try to subvert media sourcing routines by
insisting the journalists speak to all members of a
group.
For the "younger" movement groups, media access was
intertwined with more general issues of power and
representation within their organizations. In their
attempts to deconstruct patriarchal systems, younger
movement groups (such as New York Radical Women,
Redstockings, Women's Liberation) often equated
bureaucratization or specialization with patriarchal
forms of organization and refused to have either
designated leaders, or spokespersons, preferring to have
a "structureless" organization in which each individual
would "speak for herself." 39
Issues of who should or could speak FOR the
movement has also been concerns for NOW. But in the
younger movement these issues were part of larger
debates about the nature of power in which the question
of and who should be seen [if anybody] as leaders of the
movement was recurrent. In this context delegating

individuals to act as sources for the media became much
more problematic.
Whereas NOW had built into their organizational
identity the role of spokesperson, the younger movement
could not easily compromise on the issue. Central to
their critique of patriarchal ways of knowing and
representing others, was their belief in the importance
of knowledge gained from personal experience. They had
seen too often in the past how women had been spoken
"about" and "for" by male voices. In particular they
valued personal testimony or experiences of oppression
that had not been able to be spoken before.

The same

search for authoritative sources that women journalists
had been able to satisfy by talking to NOW,

then, led

journalists into trouble with the younger movement
groups. As a women's liberation member said to reporter
Sandie North when she tried to find a movement
spokesperson:

Any woman working In the media can write about her
own oppression as a woman, so why should the press
need to talk to any of us?40

By asking reporters to listen to a wide variety of
women, or indeed to listen to themselves, they were
expressing a key tenet of their feminism, but it was not
one that fit easily with news conventions.
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The generally conflictual relations between the
younger groups articulations of feminism and news
discourse conventions manifested itself most clearly in
one of the more radical movement's key strategies; they
would speak only to women reporters. Starting at the
1968 Miss America protest, when women demonstrators from
New York Radical Women (NYRW) simply refused to speak to
male reporters or to answer them explaining,

"Why should

we talk with them? It's impossible for men to
understand," this policy soon became an informal rule
among many women's groups.
As a group who had chosen their name, The National
Organization "for" Women, deliberately so that men could
also ·be a part of ending sexism, NOW were unlikely to
adopt such a policy. But the radical women's groups
involved hoped that their separatist strategy would make
it easier to deal with the press,

(which would result in

better coverage), and that it might also force the news
media to hire more women journalists. They had seen how
the Civil Rights Movement had forced editors to employ
more African-American journalists and thought that they
would do the same in order to cover the women's
liberation movement. 41
The younger groups seemed to believe that women
reporters would somehow, naturally, be more sympathetic
because they were women. But they failed to take onto
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account that women reporters also followed the
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conventions and "logics" of news.
The llyoungerll branch's approach to media sometimes
extended into outright hostility and violence against
the press where women sabotaged equipment and confounded
attempts to "cover" movement events because they were
suspicious of how that coverage would turn out. Male
reporters were often harassed and sometimes subjected to
physical abuse, though,

ironically,

it didn't seem to

cure them of their sexism:

"Get the pigs out!" was the rally cry for a
contingent of women who last fall drove Doug
Johnson, a WABC-TV correspondent away from a
Women's Lib meeting.

"One of the girls smashed

my microphone. She was rabid, but she was a lovely
little thing. ,,42

This hostility to the press, sometimes deterred
even sympathetic reporters. Marlene Sanders of ABC-TV
remembers the radical movement as a very hard story to
get, noting that covering the younger movement meant
"fighting everybody, everywhere, all the time ....

I

am

in real agreement with the Women's Liberation front and

they're oppressing me.,,43
Some of these differences In media interactions and
expectations between NOW and more radical groups may

have been due to the differences in background. Whereas
NOW's early leaders had come from government
administration, education and public relations, the
women of the HyoungerH women's movement had gained their
political experience in protest politics, such as the
peace movement or student movements, and they had
learned to be suspicious of the press in those contexts.
Freeman (1975, p. 111), for example, notes that it was
this background in student politics which made the
younger feminists wary of the press:

Young feminists had been hostile to the press from
the beginning -- significantly more so than other
social movements. Some of this fear was traceable
to inexperience as even those women with a
political background had not done press work
before. Much more derived from watching how
inaccurately the press had reported the social
movements and student protests in which they had
previously been active.

Indeed Betty Friedan once suggested that an
unspoken alliance between serious journalists and the
Hserious H women's movement had Hsaved H the movement from
its own Hexcesses: H
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The women ln the media had already become quite an
effective underground, protecting the movement from
its own excesses in their coverage. 44

In any case, NOW's pragmatism and strategic
attempts to learn about and use news routines, were
clearly not the only possible ways for feminists to
interact with news media.

CONCLUSION: THE CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBILITIES OF
MEDIA PRAGMATISM

Over time NOW developed a more and more
sophisticated version of media pragmatism. From early
attempts to control the group's identity through taking
media conventions into account,

to a fully fledged

research project to determine how best to interact with
journalists, NOW has seen news as a potential movement
resource and has set out to use it for mass
communication purposes.
This media pragmatism, which was in direct contrast
to the younger feminist groups' conflictual relationship
with media, seems to have been "successful" enough, at
least from the organization's own point of view, because
they continued to develop and refine it over time. In
the period described here, NOW leaders continued a
general strategy of trying to "use" rather than subvert,
ignore or avoid media interactions. And, day-to-day
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NOW's reflexive appropriation of news conventions seems
to have been a strategy which helped them to create and
maintain relationships with reporters. As this chapter
illustrates, NOW and other feminist groups were critical
producers of information for the women journalists who
first wrote about and publicized feminist political
issues.
NOW's media pragmatist strategizing also came with
some important constraints, however. Media access work
diverted time, energy and skills that might have been
used by NOW in other ways, thereby constraining NOW's
other political activities. But perhaps more
importantly, the media orientation of NOW from the
beginhing may have constrained its own articulations of
feminism. NOW leaders, especially in the early years,
were often more concerned with the organization's
"public identity" than they were with its internal
democracy. Early NOW leaders generally produced news
access at the costs of the strategic avoidance of
certain topics and frames -- some of which (such as
questions of patriarchy and sexual identity) were
essential to the movement's philosophy as a whole. Their
focus on reporters' perceptions meant that they often
mis-represented the organization -- for example,
ignoring and erasing the contributions of lesbian
members in the early years.
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The conventions of news functioned for NOW

both as 222

resources and as constraints. Speaking in llmedia logic ll
gained the attention of reporters -- and so access to
the public sphere --

but it also meant restricting

public communication about NOW's identity and political
concerns. NOW's decision to encode its concerns in
media-friendly ways -- llthinking like journalists ll
may in fact have meant that early NOW leaders thought
less like feminists. Later in the organization's history
this constraint of media strategizing became quite clear
to NOW's leaders. As the new NOW leaders noted in their
1975 manifesto, keeping quiet strategically on some
issues in pUblic, means they are often also forgotten In
private: llWhen we fail to articulate some of our goals,
we tend to drop them not only from our immediate demands
but from our long term vision. ll
News is a kind of resource for movement groups who
want to use it, then, but like signification, or
knowledge more generally, it is a resource whose
strategic use requires that sources articulate their
experiences within its terms. Speaking in news VOlces
may constrain what it is possible to say. The question
for social movement organizations (and source
organizations more generally)

lS what those constraints

might be at any particular time, and what, if anything,
can be done to resist them.

By choosing to interact with news media on its own
terms, and to ·think like journalists," NOW strategists
were able to produce some access, but it is a critical
question whether the kind of access NOW was able to
produce was in fact useful for the organization's
overall goals, For example, did media pragmatism help
NOW to mass communicate enough of its feminist concerns
over time? Or was there always a significant difference
between NOW's own identity and its public identity? Was
NOW able to succeed in controlling its legitimacy as a
speaker in news or did news ·process" NOW in its own way
despite the organization's efforts?
NOW leaders in the early years seemed to be willing
to ·pay· for news access by clamping down on internal
dissent and by limiting the organization's identity. In
later years, new leaders decided that it was more
important to communicate a more inclusive vision of
feminism and to risk being treated as an illegitimate
speaker by media. But the relative ·success· of these
different degrees of media pragmatism may only be seen
in an analysis of the outcomes of these strategic shifts
that is In news

content. In the next two chapters of

the study, I look closely at NOW's re-presentation in
news over time, and ask whether NOW's media pragmatism
overall, and its various manifestations at different
times, produced the kind of representations that NOW
strategists intended.
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Chapter 7

News Outcomes 1:
Patterns in Access, voice and Agenda Control, 1966-1980

Over time NOW remained committed to a sophisticated
and reflexive pragmatism in its interactions with news
media. NOW leaders and strategists saw news as a
resource and, especially in the early years, they were
willing to impose some constraints on the organization's
public communication in order to be taken seriously by
journalists. Compared to the more radical "younger"
groups, NOW's strategies were quite clearly mediafriendly, and media conventions and practices were taken
into account in most NOW communications. NOW leaders
tried to use the "rules" of news -- that is the routine
practices and discursive conventions -- in order to
access news.
This reflexive media pragmatism had two maln aims
to use news media to build an agenda for women's
issues, and to create a legitimate public identity for
NOW itself. But how effective was NOW in accessing and
using news? Was NOW able to produce routine news access?
Did NOW's incorporation of news values into its own
communications help to transfer its issue agenda to
news? Did NOW leaders' attempts to control the
organization's identity in interaction with journalists
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result in a legitimate public identity? Overall, did NOW 230
llsucceed" in controlling its interaction with news media
using media pragmatist strategies, or was the
organization and its issues "processed"---.by news?
In the next two chapters I assess NOW's media
strategies through an analysis of the outcome of these
strategies in news content. 1 Chapter seven assesses the
outcomes of NOW strategies in terms of agenda-building
success -- it asks whether NOW was able to access news
and transfer to news its agenda of women's issues. using
quantitative content analysis techniques and rank order
correlations, it tracks NOW's access, VOlce, placement,
and agenda control in the Times, asking whether, at
thes"e various levels of access, NOW "succeeded" (or not)
In its interactions with news.

Chapter eight assesses NOW's "success" In terms of
identity and legitimacy control. It draws on frame
analysis techniques to track the Times representation of
NOW and compares that representation to shifts in NOW's
overall identity and media strategies. Both chapters
draw on an original content analysis of 377 stories
about NOW in the New York Times

from 1966-1980.

Overall, I argue that NOW was relatively successful
in accessing news, and in gaining some "voice" in the
public sphere, but that at the level of both agenda and
identity control, NOW was subject to some systematic
processing by news media which limited this success.

Even as NOW reflexively appropriated news conventions
and practices to gain access to news, the organization's
discourse and identity were translated by the Times
through a public/private framework in which issues that
were framed ln more traditionally llpolitical" or legal
terms (such as sex discrimination in employment) were
placed in serious news categories, but llnew" issues or
issues that were framed in less conventional ways (such
as child care or "sexism" frames)
lifestyle or

"wom~n's

tended to be placed in

pages."

I argue that this "processing" of NOW by the Times
is the outcome both of NOW leaders' own strategies (in
which they took on some news values in their own
communications and tried to seem legitimate by framing
new issues in terms of old ones), but also of some deep
discursive patterns ln news discourse-- namely a publicprivate divide --

which NOW encountered (and

incorporated) unintentionally. News shares this publicprivate divide with liberal discourses more generally,
but it is a discursive categorization that

may be

inimical to feminisms. As feminist theorists have noted
in recent years, the public-private categories of
liberal politics , in which some aspects of life are
designated llpublic"

(and open to political debate and

collective amelioration) and others are marked llprivate"
or domestic (and no concern of the state's), are also
gendered. It is the traditional elements of women's
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lives, experlences and problems (for example, child
care, sexual harassment and so on) that are usually
consigned to the "private" and less legitimate areas of
the liberal divide, and traditionally "male" experiences
(such as work, economics, war and so on) that are seen
as public issues (cf. Butler and Scott, 1992; Fraser,
1989; 1992; McLaughlin, 1993). Given that one of they
key struggles of feminist politics overall has been to
"make public" more of women's experiences (and so open
them up to debate and political action), this
conventional public-private processing of NOW's
discourse by news is especially problematic, and perhaps
marks some of the limits of both news and liberal
discourses for carrying feminist politics.
These discursive constraints of news are not dealt
with particularly well in NOW's media pragmatism,
because unlike the "rules" of news that are accessible
to NOW at the level of practice (e.g. the "beat" system
and the event-orientation of news), these discursive
patterns are much less visible day to day. It is these
constraints, though, that may constitute the unintended
consequences of engaging with news media for NOW.

ASSESSING SOURCE JlSUCCESS

JI

IN NEWS AGENDA-BUILDING:

ACCESS, VOICE, PLACEMENT AND CONTROL

The issue of "success" in source-news interactions,
as in any kind of communicative interaction, is highly
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problematic. Indeed some observers have suggested that
we should abandon the idea of success altogether as
being too ·instrumental· a concept in
dialogical/constructivist approaches (Van Zoonen, 1992)
However, I think it is important to recognize that
dialogs are not only communicative (i.e. interactive,
non linear and sometimes oriented towards understanding)
but also often (and certainly in media-movement
interactions) highly strategic. 2 As such, we still need
ways to assess the relative outcomes of different kinds
of interactive strategies, even when recognizing that
these will be imperfect measures.
In this study I use a four-part framework for
assessing NOW's success that assesses the organization's
access patterns at four different levels:

access,

vOlce, placement, and control. Access, simply refers to
NOW's appearance in the news columns, and is the minimal
requirement for voice in the public sphere and ·success·
in interaction with news media. Voice refers to whether
NOW is allowed to speak and in what circumstances, since
voice is essential to the ability to define events and
issues in ways that would produce influence. 3 Placement
refers to where in the paper NOW stories were placed.
Placement in news has long been seen to indicate
relative importance -- front page issues are more
important than other kinds, so placement patterns can be
read as a measure of relative legitimacy assigned
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different kinds of stories by editors. Control, refers
to NOW's ability to retain control of its own agenda. 4
Issue control

1S

assessed through a comparison of NOW's

"agendas" to the Times representation of that agenda
over time. This comparison indicates whether news
coverage of NOW presented to the public the same set of
issues that NOW was concerned with internally, and
whether these issues were presented in the same "order"
or ranking, where such ranking is read to indicate
relative importance. 5
These dimensions of success -- access, voice,
placement and control

are analytically separable, and

can, to some extent be understood, hierarchically.6 We
can say for example that access is basic to all other
levels, that voice is an additional level of successful
interaction, and that legitimate representation or
control of one's identity makes a voice more credible
and more likely to be listened to. Control, over one's
identity and one's agenda, is in this framework the
ultimate "success" of strategic interaction. In reality
of course, anyone story might have overlapping and
contradictory elements of all of these, and my aim
not to put these forward as definitive a-priori
categories of success, but simply to use them to
organize a discussion of the constraints and
possibilities of NOW's access to news media.

1S
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I. PATTERNS IN BASIC ACCESS
1.1
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Simple access

Simple access is the primary level of JJsuccessJJ for
news sources. No other kinds of voice or control are
possible without that access. And indeed basic access to
the news columns was one of NOW's key communicative
aims. NOW leaders wanted to become a JJvoice JJ for women's
interests in the public debate over policy and culture
but they could only do so by first getting the attention
of reporters.
NOW was generally able to galn news access. As
Figure 7.1 illustrates, NOW's access patterns -- simply
measured in the number of stories in which NOW was
mentioned or quoted in the New York Times

show that

the organization maintained some access to news at all
times and in the first 10 years or so of NOW's existence
that visibility increased dramatically over time.
After 1975 coverage (in number of stories)
decreased and seems to have leveled off. This pattern
indicates that NOW's representation in news may have
reached a ceiling after the first ten years. During the
same period NOW's resources in terms of membership and
income also increased generally over time, showing less
of a drop-off, however, than NOW's media visibility.
Figure 7.2 illustrates how NOW's general access pattern
paralleled its resource pattern in the first ten years
or so, but then access drops off while income continues

to increase and membership drops off slightly.

(All of

these measurements are log values so that measurements
on different scales can be compared) .

Figure 7.1
Coverage of NOW in New York Times, 1966-1980
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Figure 7.2
NOW Coverage, Membership and Income Over Time, 1966-1980
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Such trends have to be interpreted with caution, of
course, because it may be that this period of apparent
leveling

lS

merely a dip in a long term trend upwards. 7

But what is very clear is that NOW was able to access
news at least minimally at all times and that access was
higher overall in 1980 than it had been in 1966. The
organization seems to have ·succeeded," then, at this
basic level of access.

1.2

Access and Gender: NOW and Women Reporters

One of NOW's key strategies in news interaction was
their building of a network of sympathetic women
reporters. Though NOW leaders manifested much less
"essentialism" in their political ideology than the
younger women's groups, they still thought that women
reporters were more likely to respond to feminist
information. 8
And in fact most of NOW's coverage was produced by
women writers. Whether as a result of NOW's deliberate
targeting of women reporters, or because of their
assignment by editors to cover women's politics because
they were women, most of the coverage of NOW that could
be identified by the writer's gender, was produced by
women reporters.
As Figure 7.1 illustrates, of the stories that
could be identified by gender, twice as many were
written by women (42%) as by men (21%). If those stories
that were unidentifiable -- because they carried no
byline

had similar proportions, then more than two

thirds of the Times
women journalists.

stories about NOW were written by
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Figure 7.3
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1.3 Access and Source Strategies

Not only did NOW's coverage increase over time (and
generally in proportion to their resource base at least
in the first 10 years) but an analysis of the origins of
news stories about NOW, indicates that the majority of
stories about NOW can in fact be seen to have been
initiated by

NOW itself.

Table 7.1 indicates a general breakdown of stories
about NOW in the Times

over the period 1966-1982 ln

terms of their origins -- that is the events or
activities produced by NOW or a journalist which
produced the news story. Again, because this content
analysis can only code manifest events or strategies
i.e. those that are mentioned or indicated by the

article -- instances in which NOW's strategic
communication influenced stories in less visible ways
are not accounted for.
For this analysis each of the 377 New York Times
stories was coded to determine what event, strategy or
activity by either NOW or a journalist had occurred to
produce the story. For example, the analysis asked, was
the story the result of a public demonstration, protest
or publicity gesture, or the result of journalist
enterprise, such as an interview?9 Was it provoked by
NOW filing a law suit or was it coverage of a NOW
conference? The overall aim of such an analysis was to
determine, if possible, how much of the news about NOW
was

~roduced

through NOW's own resource and skill

mobilization. In contrast how much was generated from
journalist Uenterprise,u as well as to determine, if
possible, which of NOW's communicative strategies were
most likely to gain news coverage. 10
As indicated in Table 7.1, most of the stories
about NOW in the Times can be seen to be the result of
NOW's own communication and political activities.
Overall, NOW was responsible for initiating around 77
percent of its own coverage (see cumulative percentages
ln Table 7.1).
One of the largest shares of this was news stories
produced from NOW's public activities, such as
demonstrations, protests and marches (19.9 %). NOW's
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overt news subsidy attempts -- where the organization
held a press conference, announced the publication of a
study, or actually wrote the piece themselves -generated the second greatest number of stories (17.8%)
Coverage of NOW's routine meetings such as annual
conferences generated the next important category of
source initiated stories (15.9%).

Interactions with the

courts (13.5%), commissions or legislatures (9.5 %)
together accounted for around 20 percent more.
Journalist enterprise stories, such as those based
In interviews or special features on the movement,
accounted for 18 percent of stories. This group of
journalist-generated stories may also, of course, have
been generated behind the scenes by NOW information
efforts, or these stories may have been instigated as
responses to NOW's public activities -- all this
analysis can conclude is that they were stories in which
NOW events or press conferences did not seem to be the
critical generators -- and which (by default) may have
been generated by journalists or editors themselves. As
an emergent movement with thousands of members (15,000
by 1973) NOW could be justified by sympathetic reporters
to their editors as a genuine story.
We should be wary about seeing these categories as
too distinct, however. The making of social change and
the making of news were deeply intertwined for NOW.
Though its public events such as marches were most
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clearly aimed at media, all of NOW's political actions
included media strategies. NOW strategists filed legal
cases to publicize particular issues as well as to seek
redress for a individual's injustice. They sent out
notices,

reminders and background materials for annual

conferences. They organized conference sessions In ways
that would attract journalists to the most central
issues. They sent out copies of, and background
information about,

their legislative testimony. Though

it is useful to see where news media paid most of its
attention to NOW,

(in this case when they took to the

streets), then, any clear separation between media/nonmedia strategies is impossible to make.

Table 7.1
Origins of NOW Stories in The New York Times,

Origins of Stories
About NOW
NOW Public Events ll
NOW News Subsidy l2
NOW Meeting/Routine
Event
Court Related
Legislature or
Commission
Other/unknown
Journalist
Enterprise 13
Totals
What

lS

Number
of
Stories

1966-1980

Total
Stories

Cumulative
% Total
Stories

75
67
60

19.9
17.8
15.9

19.9
37.7
53.6

51
36

13.5
9.5

67.1
76.6

20
68

5.3
18.0

81. 9
100.0

377

100.0

100.0

%

clear here is that most of the coverage of

NOW In the Times

carne as a result of NOW's own
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strategic actions. Indeed, other than the stories
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produced through Hjournalist enterprise H (such as
interviews and special features that are not overtly
related to specific NOW activities) which account for
only around 18 percent of stories about NOW, the bulk of
~mes

stories can be said to be HNOW-generated H media

coverage. In this framework NOW was responsible for
initiating around 77 percent of its own coverage. 14
In terms of access, then, NOW's appearance in the
news seems to have been generated largely by the
organization's own activities, and especially through
their strategic interaction with women reporters.

II. VOICE PATTERNS

2.1. Voice Over Time

A second fundamental element of legitimate or
credible representation is that a source be allowed to

speak. Voice allows sources at least to attempt to
control their own representation in media, and to set
the agenda by framing issues and events in ways that
they consider to be important. As Ericson et al.

(1989)

note, there is vast difference In being able to speak in
news, and being spoken about. One implies agency and
subjectivity, the other is associated with being
objectified and marginalized.
Voice is no guarantee of control. Journalists can,
and do, select freely from source statements, sometimes

creating from them meanings not even considered by
sources. But in general, because news is itself a
discourse made up from other discourses, what a news
story can say is constrained in important ways by what
sources says.
Voice -- or being quoted as serlOUS speakers for
American women was fundamentally important to NOW. The
organization invested significant resources and skills
in becoming ·experts· in various policy issues, and it
was one of NOW strategists aims to get reporters to see
NOW as the expert feminist organization and to become
the feminist source In elite reporters' phone lists. 15
Overall NOW succeeded in becoming a voice in news. Over
the period observed here NOW was much more likely than
not to be quoted in stories. In the Times

coverage of

NOW, the organization was quoted in 75.3 percent of the
total stories in which it appeared. It was talked about
that is mentioned but not quoted

in 24.7 percent

of stories (N=377). As Figure 7.4 indicates,
proportionally year-by-year NOW was always more likely
to be quoted than not, with most years being around 70
percent success rate at being quoted. In general, the
longer the news story, the more likely NOW was to be
quoted. 16
These figures represent only whether or not NOW was
quoted in a story -- not how many times, or in what
contexts (i.e. whether the organization was ·counter-
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quoted for example). As such they are not prlma facie
evidence for NOW's control or "success" in a news story,
but certainly without voice such control is highly
unlikely.

Figure 7.4
NOW Voice Over Time
Percentage of Total Stories in which NOW was Quoted
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2.2 Voice and Access Strategies

NOW was more likely to be quoted than not when
covered, but there were patterns in its voice. As Table
7.2 indicates the organization was proportionally more
likely to be given voice In public events, news
conferences and coverage of NOW meetings than in the
contexts of its interactions with the courts or
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legislatures. In the context of its interactions with
the courts, especially, NOW was about equally likely to
be spoken about as quoted (51% of Court related stories
show NOW being talked about.)
Table 7.2
NOW voice by Story Origin in The Times, 1966-1980
NOW
Public
Event

NOW
InfoSub

NOW
Meeting

17.3

20.9

NOW
Quoted

82.7

N
Totals

75
100.0

NOW
Talked
About

Chi Sq.: 26.308

Journ.
Enterprise

Courts

Legislature

13.3

25.0

51. 0

22.2

79.1

86.7

75.0

49.0

77.8

67
100.0

60
100.0

68
100.0

51
100.0

36
100.0

DF :5

p=.00008

2.3. Voice and Gender

NOW leaders' tendency to interact with women rather
than men reporters, and their relative success at
gaining access through that route, was no more likely,
however,

to increase the organization's llvoice ll in the

news. As Table 7. 3 illustrates, there was no real
difference in NOW's likelihood to be quoted (as opposed
to talked about) whether the reporter was female or
male.
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NOW

Table 7.3
voice by Reporter's Gender

Gender

Now Quoted

NOW

Talked About

Female
Male
Totals %

32.5
37.8
67.5
62.2
100
100
(N)
(191)
(45)
(N= 236 because stories that could not be
identified by gender were excluded.)
III.

PLACEMENT

Besides access and VOlce, the placement of a news
story also carries messages about its general importance
as a public, political topic. Within journalistic
practice, importance is assigned to news events and
issues on a sliding scale of importance; those accounts
of events that are deemed most important are put nup
front" and are framed in ways that make it clear to the
reader/viewer that these have higher status in the
opinion of news workers. Getting one's story on the
front page,

for example,

is better than the second page,

being in the national news sections is generally deemed
to better than in the cultural sections, and being In
the metropolitan section more important than the
regional sections, and so on. This tendency to value
what is most visible, and to make most visible that
which is most valued, is well understood by both
journalists and readers/viewers, and indeed to be
transferable from news texts to readers in a process of
salience transfer, or agenda-setting.
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It seems reasonable, then, that one aspect of
source Hsuccess H that we might note would be the level
of visibility or prominence that sources' achieve. We
may say,

for example, that sources who consistently make

it into the front pages are successful sources. NOW was
like other sources in this respect,

Hmaking the papers,"

and especially Hmaking the front page" were important
markers of its own day- to-day influence. In general NOW
leaders sought to make it into the Hserious H news
sections. Their media strategies (as described in
chapter six) were focused on legitimating women's
issues, by persuading reporters, editors and policy
makers that women's lssues (such as child care, sex
discrimination, and violence,

for example ) were in fact

legitimate political concerns.
They were especially concerned that women's issues
not be confined to the Hghetto" of women's pages, and
they saw coverage in the news sections as ·promotion:"

the press has been increasingly cooperative and
responsive to covering NOW activities, and we seem
to be moving out of the ·women's page ghetto" and
more into the regular news and feature sections of
the news media. 18

248

3.1 Placement Over Time
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For the most part NOW achieved its news placement
goals.

Overall, in the 15 years of coverage analyzed in

this study, NOW appeared in the news sections (that is
in the front sections of the paper, including op-ed, and
sections not designated for other purposes (e.g.
business, TV or magazine))

63 percent of the time, In

the women's pages 16 percent of the time, in the
regional sections 17 percent of the time and in other
sections 4 percent of the time.
Patterns in that placement year-by-year indicate
that NOW became more successful after the first few
years In getting its stories into the news sections. As
Figure 7.5 illustrates, in the first few years (19661968) most of NOW's stories were placed in the women's
pages. By 1969, however, that trend had reversed and
most of NOW's stories from 1969-1980 were placed in the
news sections. For the 15 year period of this study, NOW
stories remained predominantly in the news pages.
The year-by-year percentages also indicate that regional
pages became an outlet for NOW stories after 1972.
llRegional" here means regional in terms of he
neighborhoods around New York (such as the Long Island
neighborhood section for example.)

In the 1970s these

sections were quite often accessed by local suburban NOW
chapters -- perhaps following the guidelines from the
llmedia kits."19

Figure 7.5
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NOW Stories by Newspaper Section Over Time
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3.2 Placement and Gender:
NOW Stories and Women Journalists

NOW's strategic focus on the "front" of the paper
and its

focus on women reporters may have worked out to

be contradictory strategies. Despite the fact that more
than twice as many stories about NOW were written over
time by women reporters than by men, male reporters
stories were more likely than women's to be placed on

the front page and In the news sections more generally
(Table 7.4 ).
NOW's focus on women reporter may have been
successful at getting the organization into the
newspaper overall, but because of gendered staffing
practices

i.e. women being assigned llfeminine ll topics

and beats

this strategy worked against other kinds of

legitimacy, such as making the front pages. Ironically,
a more successful strategy may have been to cultivate
some male reporters who already had legitimate "news"
beats.
Table 7.4
News Section (Prominence) by Gender of Reporter
Newspaper Section

Front page
News/Editorial
Women's Page
Regional
Totals
Chi Sq.: 14.495
DF: 3

Male
Reporter
%

Female
Reporter
%

13.3
62.7
8.0
16.0
100
p=.002

8.1
49.3
30.4
12.2
100
N=223 20

3.3 Placement and Access Strategy

NOW's access to the news pages rather than the
women's page was also affected by the access strategy
and context in which the story was generated. As Table
7.5 illustrates most of the news in both the front/news
and women's pages came from public events such as
protests. However, beyond this association, it

lS

also
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clear that interaction with already legitimated
institutions such as the legislature or courts
(themselves more likely to be beats staffed by men) was
more likely to be defined as "news" material than
"women's" material. A much higher percentage of news
about NOW in the front pages than in the women's pages
carne from these interactions with the courts and
legislatures. Note for example, that none

of the

stories generated by legislative activities ended up on
the women's page, and only 3 percent of court related
stories did.
Table 7.5
NOW Strategy/Story Origin by Story Placement
Story
Origin/
NOW
Strategy

%

%

%

%

Front
Page

News
Section

Women's
Page

Regional

Public
Event

27.3

20.7

29.1

16.7

NOW Info
Sub

13.6

23.2

10.9

10.0

9.1

19.7

16.4

11. 7

Journalist
Enterprise

18.2

11. 8

40.0

21.7

Court

18.2

15.3

3.6

20.0

Legislature

13.6

9.4

0.0

20.1

NOW Routine

Totals
N=340 21

100.0
100.0
chi square: 48.83

100.0
DF: 15

100.0
p =.00002

On the other hand, 40 percent of the women's page
was made up of journalist enterprise stories; that is
interviews and profiles about feminism and NOW which
almost never made it into the front of the paper. The
women's pages had more than 40 percent of their coverage
of NOW in this form, whereas the front pages had 18
percent and the news sections around 11 percent
journalist enterprise stories.
When NOW makes the front page, then, it

lS

often

when they interact with one of the major institutions,
coverage of which also constitute the major "beats" of
elite journalism. 22

This outcome is again problematic

regarding NOW's interaction with predominantly women
reporters. If these access patterns are accurate, then
NOW is more likely to gain legitimate (upfront) news
access when it interacts with the major "beats." However
these beats are likely to be staffed by men.
Access to the news sections and front pages of the

Times is complexly overdetermined. Certainly it is
conditioned by more factors than can be accounted for
here. But it does seem clear from these patterns in
NOW's placement, that a role can be carved out in this
overall process for the interaction of gendered staffing
patterns and gendered sourcing patterns. NOW leaders'
strategy of interacting with women reporters, gains
access, but because assignments themselves are also
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gendered, these women do not have the most legitimate
access themselves.

3.4 Placement and Topic:
Public-Private News Spheres?

A further layer of complexity

lS

added to this

interaction between gendered sources and gendered beats,
when the aspect of gendered topics is also considered.
Not only were NOW stories placed systematically by the
Times in terms of the reporter's gender and strategy,
but NOW news seems also to have been processed
differently based on its topics.
As Table 7.6 illustrates, an overall pattern is
deteetable In which the Times

placed those stories

associated with more traditional political areas (such
as electoral politics or economics) or those issues
framed in terms of individual rights

(e.g. sex

discrimination) in the front section of the paper, and
issues and frames that are less traditionally seen as
political such as child care, discussions of HsexismH on
the women's pages. More than 42% of NOW's front page
stories are about sex discrimination. Additionally, 16%
of front page

stories are about equal rights, making

more than half of NOW's front page stories from this
category of topics that are framed in traditional
Hliberal H ways as matters of individual HrightsH
opposed to systemic and structural patriarchy for

(as
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example). On the other hand, most of the NOW stories
placed on the women's page are about NOW as a women's
organization or about feminism more generally (42%), or
about sexism (18%) or family and child care issues
(13%) .

These patterns are by no means conclusive. But
there is some evidence here to suggest that the Times
placed NOW stories according to what feminists and NSM
theorists have called a pervasive upublic-private U
divide that underlies liberal discourse more generally.
The public-private categorization is one in which
some lssues are seen as upublic u (and important)

and

others are assigned to the category of uprivate U

(less

impoytant). These categories have been critiqued as
linked to, and derived from,

the differential historical

experiences and practices of men and women ( cf. Fraser,
1992 ; Butler and Scott, 1992). Feminist theorists have
noted that women's traditional experiences (of child
care and domestic responsibilities) and more recently
feminist concerns (such as sexual harassment, domestic
violence and so on) are routinely consigned in liberal
politics to the uprivate u (i.e. less important, not of
public concern) half of this dichotomy.
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Table 7.6
Topic of Stories on the Front Page, Women's Page
News Pages
%

256
and

%

%

Women's
Page

News/
Ed

5.3

41. 8
5.5
12.7
3.6
18.1
5.5
12.7

5.3
100.0
19

100.0
55

19.8
24.4
15.7
12.2
15.3
5.1
2.5
4.1
1.0
100.0
197

Topic

Front
Page

NOW /Feminism
Sex Discrimination
Equal Rights
Elect. Politics
Sexism
Abortion/Contracept
Family/Child Care
Rape/Violence
Homosexuality
Totals %
N

10.5
42.0
15.8
21.1

The editorial process manifested here by the Times,
In which some topics are consigned to the Hfront H and
some to the HbackH of the paper, seems to mirror this
discursive breakdown quite closely, suggesting that news
media may play a key role in reproducing the publicprivate border In public communication processes. As
such news must be seen as a critical site for the
negotiation and struggle over making more lssues
Hpublic H that is at the heart of NSM challenges.
This public/private (front/back) patterning of news
can be seen more clearly in Table 7.7. Table 7.7
indicates the relationship between placement and topic
if we collapse the range of issues considered in table
7.6 into Hpublic H and Hprivate" categories. In this
table stories about sex discrimination, equal rights,
electoral, and rape stories are considered Hpublic" and

stories about abortion, sexuality, sexism In images and
relationships, and family/child care and to be
"private." 23
As Table 7.7 indicates, the breakdown between
"public" and "private"

(as defined here)

is clear across

news and women's pages. The women's page is the only
place in the paper which is predominantly made up of
"private" issues (61 % of women's page stories are from
the "private" category, as opposed to 11%

of front page

stories, or 35% in news sections more generally.)
Table 7.7
llpublic ll vs. llPrivate" Topics by News Section

Topic
Category

Front
Page

News/Ed

Women's
Page

publici
trade
political
issues*

88.9

64.8

39.4

private/
new
women's
issues**

11.1

35.2

60.6

100.0

100.0

Totals
100.0
(N)
N=254 24
Chi Sq. : 13.25

DF :3

p =.004

* The public category includes the following
issues: sex discrimination, equality and the
ERA, rape/violence, and electoral politics.
**The private category includes the following
issues: abortion/contraception, sexuality,
sexism in images and relationships,
family/child care.
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Given that one of the central goals of NOW (and of
the NSMs more generally) is to nmake public n formerly
private issues, this overall pattern in the Times --

In

which more conventional (or conventionally framed)
topics are treated more seriously as npublic n and as
news, while newer (gendered) topics such as child care
are treated as less serlOUS nwomen'sn issues -indicates that that goal is far from achieved, at least
in news terms. In fact news seems to be simply
reproducing the public-private boundaries of liberal
politics in its placement of NOW news.
However, some important caveats are In order here.
This aggregate pattern indicates only an static
nsnapshot n or aggregate analysis of what may be an
ongoing struggle over placement. It would take
systematic, close analysis of issue placement by news
over time, In the context of issue framing by sources
over time, to really track whether news media are indeed
processing feminisms rigidly or whether there has in
fact been movement from nprivate n (women's pages) to
npublic n (news sections) over time. In this study the
numbers of stories overall (N=377 over 15 years and
mUltiple topics) is too small to track any patterns
accurately over time in a subset of issues, but a future
study might take these suggestive patterns as a starting
point and assess the communicative nsuccess n of feminist
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groups In "making public" formerly private issues, by
tracking news placement of these issue over time.
The patterns that can be seen here, though, do
indicate some support for Van Zoonen's (1992, p. 470)
suggestion, that news is one of the key places where
such struggles over "old" and "new" politics will play
out, and that news is likely, in the short term at least
(Van Zoonen studied Dutch news media's construction of
feminism from 1968 to 1973) to tend to reproduce exactly
those categories of public-private that feminism
challenges:

The press has a preference for social, economic and
"legal issues. These themes are part of the "old"
political paradigm of the welfare state, in which
politics is thought to be about matters of material
distribution ... It is a new thing for women to
claim their share of material resources, but that
does not undermine the definition of politics per
se. This only happens when the women's movement
begins to expand the notion of politics into the
area of daily and private lives. The press can only
understand body politics, gender relations, sexual
violence, etc. as part of a social psychological
domain, not as politics.
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IV. Agenda Control
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The final measure of "success" for NOW in this
chapter (issues of legitimacy and identity are dealt
with in the next chapter) revolves around the
organization's ability to successfully IItransfer

ll

its

set of issues -- its political agenda -- to news media.
In this part of the analysis I draw on the methods
of agenda-setting research to compare NOW's agenda at key
points (1968 and 1975) with the Times' representation of
that agenda in the year or two following.

I argue that

NOW's "success" at the level of agenda control can be
indicated by the closeness of the relationship between
these two NOW agendas: if the Times representation of NOW
in terms of its range and ranking of issues resembles
NOW's own agenda in the period before the Times
representation, we can say that NOW was able to transfer
its agenda to a lesser or greater degree.
This use of agenda comparisons (and rank order
correlations)

lS

somewhat unconventional. Traditional

agenda-setting research has usually compared and
correlated audience and media "agendas," but more
recently the methodology has also begun to be used to
track "agenda-building" processes at the institutional
level -- to investigate how news agendas themselves are
set. Semetko et al.

(1991),

for example, use agenda-

setting's rank order correlation techniques to assess
the influence of presidential candidates on news

agendas. This study follows that use of agenda-setting
logic and methods and uses agenda comparisons to assess
the influence of NOW as a source organization, on the
Times representation of its own agenda.
This shift in levels of analysis for agenda-setting
logics and techniques brings with it some limitations.
For example, standardizing source and news discourses
for comparisons is more difficult than standardizing
audience and news discourses (audience agendas are
usually constructed through surveys that use the same
terms and categories of news, whereas source discourses
are already constituted). And, because source-news
relations take place (in this case especially) over
longer periods, and less frequently,

than news-audience

interactions, the time lags are longer than usual in
this analysis. However, this method may still allow us
to indicate a level of ·success· -- i.e. agenda control
beyond those already assessed.

(See Chapter

Three/Methods for more discussion of these measurements
and limitations) .
There are two key questions addressed here in
assessing NOW's agenda control. The first question
concerns NOW's ability to have its range of issues
represented. This is a question of whether NOW's overall
public agenda appeared in the news or whether that
agenda was selected from or significantly transformed ln
interaction by the Times. The second question involves
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NOW's ability to transfer to news its sense of
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priorities -- that is the order or ranking of its
lssues.

(It is this second measure has often been

described as an llagenda-setting ll or agenda building
process

(Weaver et al., 1981; Semetko et al., 1991).

In this section I assess NOW's relative agenda control
ln terms of transferring its range of issues first, and
then its ability to transfer its issue rankings.

4.1 Agenda Selection:
Representing NOW's Range of Issues

The first question in assessing NOW's relative
agenda control, centers around its ability to transfer
the entire range of its agenda to news. This means
assessing whether the Times represented NOW's whole
agenda or whether it selected in systematic ways from
that agenda. It also means, however, noting that not all
of NOW's issues were in fact strategically communicated
to media. There may have been some issues at some times
that NOW wanted to keep quiet,

(issues of homosexuality

in the early 1970s, for example), and I have tried to
indicate in the analysis when silence by the Times

is a

success and when it is a failure of NOW's agenda control
efforts.
Table 7.8 indicates an aggregate llagenda ll for NOW
ln the Times

1966-1980. All 377 stories about NOW or

cross referenced under NOW in the Times, were coded by

r
headline into these 12 categories (see chapter three,
Methods,

for more details). This breakdown, then,

indicates both the overall range and the overall
(aggregate, 1966-1980) ranking of NOW issues according
to the Times.
Over time, most of the stories about NOW in the

Times

can be categorized as not being specific "issue"

type stories at all, but stories more generally about
NOW the organization, its events, strategies or members.
As Table 7.8 illustrates, around 21 percent of these
stories were about NOW/feminism events and strategies
more generally and not about issues at all. This pattern
is in line with studies of political news more generally
where significant portions of news can be classified
as event/strategy type rather than issue stories (cf.
Semetko et aI, 1991; Iyengar 1989). These stories
sometimes also mention issues, but the stories
themselves are not about these lssues per se but about
NOW or the movement. (We might say that these stories
were about the "macro-issue," feminism itself, but for
the most part they fall into what Iyengar (1987) and
others have noted as event/strategy category rather than
issue/thematic stories.)
Of the stories that focused on particular issues,
sex discrimination was the most significant category. As
Table 7.8 illustrates around 20 percent of total
coverage of NOW was taken up by stories about sex
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discrimination. Most of these concerned sex
discrimination in employment (12.5%) though some were
also about sex discrimination in credit and lnsurance
(3.4%),

ln education (1.3%), in sports (1.1%) and in

access to housing or public places (2.7%).
Equality issues, which includes general civil
rights stories and stories about the Equal Rights
Amendment, made up the next category of NOW news overall
at 12.5% of all stories. This was followed by
traditional politics at 10.6%. The category "traditional
politics" refers here to NOW's involvement with
political candidates, either endorsing or criticizing
them, or in its efforts to encourage and support
feminist candidates. Sexism in images, especially on TV
and in children's books and cards was also an important
topic in NOW's coverage by the Times and made up around
9.5% of stories.
Family issues (marriage, divorce and child care)
were deemed less important by the Times, making up only
4.8% of stories. Sexism in relationships (such as sexual
harassment and general discussions of gender roles and
femininity) was also given low priority at 2.9% of
stories. Perhaps most surprisingly in news coverage of
NOW and feminism was the small number of stories about
race or sexuality. Only 1.1.% of stories could be
classified as being mainly about race, and only 0.8
about homosexuality (three stories overall from a total
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of 377 were clearly about homosexuality, though it may
have been a secondary issue in other stories.)
These patterns mirror to some extent NOW's own
issue concerns but with some significant omissions and
shifts in salience.

On the topic of sex discrimination,

both NOW and news media made it a central topic of
concern. As outlined In chapter four, NOW's agenda over
time always included sex discrimination law and its
enforcement as core concerns. In fact NOW was
instrumental in making sex discrimination a political
issue. NOW first publicized the term (following the
civil rights term,

Hrace discrimination") and throughout

its history NOW leaders worked to have sex included as a
category in all civil rights legislation. As the NOW
Bill of Rights for the 21st Century indicates (Table
7.9) sex discrimination is scheduled to remain a
priority lssue for NOW into the 21st century.
The Times

representation of NOW's agenda also

focused centrally on another set of issues that was
critical to NOW -- equality, civil rights and the ERA.
Since its earliest programmatic statement of goals in
the 1968 Bill of Rights for Women, NOW have been working
towards passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. As Table
7.9 notes, the ERA was a key part of NOW's agenda in the
early days and remained so through internal dissent and
reorganization in the 1970s. In the 1979-1982 period,
NOW were instrumental in having the ratification
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deadline extended, and they devoted a minimum of 50
percent of their time and energies to ratification in
1980 and 1981. 25 The Times' reflection of the ERA as a
key issue, then, is generally in line with NOW's own
priorities.
However, there are also some important differences
ln NOW's and news' representation of NOW's feminism
overall. On the issue of electoral politics, for
example, the Times

aggregate agenda gives a significant

amount of attention to NOW's activities in terms of
electoral politics. Given that NOW was not even involved
in electoral politics at all in the early years -- it
was not until the mid 1970s that the organization formed
PACs"and became active players in elections at the
local, state and national levels -- this level of
attention is disproportionate on news part. 26 That news
about electoral politics makes up 10 percent of all
coverage, then, suggests a priority on news' part that
does not reflect NOW's over time.
There were also important differences ln NOW and
the Times relative amount of attention to issues of
family/child care. In NOW policy statements over time,
family and child care issues have been centrally
important to the organization. And indeed three out of
eight of NOW's originally publicized priorities ln the
NOW Bill of Rights 1968 were issues of child care
(maternity leave, child care facilities and child care
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tax deductions). But this kind of overall attention to
family issues is nowhere present in the Times
representation of NOW's agenda.
On the lssue of sexism in lmages (in art, media,
advertising and textbooks) NOW and news are also
somewhat at odds. News coverage shows this category of
issues to account for 9.5% of news stories, but sexism
in images is not an issue that makes it into either
NOW's Bills of Rights, the 1975 Manifesto or the Bill of
Rights for the 21st Century (see table 7.9).
This is not to say, however, that NOW members and
leaders did not work on the issue of sexism. Many local
chapters of NOW indeed spent significant amounts of time
monitoring and coding media to show patterns of sexism
in TV and advertising and especially in children's
programming and toys.27 It may be that sexism in images
and relationships did not make it into the Bills of
Rights because it was more a chapter-level issue than a
national organizational priority.
The areas of greatest discrepancy between NOW's and
the Times' agendas at least in terms of stated goals,
occurred in the areas of sexuality/lesbianism, minority
and race lssues and poverty/poor women. If we compare
the Times

attention to these issues to NOW's public

agendas there is an important difference.

267

Table 7.8
Topics of NOW Stories in the New York Times, 1966-1980
Headline Topics

No.
Percent
of
of
Stories Stories

NOW/ feminism generally

79

21.0

Sex discrim In employment,
education, credit, sports,
etc.

77

20.4

ERA/equality and general
civil rights

47

12.5

Electoral politics
40
(women candidates and
candidates on women's issues)

10.6

Sexism In Images
(media, art, texts, etc.)

36

9.5

Abortion/Contraception

21

5.6

Family Issues (child care,
divorce, alimony)

18

4.8

Rape/violence

12

3.2

Sexism In relationships

11

2.9

Religion

6

1.6

Race/ethnicity

4

1.1

Sexuality/Lesbian

3

0.8

Other, various 28

23

6.1

Totals

377

100.0

As Table 7.9 lists, the NOW 1968 Bill of Rights for
example has as one its concerns Poor women and job
training, and the 1975 Caucus Manifesto also lists
minority women and sexuality as key issues. As the NOW
Bill of Rights for the 21st Century notes, these issues
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have continued to be important to NOW, and have in fact
climbed up their agenda from the bottom to the top over
time, but they have remained unimportant in news stories
about NOW.
NOW

Table 7.9
Agendas 1968, 1975 and 1989

1968 NOW Bill of
Rights

1975 Majority
Caucus Manifesto

NOW Bill of
Rights for the
21st Century

1. ERA

1. Abortion/
Reprod.Choice

1. Sex
discrimination

2. Sex
Discrimination
In employment

2. Child Care

2. Race
discrimination

3. Maternity
Benefits

3. Economic
Equality

3. Reproduction/
Abortion

4. Child Care
Tax Deduction

4.

Electoral
Politics

4. Sexual
orientation

5. Child Care
Centers

5. ERA

5. Religious/
health/age
discrimination

6. Equal
Education

6. Minority
Women

6. Right to
decent living,
housing,
education

7. Poor Women,
Job Training

7. Sexuality/
Sexual Orient

7. Clean
Environment

8. Reproductive
Control

8. Worksite
Organizing

8. Freedom from
violence and war

This disparity may indicate a significant
difference of priorities in NOW and the Times, but it is
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also important to note that NOW's stated purpose and
media activities may have not always have coincided
perfectly. As a mostly voluntary organization, work in
NOW tended to get done by those with a particular
interest in that area. With few minority or working
class members, task forces on minority and poverty
issues may have been understaffed and underrepresented
in the organization's day to day work. And in fact
criticism of the organization over time as being
unrepresentative racially or in class terms, may belie
the symbolic importance NOW gave to these issues.
The question of sexuality is more difficult to
untangle. The news silence on issues of sexuality in the
cont'ext of NOW may not in fact be a failure for NOW but
a Hsuccess H of its early media strategies. Though
lesbianism and the social construction of sexuality were
major issue in the movement generally, it was an lssue
that NOW strategists tried to silence in the early years
of this time period (1966-1973). Though the organization
later embraced sexual identity as a core issue (see 1975
and 1989 agendas) the early and significant efforts to
minimize sexuality as a public issue may have succeeded
in dissociating NOW from the issue publicly in this
period. As Mannheim (1991) has suggested, keeping some
issues invisible may also be seen as a successful
outcome of strategic communication. In the early years
NOW leaders tried to keep issues of sexuality quiet
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because they thought that if the organization became
labeled as a lesbian group it would lack credibility as
a spokesperson for women more generally. In this case,
then, media silence may have in fact been a strategic
"success."
Overall, then, the Times

reflected some of NOW's

most pressing concerns In sex discrimination and the
ERA, but there are significant differences in the
relative priority that NOW and news attributed to other
issues, especially issues of family/child care,
sexuality and race.

4.2

Agenda Rankings Correlations:

Did NOW Transfer Salience?

This general indication that NOW was more
successful at transferring some issues than others

lS

reinforced when NOW and news agendas are ranked and
compared at key points In time. Table 7. 10 illustrates
the different rankings of issues in the two discourses
(NOW and news) at key points in NOW's history, 1968 and
1975, and then In the Times agenda In the next year or
so.

(There were too few stories in 1969 to make it

possible to compare NOW 1968 and the Times rankings
1969,

for

so 1970 is used instead here). The time lags in

Table 7.10, of a year or two, are longer than usual, but
(as I explain in more detail in chapter three), the NOW-

news relationship took place slowly over long periods of 272
time, so these time lags are logical in that context.
The measures of NOW's agenda were taken at key
points in NOW's history from public documents stating
the organization's priorities. NOW's 1968 issue agenda,
for example, is constructed from The NOW Bill of Rights,
1968, which was an important early founding document of
NOW. The NOW 1975 issue agenda is taken from the NOW
Manifesto in 1975, which was a public signal of
significant change in NOW's direction as the new leaders
took over the organization. The Times agendas were
created in the conventional way by ranking the number of
stories under each topic heading for each year, leaving
out -the category of stories NOW/feminism generally which
has no logical equivalent in NOW's discourse (see
chapter three/Methods for more description of this
process.)
NOW seems to have been more successful at
transferring its sense of importance with some lssues
rather than others, and in some periods rather than
others. For example (table 7.10) NOW's prioritizing of
the ERA and employment discrimination highly in 1968, is
reflected in the Times 1970 agenda, which also ranks
these issues highly (employment is number one and ERA
number two in both agendas) .

r

i
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Table 7.10
Rank Table (Comparing NOW and News Issue Ranks)29
Issues

ERA/Equal Rights
Employment (Sex
Disc)
Family/Child care
Education (Sex Dis)
Economics (gen. )
Reproductive Issues
Rape/Violence
Homosexuality
Race
Traditional/Elect
Politics
Sexism ( Images and
Relationships)

NOW
19 68
1

NYT
1970
1

2

2

3

8.5
4
8.5
8.5
8.5
8.5
8.5

4
5
6
7
9
9
9
9

NOW
1975
5
8

NYT
1976
4.5
1.5

2

4

4

4.5
8.5
8.5
1.5
4.5
8.5
8.5
4.5

4

10

11

10
3

1
10
7
6

However, other issues, such as family and children,
and education are ranked quite differently for the Times
and NOW.

NOW's 1968 agenda,

for example ranks

family/children type lssues as its number three
priority, whereas family/child care stories in the Times
rank around eighth in an 11 item agenda. Similarly NOW's
1975 agenda ranks family/child care lssues as a number 2
priority, while for the Times it is ranked at 4.5. The
many ties in this rank order correlation complicate this
kind of comparison of course, but it is clear that for
NOW and news family/child care lssues had quite
different importance both In 1968 and in 1975.
A similar disparity may be seen in the NOW 1968 and
Times 1970 lack of agreement over the issue category of
Reproductive issues. NOW seems to have been unsuccessful

ln the 1968-1970 periods in convincing the Times of the
importance of abortion and contraception as important
news issues (it is ranked as 6 in NOW agenda and 8.5 in
the Times). By the mid 1970s, though there seems to be
more agreement between the NOW and news rankings on
reproductive issues. As Table 7.10 indicates they are
now much more closely ranked at 1 and 1.5. On the issue
of reproduction, NOW seems to have been more successful
in transferring salience later in its career.
This sense of partial "success" for NOW in setting
the Times' NOW agenda is reinforced by the rank
correlation between NOW and the Times agendas. Table
7.11 indicates the correlations (Spearman's Rho) between
thes~

rankings. As the table indicates, the correlation

coefficient for NOW's 1968 agenda with the Times 1970
agenda is .478 . And NOW's

1975 agenda is correlated

with the Times 1976 agenda (for NOW stories) is .415,
suggesting that there was agreement in about half of the
rankings.

Table 7.11
Rank Correlations (Spearman's Rho) NOW and New York
Times Agendas 1968 (1970) and 1975 (1976)

NYT
1970
NOW
1968
NOW
1975

NYT
1975

.478
.415
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This discrepancy in ranking indicates either a
failure in NOW's news management that is issue-specific,
or it indicates that the Times reacted to and
"processed" different kinds of issues differently.
NOW did shift its media strategies over time (as
chapter six illustrates) and the organization did
strategically push or minimize some issues at different
times (e.g. sexual identity was minimized in the early
1970s)

But there is no evidence in NOW's institutional

records that it failed to communicate about family/child
care lssues. In fact the institutional analysis suggests
that this was one of NOW's key areas of concern from the
beginning.
"Given the evidence indicated above in terms of
placement -- i.e. that news processed NOW in terms of a
public-private divide in its issues -- it lS more likely
that this partial "success" in terms of rank orders, is
also an indication of this public-private processing of
NOW's discourse by news. The issues that NOW was able to
transfer most effectively (i.e. to have ranked close to
NOW's own ranking) were those issues that fit more
easily into the traditionally "public" category (such as
employment discrimination), and the issues that did not
transfer their salience (such as family/child care) are
drawn from the traditionally "private" category of that
dichotomy.
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r
Chapter Summary and Conclusions

NOW was "successful," then, in some important ways
In producing news access, and through news, a voice in
the public debate over women's issues. But there were
also important limitations to this access, which stemmed
from gendered staffing patterns in news organizations,
and underlying discursive categories in which news
mirrors and invokes the public/private divide of liberal
politics. In this sense new can be seen to "police" the
public sphere and to be engaged in struggle over what
will be seen as "public" alongside other social
institutions.
To some extent NOW was successful In this struggle.
Over-time NOW was able to produce access to news.
Throughout its existence it has some level of news
presence. And NOW was mostly covered mostly In the news
sections, which the organization considered to be more
credible than the women's page. Much of this access was
the result of the organization's own publicity efforts,
rather than any "coverage" by enterprising journalists,
and it cost them significantly In resources, skills and
time. But it still indicates a level of accessibility
that is important to note, that with resources, groups
can produce some access.
NOW's

strategic interaction with mostly women

reporters was also a generally successful strategy in
that most of the news about NOW was in fact authored by
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women. However, this focus on women reporters was not
unproblematic. As indicated in this chapter, women
reporters, though they wrote most of the stories about
NOW were less likely proportionally to have those
stories placed on the front page. This pattern -probably the result of gendered staffing patterns In the
newspaper itself -- meant that NOW's access was limited
in the same way that women reporters' access was.
Besides basic access, NOW was also able to gain
some llvoice ll in news stories. Most of the time the
organization was directly quoted rather than talked
about,

for example. This llvoice ll was most likely to be

granted in feature type pieces which NOW generated
itself and least likely in institutional (legal)
contexts ..
NOW also maintained some control over its issue
agenda. On at least a few key issues -- such as the ERA
and sex discrimination -- NOW and the Times had some
agreement over importance. However there were also
conspicuous discrepancies in NOW and the Times sense of
priorities The Times was relatively silent on issues
such as family and child care, race, and economics
(especially problems of poor women). It is possible that
these issues did not receive the day-to-day attention of
NOW as stated in its public statements

-- though the

institutional records do not indicate any strategic
media interaction differences across these

particular
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lssues

(see chapter SlX for a description of NOW's media

strategies).

It is most likely the case that this

pattern -- like the patterning in placement and identity
-- indicates that news sees some feminist issues as more
important than others.
NOW managed to gain news access, then, but its
placement and agenda control patterns suggest that not
all of the issues in NOW's agenda were taken equally
seriously by news editors. These patterns, I argue,
reflect news' role in maintaining the liberal
distinction between "public" and "private" issues which,
unless challenged, works for the most part against
feminism, which sets out to blur this distinction.
This "processing" by news may not necessarily have
been a matter of deliberate practice by reporters or
news organizations, but rather the result of embedded
epistemological assumptions in news about what lS
important, which are then encoded in editorial
judgments. One of these assumptions, which news
discourse shares with liberalism more generally, is a
set of expectations about what kinds of things will be
seen as "public" issues (and therefore important) and
which will be seen as "private"

(and therefore less

important). As feminist theorists have illustrated
extensively in the last few years, these categories are
also distinctively "gendered" -- it is women's lives and
experiences that are usually consigned to the "private"
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and less legitimate areas of politics (cf. Butler and
Scott, 1992; Fraser, 1989; 1992; McLaughlin, 1993). News
reproduces this male/public and female/private dichotomy
by placing stories seen to be about "private" issues in
the women's section of the paper and by ranking them
overall as less important. It is instructive in this
context to

note that the Times (nor other papers) does

not have a "men's" section. Rather men are assumed to be
the readers of the news sections.
Given that one of the central aims of feminist
politics (and indeed of the NSMs more generally) has
been to extend the realm of issues that will be
considered "public," this pattern -- in which news media
may"be seen to be "policing" the public-private border
has important

consequences for new social movement,

and especially feminist groups, communication
strategies. NOW's partial "success" as indicated in this
chapter at the levels of access, voice and agenda
control, suggests that feminist communications
strategists may need to develop new ways of negotiating
news beyond the level of reflexive appropriation of news
practices and conventions. Strategists may need to
engage with news at a deeper discursive level where news
discourse categories (such as that of public-private)
pose a greater threat to feminist mass communication
efforts.
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NOW "succeeded" then to some extent ln its efforts
to access news and use it to build a women's issue
agenda, but that access may have come with some serious
and unintended consequences for NOW at the discursive
level. NOW sought access to news to become a public
voice for feminism, but news discourse in its processing
of NOW issues, transformed NOW's agenda in significant
way. NOW may have learned to "speak" news, but to some
extent news also spoke NOW.
NOTES

1 In this study I have been concerned mostly with NOW's
media strategies, so I am using media content as the
"outcome" against which to assess these strategies.
Clearly this is only one way to assess new social
movement communications. Assessing movement influences
on legislative agendas, on public opinion polls, or on
journalists attitudes would all also be reasonable ways
of assessing movement communicative "success." All I
argue here is that influencing media content is one
important step in this larger process of public agendabuilding. See chapter two for more discussion of mediamovement interactions as part of a larger process of
agenda building.
2 See Jurgen Habermas (1984) A Theory of Communicative
Action.
Volume 1. Boston: Beacon Press for a discussion
of the differences between strategic and communicative
styles. In this study I include only measures of
strategic communication. For example, I have not
included the communicative category of "understanding"
as a category of success, since such a relationship
would require that the participants sought
understanding. Although NOW feminists did want
journalists to understand their positions, and worked
towards educating them, it is for instrumental purposes,
i.e. so that journalists will spread the word.
Understanding was not really a clear goal for the
journalists either, who in fact shied away from being
seen to sympathize with or understand the movement as a
professional liability (see Tuchman, 1978, and chapter
six of this study). Indeed journalistic ideologies of
detachment and objectivity seem to be predisposed to
strategic use of other discourses rather than efforts to
understand them.
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3 Voice is measured by NOW being quoted or having
material attributed to them. See methods for more
explanation of measurements and operationalizations.
4 Other source studies have variously defined
successful news access (when they have defined it at
all) as: (a) simply being mentioned (cf. Sigal, 1973;
Brown et al, 1987; Barker-Plummer, 1989), (b) having
uvoice u -- defined as routine access and being quoted
(cf. Ericson et al, 1989), (c) being a uprimary def iner u
of issues and events (Hall et al. 1978), and (d) as
being able to usubsidize u news stories through having
one's (interested) information used (Gandy, 1982).
Gitlin (1980) does not define what he would consider
Usuccess.U See chapter three, methods, for more
discussion about these measures.
5 More qualitative aspects of NOW's representation, such
as legitimacy, are assessed in chapter eight within the
assessment of NOW's identity control.
6 These dimensions of success -- access, voice,
placement and control -- are commonly at work in most
communicative interactions. In any conversation or
debate for example, we seek first of all access or
standing as a member, then we seek a chance to
contribute in our own voice , and we are usually also
con'cerned with the context or placement) of our
contribution in terms of its legitimacy (is our topic
first or second, for example). Finally we would usually
prefer that the debate or conversation be structured in
ways that legitimate our positions and interests -- i.e.
that we can control the context, pace and direction of
the conversation.
7 In fact data for the period 1980-1995 indicates that
this is so, but nevertheless for the period under
observation the trend levels off.
8 This is clear in NOW media strategy notes, where they
often note that certain women reporters are more aware
than others -- that their uconsciousnessu is raised. NOW
collection, Schlesinger Library.
9 Sigal (1973) is the source of this distinction between
journalist enterprise and other kinds of stories, but it
is vulnerable to criticism too because interview or
features may also be instigated by information subsidies
of some sort -- e.g., press kits that indicate leaders
to interview, or suggestions by media strategists that
prompt ufeatures u and so on) .
10 Sometimes more than one origin for the story could be
detected. For example, if a protest march was being
reported and a news conference had also been convened by
NOW to discuss the event. In these cases, policy was to
code the umain u event that was taking place -- i.e. in
the case of a news conference accompanying an event, the
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event was coded. Consequently the category "overt
information subsidies" which is made up of news
conferences, announcements , and so on, is restricted to
those news conferences and announcements that were
themselves the main event. See chapter three for a
discussion of coding and coder agreements for each
question.
11Includes marches, strikes, demonstrations, boycotts,
anniversary or special occasion public events. When
these were also accompanied by news conferences, the
public event was coded as the source of the story. News
conferences that were themselves the main event were
coded as "overt information subsidies."
12 This category includes only overt or manifest
subsidies such a news conferences, special reports or
studies published by NOW, that were not accompanied by
another event such as a protest, or legal filing.
13 This category includes any story in which it was not
clear what the event, strategy or hook was, or that was
clearly an interview or special feature, was coded as
journalist enterprise. It is likely that some of the
stories in the "journalist enterprise" category were
also instigated by subsidies sent out by NOW, but unless
a study or news conference was explicitly mentioned, the
benefit of the doubt was
given to journalist-enterprise. Even coding only overt
subsidies, though, shows them to be a significant source
of stories.
14 If we separate out legal and legislative strategies
from "publicity" strategies as some others have tried to
do, then the figure becomes closer to 50 percent of news
being generated by NOW, still a substantial amount (see
table 7.1). See for example, Sean Cassidy (1992) The
Environment and the Media: Two Strategies for
Challenging Hegemony. In Janet Wasko and Vincent Mosco
(Eds.) Democratic Communications in the Information Age,
pp. 159-1974. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex. Cassidy
distinguishes between legal and publicity strategies in
the environmental movement, and attempts to compare them
for results (with Greenpeace said to be following a
publicity/direct action strategy and Friends of the
Earth a legal strategy). This distinction, though is
problematic with NOW, who followed both legal and
pUblicity strategies, and to whom legal action was
itself sometimes a publicity strategy. I suspect that a
closer analysis of any organization's strategies, from
the perspective of the group itself, would produce this
overlap between what are analytical not empirical
categories of strategies.
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15 Records from the PIO for example, note that NOW media
strategists spent considerable effort courting
journalists and editors and making them aware of NOW's
expertise as a source in many policy issue areas, trying
as Dian Terry, NOW PI officer 1973-74, put it, to get
them to put NOW in their Rolodexes. NOW collection,
Schlesinger Library.
16 Pearson correlation between voice/NOW quoted and size
of story in graphs is .9613, p<.OOl.
17 N=357 because "other" categories have been dropped.
18 NOW (1974, July), Quarterly Status Report, NOW Public
Information Office. NOW Collection, Schlesinger Library.
Tuchman (1978, p. 146) states that the women's page was
a "movement resource" because journalists thought so.
But it is not at all clear that feminist activists
agreed with this assessment. Tuchman and I treat some of
the same issues in the coverage of feminism, but from
different standpoints. She focuses generally on how
journalists make news, and briefly on how they made new
about feminism. I am concerned with how feminist
strategists made news about the movement. This leads to
some different perspectives.
19 Of course some of this placement is simply the
logical outcome of there being more news pages than
women's pages -- in any edition of the paper of course
there is one women's page and one front page but
multiple news pages. However, given that there was only
one women's page, it is highly over-represented if NOW
stories were being randomly distributed. A one-to-one
comparison between the front page and the women's page,
for example, was as follows: front page, 22 stories
(5.8%), and women's page 59 stories (15.6%), or almost
three times as many.
20 N=223 because 140 stories do not have bylines. A
further 14 cases were dropped from the analysis from an
"other" category -- i.e. various other sections of the
paper (business, TV, etc.) which were too small to be
significant.
21 N=340 because "other" categories have been dropped.
22 This relationship between strategy contexts and
placement is well in line with more general news studies
that suggests that much news is made up of reporters
routine coverage of state institutions (cf. Sigal, 1973;
Gans, 1980; Fishman, 1980, etc.)
23 These categorizations are of course arguable. The
assignment of rape to the public category, for example,
and abortion to private, can be debated. In either case
the number of stories in these categories mean that it
makes little difference to the overall patterns whether
they are included or not.
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24 N=254 because non-issue categories (such as stories
about NOW and feminism generally) have been omitted as
have NotherN news sections.
25 At the 1981 conference Eleanor Smeal, president of
NOW, publicly committed at least half the organization's
resources and staff time to the ERA Countdown Campaign.
26 Prior to the mid 1970s, in fact, NOW's tax status had
restricted their activities in the traditional political
arena. Whether NOW should be involved in traditional
politics was one of the key issues in the 1975
organizational battle for control. The sitting NOW
leadership in 1975 thought that NOW's involvement in
electoral politics would eat up too much of the
organization's time and energies.
27 Task Force on Image of Women papers. NOW Collection,
Schlesinger Library.
28 This category includes a number of topics with very
few stories such as drugs, prostitution, and police
surveillance.
29 Note that NotherN categories and NOW/feminism
categories have been dropped from the news agendas.
There is no equivalent in NOW agendas for the 20 percent
of news stories about NOW events/strategies. Note also
that in order to compare NOW and news agendas NOW's 1968
age'nda has been compressed -- the three agenda items
about maternity leave and child care have been
compressed into one child care item. (See chapter
three/Methods for a discussion of the problems and
limits of these methods) .

Chapter 8
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Legitimation Patterns:
The Times' Processing of NOW's Identity, 1966-1980

Strategically accessing news media, and uS1ng that
access to introduce new 1ssues and frames into public
debate, is at the heart of the "symbolic challenge" of
NOW and other NSM groups. The relative success of this
agenda-building, however,

is likely to be influenced by

a movement organization's identity as well as its issues
or agenda. In particular a movement organization's
perceived legitimacy as a political actor will influence
whe'ther its ideas will be communicated through news. As
studies of journalists have noted, the perceived
legitimacy of sources, as well as their reliability,

is

a strong determinant of how seriously (and routinely)
journalists approach them or use their information (cf.
Gans, 1980; Fishman, 1980).
Legitimacy is not only an attribute that 1S
important in determining access to news media for source
organizations. It is also a quality that can be produced
and reproduced 1n interaction with news media. Serious
and routine access to news media itself may produce (and
reproduce) public legitimacy for source organizations.
It is this quality of routine news access that Ericson
et al.

(1989) have called "voice" and which they see as

a fundamental form of Hcultural capital H ln mass
mediated societies. Movement organizations
use news to become

l

then
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l

may

legitimate public speakers.

In fact creating and maintaining such a legitimate
identity in and through news was a key goal in NOW/s
media strategies. NOW leaders wanted to create and
maintain a public image for the organization as the
serious Hvoice H for American women and they tried to do
so by controlling who could speak to journalists
they could talk about

I

l

what

and how the organization would be

rhetorically Hplaced H in regard to (and differentiated
from) other movement groups.1
In this chapter I track the outcome of NOW/s
legitimation strategies through a qualitative analysis
of its representation over time in the New York Times
1966-1980. I argue that

overall

l

I

NOW underwent a

l

general legitimation process over the time period
covered in this study (1966-1980)

I

and so was to a

certain extent HsuccessfulH in its attempts to become a
legitimate public voice for women/s issues. From a
generally marginalizing representation in the early
days

I

NOW

by 1980.
however

I

I

moved to a generally serious representation
This overall legitimation process was limited

and complicated

l

processing in which NOW/s

by another pattern of
identity was processed

through the discursive categories of news discourse. As
with its agenda building efforts

l

NOW/s organizational

l

legitimacy in news was related to the issue and movement 287
context in which it was assessed. When NOW focused on
more institutionalized or Htraditional H political issues
its legitimacy carne under less scrutiny than when the
organization took up a Hnew" women's issue. When NOW is
compared to more radical groups it

lS

also treated as a

more legitimate organization, than it is when judged
alone. This process is further complicated by the fact
that the group of ·institutionalized H issues itself
changes over time due to NOW and others communication
work. 2
The chapter is organized around four overlapping
·stages· in NOW's organizational re-presentation by
news: First, an early period (1966-1970) of
marginalization in which NOW was represented as odd,
peculiar and generally illegitimate. Second, a period of
complex and contradictory representation overall

(1970-

1974), in which NOW was presented sometimes as a
legitimate speaker, and other times as a bizarre group
making strange claims. The complexity in re-presentation
during this period was the result of both

issue

contexts (i.e. depending on what it is NOW is talking
about) and different movement context (i.e. depending on
who NOW is being compared to). Third,

is a 2 year period

(1974-1976) in which NOW itself was undergoing an
internal identity crisis. During this period news
coverage was complex, contradictory and critical,

drawing some of that critique from the challenges being
mounted inside NOW for national leadership. Fourth,
(1976-1980), is a period in which NOW began to be

accepted as serious (if sometimes incompetent) political
player that was likely to be around for a long time.
This period is characterized by stories that historicize
NOW, talking about its long history as a spokesperson
for women and noting that it was now an -insider- group
in women's politics. However, even with this general
legitimation there were important limitations invoked in
terms of what were NOW's -real" issues and which were
unreasonable demands in the eyes of journalists.
Overall, I suggest that, like agenda building,
legitimation work by movement organizations takes place
in a larger cultural context than just that of
strategists and journalists. NOW's legitimation (or not)
at particular times was influenced by the organization's
own strategies, but it was also the outcome of a larger
social debate over what would be considered -politicsin which NOW and the Times were only two of many
players.

ASSESSING LEGITIMACY AND IDENTITY CONTROL

Legitimacy is a complex concept, Which Includes
elements of credibility (is the group to be believed) ;
expertise (is the group experienced or educated enough
on a particular topic?); representativeness (who does it
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stand for?), viability (will it be around for long?),
authority (does it have any power?), and so on (cf.
Shoemaker, 1982; Ericson et al, 1989).
These various dimensions of legitimacy are
themselves referenced and presented by news media in a
variety of overt and implicit ways. Ryan (1991, p.207),
identifies a number of ways in which the media
legitimizes or delegitimizes groups through its
descriptions of them. For example, she notes that groups
can be de-legitimized by being named in ways that they
did not choose for themselves (such as HleftistH rather
than democratic); by having their identity set off by
quotes or qualifiers (such as Halleged H or Hcalling
themselves H); by having their concerns trivialized (i.e.
focusing on dress or mannerisms rather than content); or
by being Hbalanced H by sources that are of quite
different stature.
Gitlin (1980. p. 27) offers a similar serles of
news Hmechanisms H of delegitimation when he notes that
coverage of SDS

featured trivialization (making light

of movement language, style, age and goals) ,
polarization (emphasizing counter demonstrations and
balancing the group with the ultra-right as equivalent
Hextremists H), emphasis on internal dissent,
marginalization (showing demonstrators to be deviant or
unrepresentative), and so on.
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In this chapter I assess NOW's legitimacy over time 290
by looking at the ways in which NOW the organization was
described terms of its goals, its constituents, and its
leaders at different stages in its history with news,
and in the contexts of its own shifting media
strategies. I draw on Ryan (1991) and Gitlin's (1980)
methodological insights in tracking the linguistic cues
and frames for NOW that would indicate legitimacy (or
not) in a particular story (e.g. polarization or being
described in quotation marks), but I am also concerned
with more macro patterns of shifts in news
representations of NOW over time and in different
contexts.
'Neither Gitlin (1980) nor Ryan (1991)

followed

media-movement relationships over long periods, and so
consequently processes of struggle over legitimation
that may have taken place had the groups continued to
interact with media, or the researchers continued to
observe, are missed. Gitlin (1980),

for example, studied

SDS's representation closely only over one year (19651966) .

He argues that studying early framing is the

best way to see the emergence of media frames before
they "harden" into place as cornmon sense. But what if
they do not harden at all but change in some other way?
NOW's representation over time suggests that in fact
early marginalization can move into later, if limited,
legitimation. Because NOW is one of the few movement

groups to continue to exist over time, we have a unique
ability to see in its experiences with news media
whether a marginalizing representation can in fact be
turned around and recreated. I argue here that NOW's
persistence and longevity made it possible for the group
to create and maintain over time a limited amount of
legitimacy as a public voice for feminism.

I. EARLY PATTERNS OF MARGINALIZATION, 1966-1970

In the first few years of its existence NOW was
presented by the Times as a somewhat dubious
organization. Between 1966-1970, despite quite
sophisticated attempts by its leaders and media
strategists to have NOW taken seriously as a civil
rights organization parallel to the NAACP, NOW was
mostly presented in this period as a marginal and
strange group whose statements could not be taken at
face value.
This deviant framing was achieved by journalists,
through the liberal use of linguistic udistancing u cues
such as qualifiers for NOW claims
themselves,u uwhich it termed U
such claims

),

(e.g.

uwho call

quotation marks around

(e.g. seeking uequality for all women"),

and talking about the organization rather than allowing
it to speak for itself. Much of this skepticism seems to
have been aimed at NOW's self-representation as a civil
rights organization. Reporters in the early years were
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not convinced that women needed a civil rights
organization, and they resisted the overarching
framework of Hsex discrimination H as a description for
women's experiences.
NOW was also routinely trivialized in this period
by reporters focusing on NOW leaders' clothes,
mannerlsms and relative HfemininityH rather than the
content of their statements. Such issues were often
brought into the story through the use of Heverybody
knows H kinds of statements in which journalists appeared
simply to be referencing some of the stereotypes Hout
there H but in fact were recirculating them. Linguistic
cues to sexist assumptions about women were also
abundant in this period as NOW are seen to be
Hcomplaining H about inequality rather than Hdemanding H
change,

for example. News stories in this period also

questioned both the competence of NOW's leaders and the
breadth and representativeness of its membership.

1.1 "So-called," "Self-styled" and other Dubious
Descriptors

Early NOW coverage was characterized by these
distancing mechanisms. For example, a 1967 story in
which the Times reports on a NOW picket outside its own
building (against gender- segregated want-ads) indicates
how the liberal use of qualifiers (Hwhat it considers,H
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"such things as" ) can leave a reader skeptical about a
group's motives:

Eight women and three men picketed the New York
Times midtown classified advertisement office
yesterday charging that the newspaper discriminated
against women by labeling help wanted ads male and
female. The pickets were members of an organization
called National Organization for Women which
was formed last November to fight what it considers
discrimination against women in jobs and
legislation ... There are about 300 members, mostly
women, in the New York state chapter, Mrs. Jean
Faust, the chapter president said. The group has
also campaigned for such things as Constitutional
amendments that would outlaw sex discrimination and
for the right of women to terminate unwanted
pregnancies (New York Times, December 14, 1967,
p.

56).

In this anonymous, nine-paragraph story NOW is
given voice only once, and that is to claim a membership
of 300. This claim is not questioned directly, but it
stands in direct contrast to the reporter's note that
"eight women and three men" were actually there. The
story also resolutely avoids NOW's own frames for
abortion rights at this time (such as "reproductive
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freedom" or llreproductive control") and chooses an
inflammatory one,

"the right to end unwanted

pregnancies." Four of the story's nine graphs are
dedicated to giving the Times

management voice through

a long quote defending its policy.
A second example of this kind of hostile framing,
ln which NOW's claims are presented as somewhat dubious,
occurred in 1968 when a writer on the women's page
framed NOW as llself-styled militants":

The National Organization for Women (NOW), which
consists of 2,000 self-styled militants fighting
for lltrue equality for all women" had every
intention of endorsing one or more male would-be
candidates yesterday. But it couldn't because only
two of the SlX men canvassed bothered to respond to
its questionnaires

(New York Times, May 7, 1968,

p. 40.)

In this early story, the number of members
attributed to the group by NOW itself is allowed to
stand but NOW's goals of lltrue equality for all women"
is given the added journalistic insurance of quotation
marks. The story makes it clear that not only is the
organization considered a non-player by the presidential
candidates, but the writer herself also find them
dubious enough to be llself-styled."

In fact every
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organization that interacts with a news organization

lS

llself-styled ll in that they describe themselves in
strategic ways. But with organizations that journalists
take seriously, the presented identity is taken at face
value.
The general dubiousness with which the Times
approached NOW's goals sometimes opened up into direct
criticism of NOW leaders. In the same 1968 story, for
example, NOW leader Betty Friedan is made to look quite
ignorant:

Mrs. Friedan said NOW was protesting llextreme
employment discrimination against women workers.ll
She cited layoffs of women not based on seniority.
She accused the union,

the name of which she did

not know, of llplaying footsie with management.ll(New
York Times, May 7, 1968, p. 40).

The point here is again one of journalistic
selectivity. It is quite likely that Friedan did not
recall a particular union, and may have been entirely
ignorant on the matter. But it is highly irregular for
writers in political stories to make direct references
like this to their source's ignorance. Indeed,

it

lS

indication of how little the writer valued NOW or
Friedan as repeat sources that she would select this
piece of information for the story.

an
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1.2 Civil Rights vs. Being "Put Upon":
Resistance to the "Sex Discrimination" Frame

At this point In its early history NOW leaders were
trying to present NOW as a civil rights organization.
Friedan had said she wanted NOW to be seen as the "NAACP
for women" and the language of rights, discrimination
and seXlsm were all strategically produced by NOW
leaders to parallel NOW and the women's movement with
the NAACP and the Civil Rights Movement. However the
frame of "sex discrimination" did not automatically go
over well with journalists. Journalists were more likely
to report seriously on NOW's more specific goals -- i.e.
paid- maternity leave and child care expenses -- but to
balk at simply reporting the concept of sex
discrimination outright. In most cases in the early days
the idea of sex discrimination would be reported in
quotation marks ("sex discrimination") or it would be
attributed to NOW as a dubious concept (e.g. "what it
terms sex discrimination").
This general skepticism about the overall
serlousness of the movements, and indeed the need for a
movement at all, came up frequently. News stories of the
late 1960s emphasized the relative wealth and affluence
of America and seemed to be puzzled that these women
were feeling so "put upon." This article by Martha
Weinman Lear In the Times magazine,

for example, asks

over and over whether women really need such a
Jlmovement:"

... when pink refrigerators abound, when women (51
percent of the population) hold unparalleled
consumer power, when women control most of the
corporate stocks, when women have ready access to
higher education and to the professions, when
millions of women are gainfully employed, when all
the nation is telling American women, all the time
that they are the most privileged female population
on earth, the insistence on a civil rights movement
does seem a trifle stubborn. (New York Times
Magazine, March 10, 1968, p. 25.)

In this long and complex article, NOW and other
feminists are allowed to express their positions, but
still, the whole article is permeated by a general
cynicism about the real need for a feminist
organization. 3 As a large-type header (perhaps added by
a less sympathetic editor) notes "women still feel put
upon."
In any language of politics being "put upon" is
hardly the same as having one's civil rights
systematically denied. Yet throughout this period NOW is
described as "complaining," about inequality, being on a
"crusade" rather than mobilizing, being "stubborn"
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rather than principled, and being Hplaintive" In its
demands for change. These terms not only trivialize the
groups' political identity In a general way, but they
also reference a system of gendered linguistic divisions
in which men Hdemand" and women Hcomplain," men are
principled and women (and children) are Hstubborn."
These descriptors are part of a general ridiculing of
NOW and other feminists in this period in which the fact
that they are women, making demands about women's lives
is an essential aspect of their marginalization. 4
Some of this early resistance by reporters to the
term Hsex discrimination" may simply have been the
result of corning into contact with unfamiliar
terminology. HS ex discrimination" and sexism, were both
very new terms in the late 1960s. But more likely the

Times writers like the EEO itself, resisted the overall
systematic and radical consequences that such a frame
brought with it.
When they did include NOW's frame of
Hdiscrimination"

in this period, it was almost always

in quotes, as if it was not quite a believable
description of women's experlence. In a description of
feminist positions for example, a Times story frames the
feminists' terms as highly dubious:

Those here for example, are picketing such
establishments as the Federal Equal Employment
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Opportunities Commission ("unfair"), The New York
Times ("discriminatory" want ad pages) and the
Association of the Bar of New York (site of a
hearing of the Governor's Committee on abortion
Law) ."(New York Times July 24, 1968, p. 19)

In later years (after 1970), and in the contexts of
the larger women's movement, NOW's frame of "sex
discrimination" came to be used without quotations and
in fact the issues of sex discrimination in employment
and education came to be seen as the "real" issues of
feminism as opposed to the sexual or personal politics
of the "younger" movement.
In general, though,

in the first few years, even

relatively neutral descriptions of NOW would use
quotation marks around NOW's identity as if to make
quite clear that this was not a judgment on the writer's
part.

1.3 Femininity and Legitimacy: Trivia1ization
Mechanisms
This general framing as somewhat dubious was
accompanied by a tendency to focus on the dress or
appearance of NOW leaders

in particular on their

relative degree of "femininity." This focus on
femininity and fashion was sometimes used to maintain
legitimacy -- i.e. the fact that some NOW leaders were
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also attractive was used as a way of enhancing the
group's legitimacy by journalists. More often appearance
made its way into stories in ways that diminished
legitimacy -- as for example when journalists
recirculated stereotypes such as "everybody knows the
stereotype that

feminists are ugly." In either case the

focus on appearance -- whether to enhance or debunk NOW
speakers -- was a trivializing mechanism.
In fact the very first story about NOW In the New

York Times appeared on the Women's Page, days after the
press conference on which it was reporting, and was
placed between a recipe for Thanksgiving turkey and a
story about Pierre Henri, hairdresser, returning to Saks
Fifth Avenue. This first coverage of NOW, reporting on
its founding, was a highly contradictory effort to both
take NOW seriously and to fulfill the functions of a
fashion and gossip story.
The story associates NOW and the women's movement
with previous revolutionary movements (citing Marx's
Communist Manifesto), outlines the organization's recent
political activities of sending letters to the President
and the EEOC, and yet also finds time to make note of
Betty Friedan's "neat black suit" and her "ruby and
sapphire parlor":

Although no one in the dim ruby and sapphire
Victorian parlor actually got up and cried "Women
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of the World, unite! You have nothing to lose but
your chains," that was the prevailing sentiment
yesterday morning at the crowded press conference
held by the newly formed National Organization for
Women ...

The Board of Directors urged President

Johnson Hto give top priority among legislative
proposals for the next Congress to legislation that
would give effective enforcement powers to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... Speaking
in a gravely alto from the depths of the large fur
collar that trimmed her neat black suit, the
ebullient author [Friedan] suggested that women
today were Hin relatively little position to
-influence or control major decisions. But she
added, leaning forward in the lilac velvet
Victorian chair and punching the air as if it was
something palpable,
vote."

Hwhat women do have

1S

the

(New York Times, November 22, 1966, p. 44.)

Some of this focus on clothes and manners was the
result of news genre

conflicts. In the early days most

of NOW's stories were placed on the lifestyle/women's
page where fashion,

food, manners, and so on were the

usual topics and so coverage of NOW was subject to the
same kind of writing and processing as these articles.
But NOW also had a hand in this outcome. This first
story about NOW was the result of a carefully
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orchestrated press conference in which NOW strategists
showcased many of their most IIrespectableli leaders (such
as vicars, nuns, professors and government officials)
But they decided to hold the conference in Friedan's
parlor because they believed that holding the conference
in the home of a celebrity would be sufficiently
different to get journalists attention. It did indeed,
but it got the attention of the women's page editors and
was IIprocessed li as a celebrity woman story and placed on
the women's page.
Another story from 1968, which also ran on the
women's page, illustrates this confusion of politics and
fashion also. It spends 18 paragraphs reporting on a
talk.by Florynce Kennedy on movement picketing
strategies, but winds up by describing her clothes:

Miss Kennedy a civil rights lawyer and a counsel
for H. Rap Brown the militant black power advocate
socked it to a meeting held Thursday night to
discuss strategy for picketing the ColgatePalmolive Company '"

Miss Kennedy who was dressed

in a sleeveless gray wool overblouse

and a white

pleated skirt also wore a button that said
IIJeanette Rankin brigade. II
24, 1968, p. 33)

(New York Times, August
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NOW and other movement groups developed their own
ways of dealing with this focus on appearance. The more
radical groups and individuals confronted the issue
directly. They articulated the cultural relationship
between femininity and legitimacy as part of a larger
sexist system and they tried to subvert expectations
about female sexuality by appearing unkempt and by
dressing in non-traditional ways (Echols, 1989). NOW, on
the other hand,

followed its usual strategy of trying to

both use and transform cultural constraints. They
selected someone from within their midst who was
"photogenic" as a spokesperson, and then had that person
talk about the politics of femininity. Ti-Grace
Atkinson,

for example, who was briefly the leader of New

York NOW, was reportedly pushed forward by Betty Friedan
because of her "refined" looks and her "untypical"
feminist appearance was thought to have disarmed
reporters.
In other stories, the physical appearance and
sexuality of feminists was ushered in by a back door as
writers used general statements of the "everybody knows"
type to bring NOW leaders' lifestyles into focus. One
writer noted in a 1968 story,

for example, that

stereotypes of feminists as "castrating crows in
bloomers" were widespread and then goes on to determine
whether this is the case in her story (New York Times
Magazine, March 10, 1968, p. 57). Whether it is true or
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not, she has inferred that the reader ought to be
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considering the possibility. Another "everybody knows"
article in 1970 illustrates the convenience of these
unnamed sources for bringing stereotypes into the story:

From its beginnings, the movement was widely
regarded as somebody's idea of a bad joke. "A
Lesbian plot" muttered some. "A group of frustrated
old maids who need a good man," said others. (New
York Times 1970, August 30, 1970, IV, p. 4)

Just who these "people" are of course

lS

never

discussed, and indeed this maintenance and circulation
of stereotypes -- of what "everybody knows" -- is one of
the (de) legitimation tools that journalists employ while
at the same time seeming to be simply populist and to
know the mind of the "average" person. The point here
one of selectivity.

lS

It is not the case that journalists

repeat all stereotypes that they have ever heard off,
only those that further the frame of their story.
Overall, then,

in the first few years of NOW's

interaction with news media, many of the classic
indicators of marginalization -- from a focus on
appearance (trivialization) to distance markers such as
quotes or qualifiers -- NOW

lS

routinely presented in

this period as a source organization that cannot be
taken at face value.
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II. 1970-1974 LIMITED LEGITIMATION AND
CONTRADICTIONS

By 1970 some changes can be seen in NOW's
legitimacy and between 1970 and 1974 NOW began to
undergo a limited process of legitimation as a news
source. For example, in this period NOW began to be
described in its own terms, and quotes and qualifiers
disappeared from the organization's goals and claims
more generally. By 1974, for example, NOW was frequently
described as simply the "oldest and largest feminist
organization in the country."
This legitimation process was shifting and far from
seamless. NOW's organizational legitimacy as a source
depended on its issue context. Its organizational
legitimacy was usually higher in this period when the
story context was NOW's best known and (by now) most
institutionalized political issues, such as the ERA,
employment discrimination or educational discrimination.
In other topic areas, especially those that touched on
more radical or systemic analyses of discrimination or
of a whole system of "sexism," they were just as likely
to be ridiculed as respected.
The organization was also more likely to be taken
seriously when it was being compared to more "radical"
groups than when it was being assessed alone. In this

middle period NOW became the beneficiary of news'
hostility to more radical feminisms.

2.1 ERA, Sex Discrimination and Civil Rights:
NOW's News Legitimation Contexts, 1970-1974

In the 1970-1974 period NOW began to be taken more
seriously in news stories. For example, In a 1970 report
of a speech given by Betty Friedan, NOW is described in
a very straightforward way as a national organization
with thousands of members:

NOW which has about 35 national chapters with up to
100 members each,

is the oldest and the largest of

-the women's groups ... Among its campaigns have
been the demand for equal employment opportunities
for women, day care centers, where mothers who want
to go to work can leave their children, and the
repeal of abortion laws. (New York Times, March 21,
1970, p. 21.)

The quotes that used to surround NOW's goals have
been dropped and NOW's statements are taken at face
value. Notice also here the much less inflammatory
description of NOW's stand on abortion as seeking a
lirepeal of abortion laws" rather than lithe right of
women to terminate unwanted pregnancies."
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This gradual change in the media coverage was
recognized by NOW's 1970-1971 president Aileen Hernandez
as one of the most significant changes to affect the
organization:

Mrs. Hernandez, dressed in a coral and white wool
ensemble with a matching scarf in her hair, was
very definite when asked what she thought was NOW's
greatest accomplishment. "The media no longer
look at our movement with such great humor," she
said firmly.

"We used to get asked," Do you mean

you want men to become playboy bunnies? Nobody asks
things like that anymore."

(New York Times, May 2,

1970)

Unfortunately she can't say the same for reporters
descriptions of what women sources are wearing!

This

kind of commentary about women sources fashion judgment
was becoming less frequent over time, but was still
sometimes used, especially in stories like this one that
appeared on the women's pages.
One key issue area in which NOW was treated as a
serious source was in the context of the ERA. NOW's role
in the legislative debate over the ERA was generally
represented as serious and credible. The organization
was talked about in this context as if it was a serious
player, particularly by the Times'

Eileen Shanahan.
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Generally Shanahan (and a handful of other women
reporters) took women's political groups and issues
seriously in this period. These stories were not always
uncritical, but they did talk about NOW and other
women's groups as political actors (rather than as
fashion plates or "crusaders"):

A group of maJor women's rights organizations
announced today their consensus that a proposed
substitute version of the equal rights amendment to
the Constitution was inadequate. They thus killed
for this year the last possibility of enactment of
an amendment prohibiting governmental
discrimination on the basis of sex ... The women's
organizations said that the Bayh substitute would
still permit many distinctions to be made on the
basis of sex. (New York Times, November 12, 1970, p.
19. )

This story has a completely different tone than
earlier stories in which NOW is quoted. In this story,
in which women's organizations find legislation
"unacceptable," they "kill" substitutions, and act as
political agents. This is a far cry from "feeling put
out" as earlier stories had termed NOW's positions.
These stories treat "discrimination" as a known and well

308

understood term for experience, not as something that
NOW is "alleging."
Shanahan subsequently covered the Amendment and
other aspects of women's politics, including stories
about NOW conferences, and front page analyses of the
landmark AT&T discrimination/affirmative action
settlement in 1973.

Whether for personal political

reasons, or because of the context in which she carne
into contact with women's movement groups (i.e. as
informed participants in a major legislative battle)
Shanahan'S representation of women's groups was quite
different than previous coverage. 5 She simply treated
them as straightforward news sources. Her stories on the
ERA were dense, factual, and somewhat dry, legislative
stories in which NOW and other women's movement groups
were treated as informed sources. Shanahan legitimated
women's politics by treating it as news.
On one occaSlon In 1975 Shanahan's sympathetic
treatment of NOW became quite evident. When a Senate
Labor Committee expedited an EEOC appointment too
quickly for NOW to respond, Shanahan used NOW's
"prepared testimony" as the basis for a story. Despite
the fact that they had been unable to testify, NOW's
material

(statistics on the candidate's previous

affirmative action commitments, his attitudes towards
civil rights and so on) made it into the news anyway.6
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Generally by the mid 1970s NOW had become an expert 310
source for journalists especially in areas of women's
employment and sex discrimination law and policy. The
organization is quoted alongside the NAACP In
affirmative action stories, the AFSCME and other unions
in economic stories, and with anti-discrimination groups
generally in the front news sections of the paper. 7 NOW
leaders routinely testified to the Civil Rights
Commission of New York and other cities and to
congressional and senate committees. And in 1974, the
NOW president was invited to the White House as one of
the -nation's best known- women's organizations. Clearly
NOW had corne to be seen as an important voice for women:

Notes from a feminist leader's calendar: -Friday
meet with President Ford. Tell him how to better
the lot of women ... The first President of NOW to
meet with a President of the United States, Miss
De Crow said she hopes to have Mr. Ford's attention
long enough to tell him the following:

-I want to

put a buzz in his head about running with a
woman ... I will push for the appointment of women
federal judges, and I want a commitment that if he
has an opportunity to appoint a Supreme Court
justice he will name a woman. There should be an
affirmative action program for the White House and
its staff. It is essential that someone read all

the President's speeches and White House memos to
make sure they have no sexist content. I want a
commitment that if legislation is passed to chip
away at the Supreme Court decision on abortion,
that he would veto it. I want a commitment that he
support any legislation that affects women and
veto any that is anti-women. (New York Times,
September 6, 1974)

Sometimes that seriousness extended into control
over a story's frame. In a Congressional Hearing in 1974
for example, organized by Brooklyn Democrat, Shirley
Chisholm, NOW and other women's groups responses were
allbwed to define the story from the outset:

Representatives from women's groups criticized
today the Federal Government's record in fighting
sex discrimination in educational programs and told
a House subcommittee that special provisions
against such discrimination should be included in
pending vocational training legislation. (New York
Times, April 22, 1974, p. 17)

This kind of access, which has been called that of
a nprimary definer n

is rarely granted to those outside

of institutional power circles. For NOW it is certainly
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a far cry from "self-styled militants" who "allege"
"discrimination."

2.2

The Limits of Legitimation: "Private" Contexts

At the same time as ERA coverage and front page
stories on sex discrimination were portraying NOW as a
credible source, its representation in other topic areas
and on the women's page was much more contradictory and
more prone to trivialization. A story in 1971, for
example, reports on NOW's work on sex role stereotyping
on school, toys and texts, and ridicules it as a
ridiculous focus on "discrimination in the toddler set:"

·Women's liberation In the nursery? No more pink for
girls and blue for boys, dolls for girls and trucks
for boys, sewing kits for girls an football helmets
for boys? That's how it could be if some believers
in the women's liberation credo have their way.
Having already crusaded for equal treatment of the
sexes in the professions, academe and the home
as well as in children's books-- they're now
turning their attention to the playpen ... The New
York chapter of the National Organization for
Women, which just recently went before the New
York City Board of Education with a study of
discrimination against female students, teachers
and principals in the public school system, is
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turning its attention to discrimination in the
toddler set. (New York Times, May 12, 1971, p. 38)

In this 1971 story, the idea of sex role
stereotyping is pooh-poohed and feminism is described as
a "credo," rather than a politics. The story's tone
suggests that this is surely not a serious subject and
that this time these women are just going too

far.

In general, whenever new or untried issues were
mentioned (especially those that aimed their critiques
at the general system rather than specific legislative
concerns) NOW was put back in the "peculiar" box. In
fact the limits of NOW's legitimation become quite clear
over" time as we note that NOW was treated as a serious
source only in those topic/issue areas that were most
institutionalized and which best fitted existing models
of political analysis. 8 Sex discrimination in
employment, education and credit, for example, were
issues that had developed legislative histories and
institutional homes. However when NOW tried to bring
feminist analyses "home" or to describe a more general
system of "sexism" they were again ridiculed.
NOW's expansion of its concerns in the 1970s from
early focus on legal remedies and sex discrimination in
employment, to more general critiques of racism, ageism,
and sexism, ln all aspect of society, was presented in a
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way that suggested the organization was losing its
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focus:

NOW Expands the List of What It's For and What It's
Against
The Houston Conference of the National Organization
for Women ... committed NOW's 700 chapters to
increased action on behalf of npersonhood n

for

older women, homemakers, nurses, volunteer workers,
women in sports,

naggrieved women and children of

divorce,n women in poverty and even women in
foreign countries. (New York Times, June 2, 1974,
p. 18)

This distinction is agaln made quite clear in a
1970 report of a feminist address to the Rotarians.
Issues such as equal pay are fine, but analyses that
attack fundamental social and familial structures are
outside of the game:

As individuals the audience left little room for
doubt as to where they stood on the matter of
women's liberation. It was generally agreed that
equal pay for equal work and equal opportunities
for both sexes were valid points, but both men and
women appeared equally bewildered and at times
openly hostile to other statements of principle.

(New York Times

November 4, 1970, p. 20.)
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2.3 Legitimation through Differentiation:
The Reasonable and the Radical

This distinction in treatment between NOW's
institutionalized issues and its newer issues, was also
reflected in news during this period by another process
of differentiation and contextualization in which NOW
was compared to other movement groups. Generally NOW
gained from this comparison. It was presented as the
Hreasonable H alternative to more Hradical H feminisms.
In the early 1970s a number of radical feminist
groups exploded onto the public scene and NOW began to
seem-quite respectable by comparison. Journalists
writing about the movement started to make distinctions
between what was reasonable feminism and what was not,
and NOW,

for the most part, was a beneficiary of this

distinction. Even as the writer in this 1970 piece
reports on the younger groups' criticisms of NOW, it

lS

clear that the younger groups themselves are being
presented as marginal:

The largest of the groups within the movement is
the National Organization for Women

... NOW works

for passage and ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment and lobbies for federally funded day care
centers. Then there are the radical women's groups

who dismiss NOW and its sympathizers as
"bourgeois." Most of these groups are small; they
often have names of significance only to the
initiate such as Boston's Bread and Roses and New
York's Redstockings. Many of these seem less
concerned with restructuring the law than with, so
far as possible, revolutionizing the female -- in
some cases quite literally. There are some radical
women who have said that only the development of an
artificial uterus will truly "liberate" women, for
it will free them from the "oppression" of
pregnancy and birth. (New York Times, August 28,
p. 20.)

1970,

The quotation marks here around "liberate" and
"oppression" are similar to those that used to surround
NOW's claims to "sex discrimination," but in the context
of the more radical groups NOW is presented as more
legitimate.
Here we see one of the critical roles of
journalists and news media in interacting with social
movements

-- as the first interpreters of movements for

the public,

journalists playa critical role in

assesSlng the normality or deviance of new movements and
new ideas for their audiences. In the coverage of
feminism,

journalists seemed to take on this task

happily.9 In the name of an anonymous "Ms. Average
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American" they assessed NOW and other feminist groups in 317
terms of their relative nnormality" and separated
feminism into the nreasonable n and the unreasonable.
These were then packaged for readers in the appropriate
linguistic frames. In this 1970 article,

for example,

the writer does a brilliant job of separating out for
readers what is sensible feminism (equal wages and
educational access ) and what is not (consciousness
raising). All of this is achieved by general references
to (normal) American women, like Mrs. Betty Newcomb who
are midwestern (of course), married (of course), mothers
(of course), and so concerned with nreal" problems:

-But these are not the sort of theories that seem
likely to produce much response from non-radical
women, who are not so interested in restructuring
the family as In getting the same wages as their
male co-workers. Or like Mrs. Betty Newcomb of
Muncie Ind., who

lS

married, the mother of four

sons and an English teacher at Ball State
University, they are women who care less about
nconsciousness raising n than about persuading the

local school system to stop discouraging girls who
want to enter such "masculine" fields as
engineering.

(New York Times, August 11, 1970,

p. 20)

This differentiation work was not only performed by
journalists, however. At the same time as this news
story appeared, NOW's own media strategists were also
working to differentiate NOW from the more radical
groups and ideas of the movement. It was in 1970, for
example, that NOW was accused of having "purged" the
organization of its active lesbians, and throughout the
early 1970s NOW's communications to journalists included
"differentiation" strategies that would contrast NOW's
stance to that of more radical groups. In a 1973 letter
NOW's Public Information Office, for example, distanced
themselves from

other feminists whom they indicate were

the "real" bra burners, whereas NOW was a group of
"serious women and men" dedicated to
"for the

change society

benefit of both sexes."lO

Betty Friedan (who left NOW in 1970 and was
involved in organizing the Women's Political Caucus),
was also involved in fierce differentiation between
different kinds of feminism and feminists at this point.
In 1971, for example, she is quoted as saying that the
younger feminists are unrealistic and chauvinistic (New
York Times, March 23, 1971, p. 32).

And in 1973 Friedan
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wrote and had published in the Times magazine, a long,
critical umemoir u of her time in the movement in which
she attacked the younger movement groups relentlessly.
In the memoir Friedan took swipes at many of the
movement's most visible members such as Steinem, Abzug,
Brownmiller calling them uinfantillists" and even FBI
infiltrators of the movement. This article, which is
quite long and complex, represents quite significant
access for a movement leader to the Times pages.
Friedan's attacks on radical feminism garnered her much
more space than anything she had ever said on liberal
feminism's behalf (New York Times Magazine, March 3,
1973) .
. The radical feminist groups fought back against
Friedan's attacks and this internal debate was then
picked up and re-presented by the press, especially
those statements by either uside" that were most
dramatic or derogatory. The younger groups called
Friedan Ubourgeois" and outdated and she called them
uchauvinists" and uinfantilists":

Susan Brownmiller, a member of the New York Radical
Feminists, said in a recent magazine article that
to her colleagues uFriedan, the mother of the
movement and the organization that recruited in her
image are considered hopelessly bourgeois." (New
York Times, March 23, 1971, p. 32)
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News stories reported the claims of both "sides" in
the dispute quite extensively, but In the end tended to
side with Friedan or at least with more "reasonable"
feminisms. A 1973 story, for example, reporting on the
ongoing debate, sets the radical feminists up as
"children" to Friedan's "mother." Thus a serious
movement dispute about ideologies and strategies is
reduced to pop psychology:

It was billed as a "speak-out of the feminist
community" to rebut alarms sounded by Betty
Friedan, concerning a possible takeover of the
. women's liberation movement by man-haters, lesbians
and "pseudo radical infantilists," and infiltrators
"trained by the FBI and CIA." It turned into a
rather classic "kill the mother" fantasy-drama
with Mrs. Friedan, the mother of women's
liberation, described as outgrown by
the daughters .... (New York Times, March 8, 1973,
p.

52.)

Overall news coverage of the differences and
dissent in the movement in this critical 1970-1973
period,

focused on the dramatic and personal rather than

ideological or strategic differences between the groups.
And generally, the Times writers came down on the side

of more ·sensible· feminisms that fitted well within
existing frameworks of rights and equality -- i.e.
Friedan and NOW

and against the more radical claims

of the younger groups. NOW benefited from this
differentiation, then, while other feminist groups were
marginalized.
This differentiation process, while it tells us
something important about news can also be seen at least
partly as a ·success" for NOW legitimation strategies,
because these differentiation techniques were not only
the result of news framing mechanisms but also the
result of differentiation techniques on NOW's part.
During this period (as I indicate in chapter six) NOW
strategists also took the opportunity to differentiate
NOW from the "younger" groups. In fact this may be one
of the occasions when NOW's public identity strategies
meshed almost perfectly with news processing: both NOW
and news used the younger groups as a foil for
·sensible" feminisms.

III. INTERNAL DISSENT, 1974-1976:
WHO DOES NOW REPRESENT?

The third identifiable "stage" In NOW's
representation In news, came during the 1974-1976 period
when the organization itself was In internal turmoil. By
the mid 1970's many of the "younger" feminist groups had
disappeared from public view and women who were still
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interested ln working in organized political feminism
had joined NOW. This new membership, combined with an
ongoing tension between the grassroots chapters and the
national leadership over internal democracy, NOW policy,
and visions of feminism more generally, came to a head
in the 1974-5 NOW elections for national leaders.
At the 1975 NOW National Conference almost the
entire standing NOW Board was replaced by a "majority
caucus" of younger, more militant, leaders, and NOW
headed into a period in which radical, long term goals
were emphasized and the "mainstream" rejected. In a
platform entitled "Out of the Mainstream and Into the
Revolution" new NOW leaders expanded NOW's range of
public concerns and began to articulate a different,
more diverse and generalized feminist identity:11
The news about NOW produced during this two year
period (centering especially around 1975) encompassed a
wider range of critique and more complex coverage than
NOW's news representation had before. Perhaps because of
the new openness of NOW leaders -- and so the
availability to journalists of internal critiques to
draw on -- the coverage during this period is complex,
wide ranging, critical and, when taken as a whole,
contradictory. As such it reflected the reality of NOW
at this point. The organization was undergoing internal
debate and struggle over future goals and leadership,
and the usual tight control over media representations
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of internal dissent were relaxed. Indeed, as I argue in
chapter six, one of the issues being contended in this
internal struggle was the public identity of NOW and
media's role in publicizing either a united front or a
complex and inclusive image of NOW (see chapter six,
Identity Control Strategies).
Central to this period of coverage was an ongoing
debate in news about just who NOW's members were -- and
indeed who feminist were overall. Sometimes the
organization's diversity was stressed as in this 1974
story:

The women at the NOW convention seemed to represent
all ages, ethnic groups and walks of life. There
were white-haired women with canes, teen-aged girls
with their mothers-- and even a sprinkling of
men. (New York Times, September 8, 1974, p.58.)

A similar theme of "feminists are everybody" was
also struck in this 1975 story about feminism in the
"wild west:"

There were "the ladies who lunch," the ladies who
ranch, youthful college students in Levi's and
middle aged mothers in J.C. Penney pant suits. (New
York Times, May 3, 1975, p. 36)
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However this sense of NOW as encompassing all kinds 324
of women came under attack too, and NOW was sometimes
presented as being out of touch with the Haverage"
woman. When NOW's 1975 HAlice Doesn't" Strike failed,
the Times took NOW to task:

HAlice Doesn't,H a nationwide strike called by the
National Organization for Women,

fizzled in much of

the country yesterday because most Alice's did.
They did what NOW had urged them not to do.
They went to work, they did housework, they
shopped, they cooked, and they cared for their
children. HAlice did because she had to," said
an editor for a Chicago publishing house who worked
yesterday.

HIt shows how out of touch with the

world the NOW people are to call something like a
strike. It's ridiculous. Most women are in
positions where if they don't go to work, they'd be
fired.H(New York Times, October 30, 1975, p. 44.)

The critique/conversation about who NOW represented
and why continued into 1976. Often the news debate had
resonances of the criticisms that the Majority Caucus
itself had mounted at the national convention. In this
story,

for example, the writer mounts the same critique

that many of the majority caucus had about NOW's need to

out to minority women, working class women and
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housewives:

NOW Still Growing -- But It's Still White and
Middle Class ...
The National Organization for Women is now In its
10th year and some of the more gloomy are
expressing great reservations about its future.
Its last national convention was followed by the
formation of a significant splinter group.
Criticism has been leveled from various quarters at
the organization's alleged failure to reach or
represent large segments of women in society.

(New

York Times, January 24, 1976, p. 20)

This critique was accompanied by a long story which
quoted extensively working class and minority women who
worked in neighborhood projects, and whom the reporter
asked to say what was wrong with NOW. In this long
article, NOW's class and race base is examined and
critiqued in a way that had not been seen before:

For Working Class Women, Own Organization and Goals
The women's movement ... is in her mind an
amorphous middle class group involved in many
things that don't touch her life and removed
from the hopes, desires,

fears and uncertainties of

most women. I feel the women's movement puts down
women in general ... especially immigrant women who
have always worked. When these women get a chance
to stay home a few years they are being told they
are oppressed and that they are slaves ...

Groups like the National Organization for Women
Yare talking about jobs for self fulfillment when
people can't get jobs of any kind,Y Miss Noschese
said. (New York Times, January 24, 1976, p. 20.)

This new (and critical) focus on NOW's goals and
membership, is not really be seen a Yfailure Y of news
management, though, because at this time NOW leaders
were quite deliberately expressing dissenting ideas and
positions to journalists. As part of a new Yopenness Y in
its dealing with the press and with grassroots
membership, the new Majority Caucus Leadership may have
in fact provided much of the raw material for these
critiques. The tendency of earlier administration's to
Ysoft pedal Y particular issues with media was critiqued
by the Majority Caucus who wanted NOW to

begin to be

more Yup frontY with news media about the range of
concerns and conflict in the organization as a whole:

Down playing some issues for tactical reasons
always a risky procedure. When we fail to

lS
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articulate some of our goals we tend to drop them
not only from our immediate demands but from our
long term vision,

It does not take much anxiety and

circumspection to turn a multi-issued revolutionary
movement into a one issue reform. 12

After 1975, NOW's differentiation strategies,

In

which NOW's respectability had been played up at the
expense of other movement groups, were also adjusted. In
this later period NOW's relationship to the rest of the
movement was usually presented to media as one of
llsisterhood ll rather than as the respectable arm of the
movement .
. NOW is presented overall in this period as a highly
contentious organization whose membership,

leaders and

agenda was in flux. However this was not a marginalizing
representation. Although NOW does not corne off
particularly well in these debates -- being presented as
an elitist, white, middle class organization which was
only partly true -- it is a debate in which NOW's right
to be the subject of such serious analysis is now taken
for granted. This overt, serious weighing of NOW's
goals,

future and membership is a far cry from its early

representation as somewhat dubious and llself-styled. ll
Though the organization did not always look good
In this period,

it is an indication of NOW's general

increase in legitimacy that they are subject to this
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level of strategic critique at all. Reporters usually
save this kind of attention

the "how well are they

doing their job" frame -- for electoral candidates. NOW
is seen during this period as a legitimate organization
which should be doing a better job of representing all
women. It was exactly this identity as a voice for women
that NOW's early leaders had tried to produce, and which
it had been hard to persuade journalists there was any
need for.

IV. 1976-1980, SOLIDIFYING LEGITIMACY,
HISTORICIZING NOW

In the mid and late 1970s NOW's identity in news
stories became more and more normalized. Indeed the
organization even began to be historicized as a
respected pioneer of "hard won rights" and to be seen as
a fixture in the political process. An unsigned (and
therefore institutional) Times

editorial in 1977,

entitled "Feminism Then and NOW," caps this progression
to respectability as the Times itself recognizes NOW's
importance:

The quiet passage of the tenth annlversary of the
National Organization for Women belies the profound
change in America's consciousness generated by the
women's movement. Initially feminist claims were
jarring, even enraging ... In a decade the country
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has changed. The women's movement has unleashed a
new literature, new social criticism, new talent.
Few men would now be insensitive enough to sum up
the movement's appeal the way one comedian did a
few years ago: llSure my wife joined the feminists.
Why not? They all want somebody to help with the
dishes. ll Solid gains in legislation, business,
labor and government, clearly have been made.
(New York Times, May 3, 1977, p. 40.)

This piece on Westchester NOW's reunion,
example,

for

focuses on how feminism, and NOW membership has

even been good for the health of the participants:

... feminism is doing what Lydia E. Pinkham -- the
inventor of a patent medicine for Hfemale ailments H
-- and tranquilizers haven't been able to do;
keeping us healthy, happy, busy, sober and
married. (New York Times, June 26, xxii, p. 20.)

The hook for this institutionalizing of NOW was
officially its tenth anniversary. But in fact the
general process of legitimation had been building up for
some years prlor to it's official declaration in this
editorial. 13
This general legitimation as a long-standing
participant in social change did not mean that NOW was
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treated uncritically.

As I indicated in the previous

section, NOW was routinely critiqued during this period
for its imperfections in representing all women. And in
this last period, NOW was also critiqued for its lack of
sophistication as a "insider" player. Now that the Times
had allowed NOW into the fold of serious civil rights
organizations, it began to assess NOW's strategies, not
as a social movement (i.e. as critical and/or radical)
but as an "insider" who should know better than to be
"unrealistic" or "extreme."
During this period,

for example, NOW had begun to

take more of a role in electoral politics. But as far as
the Time's was concerned NOW was not very good at this
kind of politics. When in 1979 NOW decided not to
endorse Carter for renomination because of his dismal
record on getting the ERA ratified, the Times subjected
NOW leadership to a heavy dose of patronizing advice.
Under a general heading of "The Complaints of the
Women's Lobby," the editorial said:

We've held back comment on the rejection of
President Carter's candidacy by the National
Organization for Women. The nominating convention
is eight months off and the election is 11 months
off. Perhaps, we thought, there

lS

a way out of

that tightly painted corner, or an explanation.
Alas, the ineptitude stands unrelieved, NOW should
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try to get out of its corner even before the paint
dries.

(New York Times, December 19, 1979, p. 30)

The Times tone In this period is one of scolding a
recalcitrant child. NOW is being criticized for holding
onto its outsider tactics, when it is now in the game.
But being critiqued as a player (or as a not very good
player)

is something quite different from being a

dubious newcomer.
By 1981, as this editorial plece notes, the women's
movement has corne of age as far as news is concerned:

A Bad Time for Women?
A columnist reporting recently on an argument
between two writers quoted the following dialogue:
He: HI am not here to argue with a feminist. H
She: HI am not a feminist."
To him Hfeminist" seems to be a kind of dirty word.
Judging by the response, it is to her as well. Why,
we'd like to ask them. Do you really know what it
means? Or do you really mean what you're saying?
that someone who espouses, to cite Webster,

Hthe

theory of the political, social and economlC
equality of the sexes," isn't worth talking to?
Still, being able to define feminism correctly is
less important than being able to recognize the
extraordinary growth of the women's movement. Since
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November, new memberships in NOW have been
running at approximately 9,000 to 10,000 monthly,
two to three times the preVlOUS average. No fewer
than 24 women's groups have, in a joint statement,
assailed certain of the Reagan Administration's
budget cuts. Another new coalition includes several
public affairs law groups, and a similar
organization is being formed for food and hunger
issues. There are, of course, many other women who
see themselves threatened, less by a new
administration than by the new roles into
which they are being urged, and by what they
interpret as denigration of their old ones. It
. would be an error, then, to assume that females
now constitute a political monolith. What lS
certain, however, is that faced with what they
perceive as an alarming insensitivity to certain
human issues, some women are mounting strong and
increasingly structured protests. Only ten years
ago such political channels were close to
nonexistent; 15 years ago they were close to
inconceivable. This may indeed be a bad time for
women, but there lS no longer any doubt that the
women's movement is a remarkable revolution.
(New York Times 1981, June 1, p. 16)
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This editorial plece lS extraordinary

for its

IIseal of approval" of NOW. But also for its alignment of
the Times

(lI we ")

with feminism ("well, we would like to

ask him why"), when in fact that had not always been the
case at all. The editorial wipes out the Times own
historical resistance to NOW, to feminism and to sex
discrimination. Its own role in resisting "so-called
equality" is erased and readers are now asked to stand
with the Times on the side of sensible people and
support the movement. It notes that "political channels"
were closed to feminism 10 years ago, but fails to note
that the Times itself was one of those channels.
This is an important development in NOW's public
legitimation, and it must be seen as a "successful"
outcome for NOW media strategists. If the Times is an
indicator of journalism more generally, then, by 1981,
NOW had become a publicly legitimate voice at least for
equality feminism. But it is important to note also,
that it is a particular version of the movement that lS
being centered here -- the Times supports a

feminism

that is about IIpolitical, social and economic equality."

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:
Conditional Legitimation for NOW

In the early years, 1966-1970 NOW was generally
trivialized in news through a combination of being
treated as part of the fashion genre and through
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distancing techniques and descriptions that trivialized
the organization's political positions. In the 1970-1974
period NOW began to be presented as a more legitimate
source. But this legitimation was limited and
complicated by news tendency to process NOW differently
in different issue and movement contexts. In 1975, as
part of a larger process of dissent in the organization,
NOW's representativeness, and membership, came under
serious critique, but I argue that this critique was not
necessarily marginalizing, because it took NOW seriously
as an organization trying to represent all women. By
1980/1981, NOW seems to have become institutionalized In
the eyes of the Times editors at least. The organization
was still critiqued, but stories and editorials
surrounding NOW's 10th anniversary indicate that it had
come to be perceived as a Hplayer" in national politics.
These patterns in NOW's representation reflect its
own active control and strategizing to some extent, but
the NOW-news relationship was also structured by
discursive categories and assumptions that news brought
to the interaction, and which may also stretch beyond
news to the liberal political discursive context of both
news and NOW. In the early years,

for example, despite

NOW's investment in media work and its attempts to
retain tight control of the organization's in media, it
was not represented as a legitimate news source. NOW
suffered as an organization in this period from the
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general Hnewness H of feminism to journalists, who
responded by marginalizing and ridiculing NOW and its
goals. In 1966 the idea of feminism and especially Hsex
discrimination H was a new and challenging frame for
gender relations, and in the first few years of
interaction with news, NOW's articulation of this frame
was not taken seriously. As NOW and other groups
continued to articulate sex discrimination and sexism
frames over time, and as their efforts resulted in
legislation and EEO compliance, news also began to take
these frames for experience more seriously, and to drop
quotes and qualifiers from its representation of NOW's
goals. It is the persistence of these strategic
communications over time, though, that seems to be key
here.
In the 1970-1974 period when NOW was beginning to
be taken more seriously, some of this legitimation
process may be traced directly to the setting up of the
Public Information Office and the systematic provision
of information to journalists about women's issues. The
information work NOW strategists did with women
reporters (such as Shanahan)

In making the ERA an lssue

seems to have succeeded here.
The differentiation process, through which NOW
gained some legitimacy at the expense of the HyoungerH
movement groups, was also influenced by NOW's
strategies. As I indicate earlier in the chapter, it was
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not only journalists who were involved in making
distinctions between ureasonable" and uradical"
feminisms. Some NOW strategists at this point also saw
the rise of women's liberation groups as an opportunity
to set NOW apart. In the long run, however, these kind
of differentiation processes also worked against NOW
itself. NOW was more likely to be seen as a serlOUS news
source only in specific issue areas such as the ERA or
sex discrimination, which by the 1970s had a developed
institutional and legislative history. When NOW moved to
address newer or more radical feminist topics, however,
its reception was less friendly, and some of the old
marginalizing techniques that had been used in
presenting NOW in the early years reappeared In these
stories. News' preference for uold u politics and
equality (rather than radical)

feminism which NOW had

been able to use strategically to gain legitimacy as a
group (compared to the UyoungerU groups) was also
brought to bear on NOW at the level of issues.
The question of whether NOW usucceeded" in its
legitimation strategies, then, seems to be yes and no.
Over time a general legitimation can be seen to have
taken place in NOW's representation in the Times. But
this legitimation had some important limitations. As in
NOW's agenda-building activities, NOW's identity was
processed within a discursive context of struggle over
the boundaries of ulegitimate" politics more generally,
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and which in the context of feminist and NSM politics
can be seen as a struggle over public-private boundaries
(McLaughlin, 1993; Fraser, 1992).
Just as in agenda-building strategies and outcomes
a pervasive public-private framework seems to be in
place throughout NOW's interaction with the Times in
this period. NOW's legitimation, for example, was more
assured when it talked about traditional issues. But
there was also some shifting of issues within the
framework. Over time what news considered to be an
illegitimate issue changed. In 1966, for example, the

Times

was less than friendly to sex discrimination as a

frame for women's politics

calling it llso-called

dis'crimination ll and asking if a women's movement was not
somehow ridiculous. But by 1981 sex discrimination in
employment, education and so on, had become the
legitimate aspect of feminism in the eyes of the Times
The NOW-news struggle, then, was both structured
and shifting. It was the result of systematic processing
by news conventions, but over time it was also
influenced by NOW's strategies and by its ongolng
strategic communication and political mobilization. The
same sorting mechanism

was always at work here in which

news decided what was legitimate or not (or in this case
what is llpublic ll or not), but some llmovementll took place
from one category to the other as a result of NOW's
strategic framing and articulation of issues. NOW was
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able to llmake ll sex discrimination an lssue,

it was less

able to make child care an lssue, at least in this
period.
NOW's legitimation in the public sphere was
connected to its own strategic choices, then,

in that

without that strategic interaction on NOW and other
feminist group's part,

it is doubtful if any of the

Umovement U indicated in this chapter -- i.e. sex
discrimination becoming legitimated as a frame -- would
have taken place. But the

NOW-news relationship was

also part of a larger struggle over public-private
politics that both constrained and enabled both
journalists and activists, and in which NOW and news
workers were only two of many players.
NOTES

1 See chapter six for more discussion of NOW's identity
control strategies.
2 For example, as I note later in this chapter, llsex
discrimination" started out as a radical frame for
women's experiences of inequalities and was resisted for
a while by journalists and policy makers, but by the mid
1970s this was one of NOW's more institutionalized
issues and usexism" or child care were the areas in
which it was taken less seriously.
3 The context of the story is also highly contradictory
-- the first serious magazine article on the movement in
the Times and it is placed among ads for girdles and
lingerie whose catch line is UMy Wife and My Wallet are
in Great Shape (Thanks to Soft Skin)."
4 Gitlin (198D) has illustrated how SDS was marginalized
by playing on its youth and flamboyance -- i.e. news
legitimacy centered around age/experience vs.
youth/inexperience dichotomies. In NOW's case the
marginalization was gendered -- i.e. it centered around
male/female legitimacy fault lines.
5 Shanahan is widely credited with making the ERA a
major story, after she was alerted to it by women's
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rights activist, See Simpson (1979) and Robertson
(1992) .
6 New York Times, Wednesday May 21, 1975, p.
7 See for example, New York Times, January 19, 1973,
for an analysis of the AT&T discrimination settlement
where NOW and the NAACP, are key spokespersons, or
December 15, 1972, p.69, a story on the SEC and
discrimination in stock market firms in which NOW and
the Presbyterian church are sources; or May 8, 1973 for
responses by "social reform groups" to proposed budget
cuts that includes NOW and the AFSCME.
8 It is worth noting here again, though, that what
constituted this group of "institutionalized" topics was
itself the outcome of previous struggle. The relative
legitimacy of sex discrimination by the 1970s was the
result of previous years of strategic communication.
9 Reporters' willingness to stand in for the "public" is
problematic first, because of their general lack of
representativeness of the population, and second,
because of their general lack of reflexivity about the
specificity of their own socio-cultural backgrounds. For
example, the reporter quoted above assumes that because
feminist groups names did not have any resonance for
her, that they would not for anybody. But both Bread and
Roses and Redstockings would have resonated for people
familiar with labor or feminist history.
10 Letter from Dian Terry to Dick Cavett Show, NBC TV,
June 1973, Public Information Office papers, NOW
Collection, Schlesinger Library
11 The flOut of the Mainstream" title was a deliberate
reference to NOW's first public statement that it
intended to bring women "into the mainstream" of
political and social life in America. See NOW Statement
of Purpose, 1966.
12 NOW, 1975, Majority Caucus manifesto and "slate"
published for the 1975 National NOW Conference in
Philadelphia. NOW Collection, Schlesinger Library.
13 In the same year (1977)three other stories also
reflect on how attitudes have changed and how NOW has
been a historical force; April 24, p. 26, March 25, p.
B5, June 26, xxii, p. 20.

Chapter Nine
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News as a Political Resource?
An Overdetermined Dialogical Model

NOW's access to news, and its ability to use news
to build a women's issue agenda and a legitimate public
identity

its "success" as defined in this study

was clearly overdetermined. The organization's own
ability to understand and interact with news over time
was structured by its available resources, its strategic
choices, and its identity at different times. And the
outcome of that interaction -- the representation of NOW
and its agenda over time in news content --

was the

result, not only of shifts in these structuring factors,
but also of the underlying categories and discursive
constraints of both news and feminist discourses.
The NOW-news interaction took place across mUltiple
levels. It was, at the same time, an interaction between
individuals (journalists and news workers),
organizations, and, perhaps most complexly, between two
discourses, news and feminism, which are substantially
different system of knowledge. News, for example, owes
much of its way of seeing the world to liberal,
objectivist, philosophical underpinnings, which tend to
assume a separation between public and private domains
(van Zoonen, 1992; McDermott, 1994; Hackett, 1996).

Feminisms on the other hand, whether they are designated 341
liberal, radical or pragmatist, have often been said to
be constructivist, experientially based system of
knowledge whose participants are engaged in blurring or
breaking down this public-private boundary which
historically has served to marginalize women's
experiences and concerns (Fraser, 1992; Butler and
Scott, 1992).
Interactions at each of these levels (between
individuals, organizations and discourses) affected and
constrained the others, sometimes in contradictory ways.
For example,

journalists and activists drew on and

reproduced the structures of their own discourses, but
they' were also affected by each other in interaction.
Interactions with feminists meant that journalists
introduced issues like sexual harassment and terms such
as nsexism n and nsex discrimination n into news and so
into public discourse. And clearly NOW was influenced by
news ways of seeing the word, as it deliberately encoded
media conventions into its communications in order to
attract and maintain relationships with journalists.
The relative effects of these discourses on one
another-- whether one transforms the other or whether
there is fundamental disjuncture or agreement --

lS

as

likely to structure the NOW-news interaction as day-today relationships between individuals. Indeed these two
levels are inseparable -- it is through individuals'

interaction day to day that these different discourses
are brought together, elaborated or transformed in
interaction.
This complexity of mUltiple levels and multiple
structuring factors means that NOW's relative "success"
in the interaction has to be determined contextually
within particular boundaries and trajectories, and at
different levels. Different structuring factors are also
likely to be more or less important at different levels
of the interaction. In the rest of this chapter, then, I
summarize and discuss some of the key relationship and
structuring factors at different levels of this
overdetermined interaction. First, I summarize the
various

(and overlapping) roles played by resources,

strategies and identity in structuring NOW's media
access possibilities. Then I summarize and assess
patterns in the outcome of that interaction -- in news
content. By analyzing patterns in the outcome of the
NOW-news interaction (content analysis)in the context of
information about NOW's shifting media strategies,
agendas and identities (institutional analysis) it
possible to

lS

identify the roles played by news

practices, conventions and discursive categories in
structuring this interaction separately from the roles
played by NOW strategies.
I argue overall that the press functioned as both a
resource and a constraint in NOW's public communication.
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While news access made it possible for NOW to
communicate to larger publics, news media also brought
to bear on NOW's discourse, its own discursive
categories and structures. In particular, I argue here,
it brought to bear a pervasive public-private dichotomy,
which news shares with liberal politics more generally,
and which is inimical to feminism.
The question for NOW, and other new social movement
organizations, then, becomes less whether news media can
be understood and used as a resource, but more
strategically, how can the constraints and possibilities
of news -- the structures of news -- be negotiated as a
resource? As Giddens (1984) has noted, structure is both
constraining and enabling. Structure can be oppressive
when it is routinely reproduced through unreflective
practice, but structures can also be enabling when the
"rules" of a system are made accessible to the
participants, who can then use them as resources. It is
this reflexive appropriation of the "rules" of systems
as resources which challenges deterministic models of
social life.
NOW seems to have been only partially successful in
negotiating the structures of news. The organization did
manage to learn about and use some of the structures of
news -- to reflexively appropriate some of the rules
but there were also areas of news, especially at the
deeper discursive levels, that were not accessible to
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NOW strategists, and could not be incorporated into
their strategic interactions. Generally NOW seems to
have been more successful in learning about and using
the structures of news at the level of practices and
routines, than at the ideological or discursive level
where it was constrained (and processed by) the
discursive constraints of news.

The Structuring Role of Resources in News Access

One of the most fundamental relationships that
emerged in this study was that between resources and
access to media. NOW's access to media was structured by
its resource mobilization more generally. It was the
income from membership that allowed the organization to
spend money on media work. The class and professional
background of NOW leaders, which translated into
competence and media contacts, was also instrumental ln
allowing it to interact with media. NOW's organizational
form, of centralization and also representation across
the country in chapters, made it possible both to
control communication to media and to be seen as
representative by media.
Resources, especially information, competence and
membership dollars are the first determining factors in
NOW news access. Without such resources no interaction
with media is possible at all. As Curran and Gurevitch
(1991, p. 19) have suggested, when it comes to symbolic
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power resources are determining not in the lllast
instance" but in the first.
The relationship between resources and symbolic
success is not a straightforward one, however. Resources
may make interaction possible, but they do not determine
success in controlling the interaction. While they tell
us about the general parameters of the relationship they
do not help us to understand how it is that material
resources can be translated into news voice. It is in
strategic analysis that the answer to how resources are
transformed into symbolic success can be found.

The Role of Reflexive Strategy

Besides resources, NOW's strategic sophistication
in interaction with news was a critical factor in
structuring access. While resources made the interaction
possible, it was NOW's development of a sophisticated
media pragmatism which made continuous interaction with
journalists possible. Over time NOW developed a more and
more sophisticated version of its media pragmatism. From
early attempts to control the group's identity through
taking media conventions into account,

to a fully

fledged research project to determine how best to
interact with journalists, NOW saw news as a potential
movement resource and has set out to appropriate and use
it for mass communication purposes.
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This media pragmatism was somewhat contradictory as 346
a strategy however. It produced both access to news (and
so to publics and the public agenda) and limitations in
NOW's public communication. It was this pragmatism, for
example, which allowed NOW to become a useful source for
women reporters. But it was also media pragmatism which
distorted NOW's identity in the first few years as NOW
leaders avoided talking about subjects such as
lesbianism.
Similarly NOW's strategy of finding and supporting
sympathetic women reporters had both productive and
limiting outcomes. As chapter seven illustrates, a large
percentage of news stories about NOW were produced by
women reporters, and in particular by a handful of
recurring writers (e.g. Eileen Shanahan, Peggy Simpson,
etc.) with whom NOW

built relations over time. The

significant resources NOW invested in becoming sources
to these women reporters seems to have paid off in
serious coverage.
However, this strategy of interacting with and
supporting women reporters meant that the limited access
women journalists had at this time to front page news
and institutional beats also limited NOW's media access.
As chapter seven illustrates, even though 2/3 of the
stories were written by women, most of the front page
NOW stories were written by men. It seems that gendered
assignments and sexism within news organizations makes

women reporters less influential gateways into news for
feminist sources at the same time as they are the
journalist who may be most likely to pay attention to
women's politics.
It may also be the case that NOW's media pragmatism
contributed overall to its own "processing" by news
media in terms of public-private categorizations. As I
suggest above, incorporating the news "values" of
journalists in order to get their attention, may have
meant that NOW was also sometimes invoking a discursive
system that was inimical to feminist discourses.
Speaking in "media logic" gained the attention of
reporters -- and so access to the public sphere --

but

it"also meant restricting public communication about
NOW's identity and political concerns and may have meant
that early NOW leaders thought less like feminists. In
the early years,

for example, NOW leaders often erased

or ignored issues and concerns of NOW membership in an
effort to appear "respectable" to news media and policy
makers. For example, in the early years NOW leaders
erased the organization's lesbian membership from its
public identity, and in the 1970-1974 period NOW
strategists were willing to publicly marginalize the
younger movement groups in order to increase NOW's
perceived news legitimacy as the "reasonable" arm of
feminism. As a social movement organization with
normative and philosophical goals, as well as strategic
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alms, NOW's focus on its media identity may have cost it 348
some legitimacy within the movement.
NOW's media pragmatism, then, was successful at
producing access, but that access Ycost" the
organization in terms of ideological constraints in its
public communication, and in the long run this media
savvy may also have made it easier for news discourse to
process NOW's discourse through its own discursive
framework because NOW has already encoded news
conventions into its own communications.

Ideology/Identity and Discursive Interaction
NOW's organizational identity also structured its
interactions with news media, but not in any
straightforward or predictive way. Rather NOW's shifts
in identity (e.g. its goals, leaders, or policies) over
time, also affected its communication strategies, and it
was shifts in these communication strategies as much as
any identity shifts that usually resulted in changes in
NOW's news legitimacy (the measure of identity Ysuccess Y
used here.)
In the early years, 1966-1970, for example, NOW was
generally trivialized ln news through a combination of
being treated as part of the fashion genre ,and through
distancing techniques and descriptions that trivialized
the organization's political positions. This
trivialization period ends around 1974, however, and NOW

begins to be seen as a legitimate speaker in news media
. This change in representation is not really the result
of significant changes in NOW's identity though. Rather,
it is the result of an intensification of communication
efforts. The early 1970s to 1974 was a period of intense
communicative activity on NOW's part, with the NOW PIO
especially playing a role in increasing news visibility.
It was also during this period that NOW strategists
began systematically supporting women reporters and this
information "subsidy" work

seems to have succeeded here

in making the ERA a public issue among other efforts. 1
In 1975, again, shifts in NOW's representation were
more tied to shifts in strategy than tied directly to
idEntity questions. News representations of NOW in the
1974-1976 period,

for example, showed NOW as a complex,

contentious organization, but to a large extent this new
public identity was the result of loosening of control
over its public image by new NOW leaders. The
organization did change its identity during this period,
but it was the effects that this shift had on
communication strategies that affected NOW's
representation. The new majority leaders wanted a more
open public identity for NOW that was inclusive, and
they were willing to risk media ridicule for this
purpose, so they changed NOW's media strategy from a
careful, controlled public communication about NOW that
sanitized the organization and stressed its respectable
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elements, to a strategy that more accurately represented 350
NOW's own internal diversity,
Clearly identity does play a role -- when we
compare NOW to the "younger" feminist groups it becomes
clear that a group's overall identity will structure its
media interactions. But it is difficult to carve out an
independent role for NOW's identity in structuring media
access Rather, NOW's identity structured its media
strategies which affected its representations. Over time
the relative legitimacy of NOW's public identity (the
identity "success" measure used here) was the result,
then, of news conventions and practices interacting with
NOW's media strategies. There seems to be no strong
independent determining role here for identity per se.

News Outcomes: Successes and Limitations

These structuring factors -- resources, strategies
and identity --help explain NOW's interaction patterns
with media, but in order to understand the interaction
-- and indeed to assess the relative "success" of NOW
strategies in controlling the organization's identity or
agenda -- we need to look also at the outcomes of the
interaction in news content. It is only by looking at
both NOW strategies and news content, that we can In
fact separate out a role for news discourse structures
in this interaction.

NOW was successful in some important ways in its
interaction with news media. The organization was able
to access news media and in doing so it helped to build
a public agenda for llwomen's issues. ll As chapter seven
illustrates, NOW was able to achieve basic access to
news and to produce voice in the news most of the time.
NOW leaders and strategists were quoted in news stories
NOW more than half of the time. This kind of access and
llvoice" do not necessarily equate with NOW's control
over its representation or its agenda, but they are both
necessary,

if not sufficient, conditions for such

control.
With some important exceptions (such as
homosexuality and poverty) news stories about NOW
represented the range of its issues accurately. And
indeed, the Times silence on the issue of homosexuality
may have also been a kind of llsuccess" for NOW, whose
early leadership at least, found the topic too
controversial and divisive to make it central to the
organization's agenda. 2
NOW was also able to transfer its sense of
importance to news media with several issues, such as
the ERA and sex discrimination in employment, though its
ranking of other issues such as family/child care issues
was less successful.
As chapter eight describes, NOW was also successful
in building legitimacy for itself as a serious civil
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rights organization, though this legitimacy was limited
in important ways and it was only achieved over a long
period of time. From an early period of marginalization
(1966-1970) In which NOW and its goals were generally
trivialized In news, NOW then underwent an overall
legitimation beginning in the early 1970s. By 1980 the
organization was seen as a serious political player and
a champion of "hard won rights" by the Times. In this
later period NOW's treatment was still often critical,
but stories and editorials surrounding NOW's 10th
anniversary indicate that it had corne to be perceived as
a "player" in national politics.

The Limits of Media Access

Despite the considerable reflexive news skills
developed by NOW strategists, the organization and its
discourse were still "processed" in constraining ways by
the Times. NOW's feminist discourse was quite
systematically processed through a pervasive
public/private framework that tended to legitimate (i.e.
put up front as news) those subjects that could most
easily be connected to liberal discourses (e.g. those
traditionally associated with individual rights

and

state or public concerns) and to marginalize or depoliticize others by placing them in the context of
traditional "feminine" or lifestyle contexts. This
placement was not inevitable or determined -- for
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example abortion stories, depending on their context
(i.e. legal or protest) and their writer might be placed
in different locations at different times-- but it was
pervaslve.
A similar process seems to have been in effect for
NOW's organizational legitimacy.

As chapter eight

illustrates, after initially marginalizing
representations, NOW then underwent a general
legitimating process and began to be cited as the
central feminist organization in American public life.
This general increase in NOW's perceived legitimacy,
however, was constrained by the issue and movement
contexts in which NOW appeared. If NOW was being quoted
in the context of its more institutionalized issues -such as sex discrimination in employment,

for example --

the organization was more likely to be treated seriously
than if it was talking about sexism In children's toys.
NOW's increase in organizational legitimacy was
also gained at the expense of other more Hradical"
groups in the movement. In the early 1970s especially,
NOW became a strategic signifier of the acceptable
boundaries of feminism, while the younger branch groups
were credited with more "unreasonable" demands. 3
This Hprocessing" of NOW's identity or agenda was
not itself static over time, however. As news processed
NOW through its public-private framework the contents of
these categories were themselves shifting over time.

353

What news considered an illegitimate issue In 1966 (e.g. 354
"so-called true equality for women") had become by 1981
the legitimate aspect of feminism in the eyes of the
Times.
The NOW-news struggle was both structured and
shifting. It was the result of systematic processing of
NOW by news into legitimate/illegitimate categories. But
it is also clear that some issues and frames move
between these categories over time as a result of
ongoing strategic communication.

NEWS DISCOURSE AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

News functioned as both a resource and a constraint
In NOW's public communication. While news access made it
possible for NOW to communicate to larger publics, news
media also brought to bear on NOW's discourse, its own
discursive categories and structures. In particular, I
argue here, it brought to bear a pervasive publicprivate dichotomy, which news shares with liberal
politics more generally. In this framework, NOW's more
"public" lssues

-- i.e. those that conformed to

conventional news (and liberal political)

judgments of

importance (e.g. employment issues and the ERA), were
highly ranked and placed in the news sections, More
traditionally "private" issues (such as family/child
care concerns) were ranked low (in agenda setting terms)
and placed on women's pages. In filtering NOW's

discourse through this public-private framework, news
was reproducing some of the very constraints that
feminists had set out to negotiate in their attempts to
llmake public ll formerly llprivate"

(and gendered) issues

whose lack of public attention has been a source of
oppreSSlon for women (Fraser, 1992; Butler and Scott,
1992; McDermott, 1994).
The question for NOW, and other new social movement
organizations, then, becomes less whether news can be
understood and used as a resource, but more
strategically, how can the constraints and possibilities
of news -- the structures of news -- be negotiated as a
resource? As Giddens (1984) has noted, structure is both
constraining and enabling. Structure can be oppressive
when it is routinely reproduced through unreflective
practice, but structures can also be enabling when the
llrules" of a system are made accessible to the
participants, who can then use them as resources. It lS
this reflexive appropriation of the llrules" of systems
as resources which challenges deterministic models of
social life.
NOW seems to have been only partially successful in
negotiating the structures of news. The organization did
manage to learn about and use some of the structures of
news -- to reflexively appropriate some of the rules
but there were also areas of news, especially at the
deeper discursive levels, that were not accessible to
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NOW strategists, and could not be incorporated into
their strategic interactions. Generally NOW seems to
have been more successful in learning about and using
the structures of news at the level of practices and
routines, than at the ideological or discursive level.
For example, NOW strategists learned about and used the
event orientation of news, and they planned events In
order to have a chance to talk about issues more
generally. And NOW strategists learned about and used
news convention in their Hsubsidizing H of women
journalists. But the organization was less successful In
negotiating the discursive constraints of news through
which NOW's discourse was processed according to issues
as public (important) or private (less important). These
discursive constraints - which

I

argue here are

manifested in public/private distinctions -- thus became
constraining for NOW's public communication. 4
Giddens (1984) suggests that we can understand
structure as a combination of rules and resources; and
it is by learning about and appropriating those rules
and mobilizing resources that structures become
enabling. But it is necessary first to bring knowledge
of the rules (which are usually deeply embedded in
routines and practices) to the surface for conscious
appropriation. NOW seems to have managed to mobilize
some resources and to learn about and use

some of the

rules involved in news structures. For example, the
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organization appropriated some of the convention of news 357
writing and news gathering. But NOW did not access the
structures (or "rules") of news at the epistemological
level. Yet

it may be that it is these discursive level

constraints of news structures that will be most
critical to the NSMs. As many observers have noted, the
symbolic challenge of the NSMs is often at exactly this
level -- they challenge the parameters of debate and
propose new ways of seeing or relations to one another
and to the world (Boggs 1986; Larana et al, 1994). If
the NSMs are to try and mount this challenge through the
use of news,

it

lS

important that they begin to access

the constraints of news at the discursive level, and
incDrporate that knowledge into their media strategies.

News as an NSM Resource?

News, is a resource, then, but like signification,
or knowledge more generally,

it is a resource whose

strategic use requires that sources articulate their
experiences within its terms. Like other forms of
discourse, news is a system of meaning, one that comes
with its own encoded and implicit assumptions about
reality (Van Dijk, 1988; Hartley, 1982; McDermott,
1995). Using that discourse constrains what it is
possible to say. And it is only by understanding very
well the rules of the discourse that its constraints can
be negotiated or overcome.

Even as NOW leaders strategically and reflexively
translated their concerns into Hnews-speak H the
underlying categories of news discourse (such as that of
pUblic-private divides or legitimate and illegitimate
Hpolitical H issues) were being invoked by both NOW
strategists (as they invoked news conventions) and media
workers to process NOW's feminism. This may not have
been deliberate on the part of news workers. Rather,
news processes feminism through the routine use of the
editorial practices that embody these discursive
categories. The editorial practice of sectioning the
newspaper into HfrontH and HbackH sections (with
corresponding importance) and the Hobviousness" to
journalists of what constitutes real or Hhard" news and
what is Hfeature" or lifestyle material -- and so what
belongs in each of these sections --

is one of the ways

that news institutionalizes the public-private divide
that feminist have noted underlies much liberal
discourse (Fraser, 1990: McLaughlin, 1993).5 In short,
NOW leaders may have become as much Hspoken by" news
discourse as they were its speakers.
This kind of "processing" of movement discourses by
news media is a result, not only of individual
journalists and activists in interaction, or even of
organizational relations, but of the interaction of
different discourses at the epistemological level. When
feminists and journalists interact they bring with them
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two systems of meaning that are also in
interaction. 6 These discourses may draw on fundamentally
different ways of seeing the world.
News discursive categories and processlng may not
In themselves be fatal to movements -- if they can
become known to strategists. Movement communications
strategists have been adept at monitoring and
appropriating aspects of news practices and conventions
more generally -- such as learning about and
manipulating sourcing practices, planning public
"events" and incorporating newsworthiness judgments into
their activities and communications. It may be that they
can also find ways to incorporate and appropriate some
of news' deeper discursive conventions too.
Bruck (1992) has called this approach to struggle
for change one of the "active negotiation of
constraints" in which the goal is to both recognlze and
work against the constraints of dominant discourses and
practices. In this approach it may be unlikely that
movements can abolish the mechanisms of discursive
control that media and other dominant discourses use to
contain meanings in the world in the short term, but
they may through active and strategic, negotiation of
these constraints move issues, ideas and identities from
one category to the other and by doing so (eventually)
undermine the categorization process itself. 7 In the
case of NOW and other feminist groups this means ongoing
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strategic communication to

II

move

II

formerly private
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(domestic, illegitimate) issues into the public
(legitimate, political, open to collective amelioration)
domain.
And, indeed, over time there is some evidence in
this study, and in public shifts more generally, that
feminist strategic communication has moved some issues
and frames from one category to the other. When NOW
first espoused the term "sex discrimination" in 1966,
for example, the Times

did not take it seriously,

noting that a civil rights movement for women was
somewhat ridiculous and presenting IIsex discrimination"
as a ridiculous claim to parallel women's inequality to
rac"e discrimination. But by 1980, sex discrimination
(and the equality/rights framework to which it belongs)
was seen by the Times editors as part of "hard won" and
reasonable feminist agenda. Though NOW's (and other
feminist groups) legitimation was limited, then, without
such strategic interaction it is doubtful if any of this
Hmovement" would have taken place at all.
This kind of Hactive negotiation of constraints"

1S

likely to be successful, however, only if challengers
come to accurately understand and challenge the embedded
assumptions of news structures. In this study NOW was
actively involved in the negotiation of constraints in
the form of news practices and conventions, but it was
also constrained by these conventions at another level.

While learning about and uSlng the HrulesH as resources
at one level

(practice and conventions) the group failed

to see and anticipate the constraints of another level
(epistemological). By becoming aware of such
constraints, their active negotiation may be possible ln
the future.
Some groups will find this kind of strategic
communication more difficult than others -- it requires
resources, skills and the ability (and desire) to frame
one's own discourse and identity in strategic ways. But
it is here

-- in the day-to-day strategic mobilization,

articulation and communication of new knowledges by
social movements

as much as anywhere, that the

possibilities and constraints of social change ln
complex, mediated societies are to be found.
NOTES

1 Some of this increase in legitimacy may also, of
course simply be the result of continuing to exist over
time. Shoemaker (1982) has noted that perceived
legitimacy is constituted partly through viability over
time. But in any case, it was less a cataclysmic shift
in NOW's identity that shifted its perceived legitimacy,
but rather persistent and continuous communication
efforts over time.
2 Mannheim (1991) notes that silence can in fact be a
successful outcome of strategic communication -- keeping
some stories out of the press is sometimes as difficult
as getting others in.
3 NOW also played a role in this differentiation. In
1972/3, media strategists for NOW also began to use the
younger groups radicalism as a way of increasing NOW's
prestige, by differentiating NOW as the Hserious H
feminist group.
4 There is no guarantee of course that knowing about
rules will make it possible to change them, but
certainly not being aware makes it unlike that change
can be attempted.
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5 See chapter three for a discussion of the
"publicizing" aspects of feminism which tries to extend
public concern and state resources to formerly "private"
issues and relations.
6 They also bring with them mUltiple other discourses
such as that of race, sexuality, class, and so on. But
in this discussion I am limiting the complexity of
journalist-strategist interactions to seeing them as
agents of news and feminist discourses.
7 If there is nothing left in the "illegitimate"
category of the dichotomy, then the dichotomy itself
fails to be useful.
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